North Atlantic Treaty Organisation: Need for Reinvention
The
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) started as a defensive organisation
against the Soviet bloc. After the signing of the Treaty of Brussels and
particularly when the conflict between eastern and western Europe over the
German problem assumed a serious proportion, the United States endeavoured to
establish a mutual military assistance organisation with the western countries.
On April 4, 1949, the US, Britain, France, Italy, Canada, Belgium, Denmark,
Luxemburg, Norway, Portugal, Iceland and the Netherlands signed the North
Atlantic Treaty containing 14 provisions. Greece, Turkey, West Germany and many
more countries joined this organisation later.
At
the top of this organisation there are one permanent staff under a Secretary
General and one permanent high level Executive Committee. This organisation
mainly rests on army, navy and air forces supplied by its member states. The North Atlantic Council is the alliance's principal political
body, composed of high-level delegates from each member state. NATO's military
structure is split between two strategic commands: the Supreme Headquarters
Allied Powers Europe located near Mons, Belgium, and the Allied Command
Transformation located in Norfolk, Virginia.
It
is composed of four main commands viz the European Command, The Atlantic Ocean
Command, the Channel Command and the Canada US Regional Planning Group. Although
the alliance has an integrated command, most forces remain under their
respective national commands until NATO-specific operations commence. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe, always a U.S. flag or
general officer heads all NATO military operations. NATO's secretary-general serves a four-year
term as chief administrator and international envoy.
The
primary financial contribution made by member states is the cost of deploying
their respective armed forces for NATO-led operations. (These expenses are not
part of the formal NATO budget, which funds civilian and military
headquarters and certain security infrastructure.) In 2014, NATO members
collectively spent an estimated $850 billion on defence. The United States
accounted for more than 70 percent of this, up from about half during the Cold
War. There is an over-reliance by the Alliance as a whole on the United States
for the provision of essential capabilities, including for instance, in regard
to intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; air-to-air refuelling;
ballistic missile defence; and airborne electronic warfare.
According
to its terms, the signatories have expressed their full confidence in the UN
Charter, have agreed to make peaceful settlement of all disputes among
themselves for international peace, security and justice, have pledged to
encourage economic collaboration among themselves, have agreed to resort to
arms singly or jointly against foreign aggression and also have agreed to put
up joint resistance to foreign aggression until the Security Council would take
necessary measures against the aggressor. In accordance with Article 51 of the
UN Charter, the signatory states have agreed to submit report to the Security
Council in its efforts to maintain international peace and security.
Headquartered
in Brussels, the chief purposes of NATO was to strengthen the military power of
the western countries under US control against the then Soviet or the Eastern
European bloc and to encourage economic collaboration among the participant
countries. In 2016, NATO was pursuing several missions including peacekeeping
in Kosovo; counterterrorism and human-trafficking patrols in the Mediterranean;
counter-piracy off the Horn of Africa; support for African Union forces in
Somalia; security assistance in Afghanistan; and policing the skies over
Eastern Europe apart from efforts targeted at containing a resurgent Russia.
NATO,
being a Cold War mainstay of transatlantic security, has significantly recast
its role in recent years. But while the modern NATO is generally more
recognized for its role beyond rather than within Europe, Russian actions in
recent years, particularly its 2014 intervention in Ukraine, have refocused the
alliance's attention on the continent. Recent
developments have also exposed unresolved tensions over NATO's expansion into
the former Soviet sphere. After the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, the
United States favoured expanding NATO to both extend its security umbrella to
the east and consolidate democratic gains in the former Soviet bloc. On the
other hand, some US officials wished to move away from the Pentagon's
commitments in Europe with the fading of the Soviet threat.
European
NATO members were, however, split on the issue. United Kingdom feared the
organization's expansion would dilute the alliance, while France believed it
would give NATO too much influence. Many in France hoped to integrate former
Soviet states via European institutions. There was also concern about
alienating Russia. To be better able to face the post-Cold War realities, the alliance
launched the Partnership for Peace (PFP). PFP is a program designed
to strengthen ties with Central and Eastern European countries, including many
former Soviet republics like Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia.
Many
defence planners felt that a post–Cold War vision for NATO needed to look
beyond collective defence and focus on confronting acute instability outside
its membership. The breakup of Yugoslavia in early 1990s and the onset of
bloody ethnic conflict tested the alliance on this point almost immediately.
What began as a mission to impose a UN-sanctioned no-fly zone over Bosnia and
Herzegovina evolved into a bombing campaign on Bosnian Serb forces, NATO’s
first ever combat operations in its forty-year history. The operation was
important to ending the conflict in the region.
NATO invoked its collective defence provision
(Article V) for the first time following the September 11 attacks on the United
States, perpetrated by Al-Qaeda. Shortly after US-led forces toppled the
Taliban regime in Kabul, the UN Security Council authorized an International Security Assistance
Force to support the new Afghan government. NATO officially assumed command of
ISAF in 2003, marking its first operational commitment beyond Europe. It was proof
the allies have adapted NATO to dramatically different tasks than what was anticipated
during the Cold War.
The
new provision effectively gives the US-led coalition in Afghanistan the right
to intercept and board vessels suspected of carrying arms or reinforcements for
terror groups that operate in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border areas. It serves
the purpose of legitimising the NATO’s future maritime activities in the Indian
Ocean and the Arabian Sea—an ominous development against the background of the
US’ standoff with Iran.
But
some critics questioned NATO's battlefield cohesion in Afghanistan. Allies
agreed on the central goals of the mission—the stabilization and reconstruction
of Afghanistan—but some members restricted their forces from participating in
counterinsurgency and other missions, a practice known as "national
caveats." Troops from the United States, the UK, Canada, and the
Netherlands saw some of the heaviest fighting and bore the largest casualties,
stirring resentments among alliance states. After thirteen years of war, ISAF
completed its mission in December 2014. In early 2015, NATO and more than a
dozen partner countries began a non-combat support mission of about twelve thousand troops to
provide training, funding, and other assistance to the Afghan government.
NATO
members have also boosted direct security collaboration with Ukraine, an
alliance partner since 1994. But as a non-member, Ukraine remains outside of
NATO's defence perimeter, and there are clear limits on how far it can be
brought into institutional structures. The United States and the UK sent modest
detachments of troops to train Ukrainian personnel in 2015, but the Obama
administration has refrained from providing Kiev with lethal weapons to help
counter the Russia-backed insurgency out of fear that this would escalate the
conflict. In the longer term,
some defence analysts believe the alliance should consider advancing membership
to Finland and Sweden, two Partnership for Peace countries
with a history of avoiding military alignment. Both countries have welcomed
greater military cooperation with NATO following Russia’s recent intervention
in Ukraine.
Moscow,
however, has viewed NATO's post–Cold War expansion into Central and Eastern
Europe with great concern. As of 2016, twelve Partnership for Peace members
have joined NATO. Over the years, NATO and Russia have taken significant steps
toward reconciliation, particularly with their signing of the 1997 Founding Act, which established an official forum
for bilateral discussions. But experts say that a
persistent lack of trust has plagued relations. NATO's Bucharest summit in 2008
deepened the suspicion.
While
the alliance delayed Membership Action Plans for Ukraine and Georgia, it vowed
to support the pair's full membership in the future, despite repeated warnings
from Russia of political and military consequences. Russia's recent invasion of
Georgia was a clear signal of Moscow's intentions to protect what it sees as
its sphere of influence. Russia's
annexation of Crimea and destabilization of eastern Ukraine in 2014–2016, have soured
relations with NATO for the foreseeable future.
Another
perennial point of contention has been NATO's ballistic missile defence shield, which is being
deployed across Europe in several phases. The United States, which developed
the technology, says the system is only designed to guard against limited
missile attacks, particularly strikes from Iran. However, the Russia says the
technology could be updated and may eventually tip the strategic balance toward the West.
Fears
of further Russian aggression have prompted alliance leaders to reassess
defences on the continent, particularly in the East. NATO allies in 2015 agreed
to establish command centres in six eastern periphery states: Bulgaria,
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania. The outposts are expected to
support a new-rapid-reaction force of
about five thousand troops, intended to respond to crises within days. In a
major emergency, NATO military planners say that a force of about forty
thousand can be marshalled. The United States is also planning to shift heavy
military assets, including tanks, into some of these countries.
Meanwhile,
NATO allies, particularly the United States, Denmark, Germany, and the UK have
increased air patrols over Poland and the Baltic states. In 2015, NATO jets scrambled
to intercept Russian warplanes violating allied airspace more than
four hundred times. In December 2015, Turkey-Russia tensions flared after a
Turkish fighter shot down a Russian warplane that Ankara claimed violated its
airspace and ignored repeated warnings. Russia denied the encroachment and said
the incident would have “serious consequences for Russian-Turkish relations.
In
recent times, NATO’s focus has been on the alliance’s switch to a global
strategy, concentrating on operations outside its traditional zone of
responsibility, responding to global challenges and international security and
stability. The NATO mission to the Indian Ocean was undertaken hardly six
months ahead of the April 2008 summit meeting of the NATO in Bucharest,
Romania, where the agenda was expected to be the alliance’s further enlargement
as well as strengthening its capacity and reach to undertake missions with
partners around the globe.
At
the same time, the NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue (1995) and the Istanbul
Cooperation Initiative or ICI (2004) have already brought the alliance from the
eastern Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf region. The NATO presence in the
Persian Gulf took a solid footing when Saudi Arabia became an ICI partner. The
alliance is now set to consider a formal link-up with the Gulf Cooperation
Council comprising Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United
Arab Emirates. Unlike with the
NATO’s Gulf and the Middle Eastern partners, which are all authoritarian
regimes, the alliance prides itself as sharing “common values” with its
partners in the Asia-Pacific. Here, the NATO’s refrain is “common values and
common security threats”. It is easy to see that such exclusivity is intended
to keep out China.
From
Japan’s perspective, a joint security agenda with the NATO would include Asian
nuclear non-proliferation (North Korea and Myanmar), prevention of a
cross-strait conflict between China and Taiwan, and balancing the Shanghai
Cooperation Organisation in which China and Russia play a lead role. Involving
the NATO in northeast Asia’s security problems and ensuring a credible
deterrence against China through increased partnership with the NATO would be
Japan’s optimal aim.
NATO-India Partnership
As
NATO reconfigures for the 21st century for new missions in Africa and South
Asia, and as it advances across the Middle East toward the Indian Ocean looking
for global partnerships, India inevitably figures high in its agenda. A NATO
announcement said the deployment in the Indian Ocean aimed to demonstrate the
alliance’s continuing ability to respond to emerging crisis situations on a
global scale and foster close links with regional navies and other maritime
organisations.
For
any security system in the Asia-Pacific (the US, Japan and Australia), India
remains the prize catch. Equally, without India, the NATO’s partnerships in the
Indian Ocean region would remain inherently weak. Japan has already invited
India to become part of a coalition of Asian democracies. Thus, India was
involved in naval exercises with the US, Japan and Australia in the Bay of
Bengal. These exercises were said to be intended against sea piracy, drug
trafficking and for coordinating disaster relief and humanitarian efforts. But
they were largely seen as templates of a collective security system in the
making, under US leadership. India has been engaged in a strategic dialogue
with the US, Japan and Australia in recent years.
Simultaneously,
the US is pressing for the “inter-operability” of its armed forces with
India’s. Sustained efforts in this direction by both sides are evident. In the
past five years, for instance, more than half of the military exercises held by
India with foreign armed forces have been with the US. Of course,
“inter-operability” with the US armed forces would enable India to partake of
the US’ plans for missile defence systems. The recent Logistic Exchange
Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) is an exercise in this direction.
Any
pronounced gravitation toward an “Asian NATO” form of collective security will
inevitably affect India’s relations with China. Therefore, India has to perform
some very tightrope walking in the times ahead. The challenge for Indian
diplomacy will be to convincingly interpret the implications of its “strategic
partnership” with NATO members including the US. The perception is growing, and
is incrementally gaining credibility, that India is aligning with a US-led
security system in Asia. LEMOA only strengthens this perception.
All
said and done, even though NATO has tried to reinvent itself from being a Cold
War entity directed at containing Russian influence, the situation does not
seem to be much different in its post Cold War avatar as well, given the
continuing one-upmanship with Russia on various accounts. NATO has gone beyond
its core jurisdiction and ventured beyond in its bid to retain its supremacy in
international affairs and it has all done do under US leadership. The fact remains that while NATO’s
existence has weakened the United Nations right from the beginning, it has also
throughout functioned as a frontline organisation for furthering US diplomatic
and strategic interests in the world. It would be more than advisable for NATO
leaders to align its objectives with that of the global community to use its
strength and organisation to tackle the multifarious global challenges
collectively.
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