The Kosovo Problem: Implications for India
Saumitra Mohan

The tinder-box of the Balkans is again in flames and even threatens to spin out of control. The conflict over Kosovo has gone far beyond the "humanitarianism" that informed the collective intervention in Somalia about half a decade back. Even a greenhorn unschooled in international relations can sense the dangerous portents in Yugoslavia. The smoke wafting away from Kosovo may one day garrotte the world if it continues to be a mute spectator over a conflict which has serious implications for the concretizing post-Cold War world order.

Though India has lately undertaken a few proactive steps towards the resolution of the Kosovo tangle, Indian reactions so far have been quite restrained and stopped short of an outright condemnation of the US misadventure in Yugoslavia. The Indian response is informed more by her own substantial economic interests in trade with the US and Europe which together account for more than 40 per cent of the two-way trade with this country. In this context, it would definitely be worth its while to see as to what could be the ramifications and repercussions of the Kosovo crisis and its implications for India. But before that, a small backgrounder of the Kosovo crisis seems to be in order.

The seeds of conflict in Kosovo were sown simultaneously with the NAM (non-aligned movement) appeal to eschew designs for domination. In June 1989, just about two months before the NAM summit in Belgrade, Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic had celebrated in Pristina, the capital of Kosovo, the heroism shown by the Serbs in the war against Turks 600 years ago in 1389.[1] It was a demonstration of Serb chauvinism that had been rearing its head in the post-Tito Yugoslavia. The federalism on the basis of which Tito had evolved composite Yugoslav nationalism by equal treatment to diverse ethnic groups and regions began to be eroded. The result was in the first place, the breaking away of Slovenia and Croatia and subsequently unrest in Bosnia, Kosovo and other ethnic minority regions.

The growth of fissiparous tendencies was seen as an opportunity by the West European nations to expand their sphere of influence. Despite most of the federating units breaking away, Kosovo somehow survived the contagious urge for a separate nation-state. But the smouldering embers of nationalism got fanned by the collusion and connivance of the Western powers and the Dayton Accord in 1995, ironically, provided the last whiff of air needed to turn it into a conflagration. The non-violent resistance of the Kosovar Albanians turned violent and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) accelerated its activities with aid flowing in from the West.

The beginning of 1998 marked a turning-point upsetting the delicate balance that had existed for nearly eight years since the break-up of Yugoslavia. Crucial in this respect were the events unfolding in February 1998 when the Serbian authorities launched a full-scale offensive against the ethnic Albanian populations which by the end of March 1999 had left some four thousand dead and hundreds of thousands taking shelter in neighbouring countries. Attempts of the ‘contact group’ comprising the USA, Britain, Russia, Germany, France and Italy to strike a compromise came unstuck owing to intransigence of Serbia and the KLA. To the KLA, nothing short of independence was acceptable. The 17-days-long peace conference on Kosovo held in Rambouillet, France, in February 1999 failed to achieve any breakthrough. The threat of possible NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) strikes failed to deter Milosevic. Finally, NATO began its air strikes on March, 24, 1999.

The Kosovo crisis has raised sundry questions. The most pronounced one is regarding the legality of the NATO operations. The situation in Kosovo never reached a stage which could not have been managed through diplomacy and in no case was there any ground in international law for legitimating the NATO aggression to force a sovereign country to agree to its territorial disintegration. There is nothing in the UN Charter which would permit such interference in a sovereign country's internal affairs. Article 2, sub-clause 7 of the UN Charter explicitly bars the world body to "intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state".[2] But there could be situations where such interventions could be permitted under the Charter, but the US and her allies never expected to obtain a mandate for armed operations from the UN. Hence, the short shrift to the latter.

Yugoslavia has argued that the attack is unlawful since it had been initiated after bypassing the UN Security Council.[3] It insists that Yugoslav security operations in Kosovo have been those of a sovereign state protecting its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Its actions, Belgrade says, have been directed solely at the KLA, which has been working to detach Kosovo and create a greater Albania. Yugoslavia has told the International Court of Justice (ICJ) that the NATO aggression has claimed more than 1000 civilian lives so far and that 4500 others have been grievously wounded; in addition, there has been massive damage to bridges, factories, schools and hospitals.[4] According to Western media estimates, Yugoslavia may have suffered material loss exceeding 100 billion dollars. According to one analyst, the main US target now is to overthrow Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic who, like Saddam Hussain of Iraq, has dared to defy the sole super power.[5]

Even if the far-fetched allegations about genocide are true, the 1948 International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide does not allow states to use force arbitrarily and is in contravention of the UN Charter[6] in order to prevent genocide. In fact, Washington has set a dangerous precedent in Kosovo. With the UN being sidelined on important issues, the West could try to impose Kosovo like solutions on other countries as well. And after the recent Washing summit of NATO whereby NATO officially assumed the role of a global policeman bypassing the UN Security Council,[7] this is a strong possibility.

Meanwhile, many observers have begun to question the criteria being adopted vis-à-vis Kosovo. Why are the Kurds and Palestinians not being given the same treatment as the Kosovars?[8] Despite the fact that the Kurds demand only autonomy and not independence, the Turkish Army is allowed to go on the offensive against them. One can also ask: will NATO ever send in its planes to bomb Tel Aviv for Israel's non-implementation of the Oslo accords?

As far as India is concerned, some of the fears expressed above extend to India as well. Observers here have argued that, if uncriticised, the US may one day try to play the Daniel in Kashmir as well. Even though a desperate Pakistan has called Kashmir as their Kosovo, let's see how far the comparisons hold.

To begin with, there have not been any large-scale human rights violations in Kashmir to attract the wrath of the super cop and whatever stray incidents have taken place, they have largely taken place due to the exigencies of terrorism. Also, a large number of such human rights violations remain in the nature of allegations and are still unsubstantiated. Unlike Yugoslavia, India has allowed human rights bodies from abroad to check the truth for themselves by visiting Kashmir and there has not been any criticism of serious nature from them.

Then while Kosovo's problem has aggravated due to aiding and abetting from many neighbouring countries aimed at the former's independence, here the Kashmir problem is the handiwork of a single country with sinister designs over Kashmir. Pakistan's involvement in various terrorist activities in this country in general and in Kashmir in particular is well documented. The US State Department itself has from time to time brought out reports confirming active Pakistani involvement in terrorism in Kashmir.

Also, Kashmir is so divided between India and Pakistan that there is no possibility of an independent Kashmir. Pakistan, which has already lost a major part of her territory in 1971, is active in Kashmir only to grab more territory and not to allow an independent country acting as a buffer between India and herself. An independent Kashmir would redound to further Pakistani loss of territory as it would envisage Pakistan also foregoing her part of Kashmir to which it would never agree. To Pakistan, Kashmir's right to self-determination ends at its unification with the former. After the end of the Cold War, Pakistan does not have much geo-strategic significance left for the US. So, with almost no stakes in Kashmir, the US had better let the status quo continue if only to have both the South Asian giants over the barrel.

Again, the so-called independence movement is already petering out in Kashmir as in Punjab and after the installation of a popularly-elected government, the State is back into the electoral process. Fed up with Pak-sponsored terrorism, Kashmiris have come down heavily on Pakistan and have been helping Indian troops lately in fighting terrorism. It is notable that the tip-off on Kargil came from a Kashmiri shepherd.

With India being a vigorous democracy, a major economic partner and a prospective ally vis-à-vis China, the US is not going to alienate India. Not only this, the US is not going to get the same support from her allies in the assumed incursion overriding roughshod over the world public opinion very soon and becoming villain of the piece in the process. Also, if at all the US decides to go on her own in Kashmir, her operations in Kashmir is not going to be as easy as in Yugoslavia. Unlike Yugoslavia, India has a nuclear deterrent in her armoury now and is equipped with Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) and other state-of-the-art weaponry. So, a feeble Yugoslavia may not be able to respond, but the same is not going to be true of India. The US may end up in a situation worse than that of Vietnam and might even get a bloody nose in the exercise.

So, even though India is not Yugoslavia and is a rich multi-religious, multi-cultural, multi-linguistic, multi-national and multi-ethnic country with a good record in Kashmir with much of the stray human rights violations stemming from Pakistan-inspired terrorism, in all likelihood the US is not going to act soon (if at all it does) in Kashmir as the costs involved are substantial. The US quick intervention may also lead to the entire world speaking out against her much to her detriment. So, after the Yugoslav operations, the US would have a prolonged breathing space before setting off on another such venture.

At a time when the post-Cold War world order seems to be consolidating in favour of the sole superpower with a countervailing force yet to emerge, a country of India's size should not bank on anyone else for her security. While she should keep on exploring the possibility of a joint front with Russia and China to act as a counterforce to the US, she should simultaneously start working towards development of an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defence system and Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) with stronger AWACS (Air-borne Warning and Control System). Just because our record is good, the US has no stake in South Asia, India is a major economic partner or Kashmir's is a unique situation owing to Pakistan's disinclination to forego her part of Kashmir; India should not bank on the United State's good sense. She should keep on strengthening her security so as to make her impregnable to any such future aggression.

After the Chagai Nuclear tests, Pakistan has attained parity with India and should have no security threat (if at all one was assumed to be there) from India. So, now there can be no 'relative gains' problem (that India would benefit more from any bilateral cooperation) and it is possible to convert competitive security scenario into a positive-sum game (where both partners benefit) by indulging in functional cooperation in several areas of mutual interest. Nawaz Sharif has slowly been able to assert civilian supremacy in a Pakistan whose history has been marked with military interventions and dictatorships. But, Pakistan still has a long way to go as the military establishment there is still autonomous enough to set the agenda for the civilian authority when it comes to national security. It is hoped that Sharif would one day get out of the time-warp by further restraining the military-bureaucratic establishment without undermining their defence potential and lead his country to work with India in consonance with the Lahore spirit in the interests of both the country and South Asia as a whole.

If somehow it happens, Samuel Huntington's assumed "Clash of Civilisations" would not longer describe the situation in South Asia.
Reference
[1] D.R. Goyal, "US Challenges World Community", Politics India, May 1999, New Delhi, p. 3.

[2] Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice. United Nations Department of Public Information, New York, 1993, p. 5.

[3] D.R. Goyal, op, cit., p.3.

[4] John Cherian, "NATO : Geeting Out of Control", Frontline June 4, 1999, p. 59.
[5] Surendra Kumar "Kosova : Boiling Cauldron of Balkans" Politics India, May 1999, New Delhi, p. 34.
[6] The UN Charter itself vide Article 2, subclause 4 forbids members to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.
[7] Ramesh Chandran, "NATO widens scope for intervention", The Times of India, April 26, 1999, p.1.
[8] John Cherian, "Kasovo Stalemate", Frontline March 26, 1999, p. 51.
(1999)