India's Nuclear Doctrine andPakistan's Reaction
Saumitra Mohan

It was clear from the time India exploded its nuclear device for the second time after a gap of 24 years on May 11 and 13 last year (1998) that it would have to come up with a suitable nuclear doctrine matching its security needs and national interests. And it took it more than a year (thirteen months to be precise) to respond to the strategic need of having an appropriate and sound nuclear doctrine. On August 17 this year (1999), the India bomb was sought to be formalized when the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), the advisory tier of the National Security Council (NSC) presented the draft document of a nuclear doctrine to the government. The draft document has been made public to be debated and discussed thoroughly ahead of its formal adoption by the next elected government. By doing so, India became the first country to put its nuclear doctrine out for debate and discussion to the general public, at least so asserts Brajesh Mishra, the National Security Adviser.

The Indian Doctrine
The document repeated what Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee has already said in Parliament that Indian will maintain a credible minimum nuclear deterrence, which may change according to the changing security environment in the region. India will not be the first to use nuclear weapons, nor will it attack countries which do not possess nuclear capability. However, in case of an attack by another nuclear weapon state, India reserves the right to strike back. There should be enough weapons in its arsenal to be able to inflict punitive destruction on the aggressor. "Nuclear weapons shall be tightly controlled... The authority to release nuclear weapons for use resides in the person of the Prime Minister or the designated successor", says the document.

The Board paper lists five specific nuclear deterrence requirements—sufficient, survivable and operationally prepared nuclear forces, a robust command and control system, and effective intelligence and early warning capabilities. India's nuclear forces will be based on a triad of aircraft, mobile land-based missiles and sea-based assets. Its nuclear profile seems to be no different from that of the other nuclear weapon states and will involve large costs which are yet to be specified.

However, according to NSC member Bharat Karnad, it may cost the country up to Rs. 70,000 crores over a 30-year period, about 6.7 per cent of the GNP today (as a percentage of GNP this figure is likely to come down significantly over the years with the expansion of the national economy). But it is notable that when the US began its nuclear programme, the estimates were similarly lower, but it ended up spending a whopping amount of about $5.5 trillion.

The autonomy of decision-making in the developmental process and in strategic matters is an inalienable democratic right of the Indian people, the document says. It further says that India will strenuously guard this right in a world where nuclear weapons for a select few are sought to be legitimized. The document justifies the decision to go nuclear by pointing to the UN Charter which upholds each country's right to self-defence.
Indian Catches Pakistan Unawares
While naturally the Indian nuclear doctrine has sent alarm bells ringing around the world including the capitals of the Big Five (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council who are the only legitimate nuclear weapon states as well), it has truly caught Pakistan unawares or, at least, so does it seem from her almost frenzied reactions, though a nuclear doctrine in the wake of the Pokharan II nuclear tests by an India determined to secure her frontiers should have been expected and received as something routine. But perhaps Pakistan did not expect it or did not expect it to come so soon. One does get the impression that, at least, since the days of Pokharan II, it is India which has been proactive vis-à-vis Pakistan in terms of policy initiatives and the latter has been found only to be reacting to the Indian initiatives. Even though External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh has sought to allay its fears or those of the world by saying that ‘What India done is acted (sic) in its own interest to enhance the strategic space and autonomy that it has? There is no need for anyone to fear from what, after all, is a discussion paper’

But Pakistan is not amused. Pakistan has since accused India of fuelling an arms race in South Asia and called for a peaceful resolution of disputes dividing the two countries. Pakistan's Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif said on August 22 this year (1999) that ‘it was in the interests of both countries and the region to rise above half a century of mutual hostility and divert resources to economic development.’ He added, ‘it is India which has generated tensions and a race for arms which compelled Pakistan to follow suit to safeguard its security.’

So even as Pakistan indulges in diplomatic posturing and attempts to score some cheap brownie points diplomatically by crying foul and exhorting her mentors in Washington and Beijing to put India on leash so as to save South Asia from sinking further and deeper into the nuclear morass, it has not been simply waiting for the Daniel to come to do justice, but has itself got into the act. Pulling itself by its bootstrap, Pakistan is busy giving final touches to its own nuclear doctrine.

"Pakistan's own nuclear doctrine is in the final stages of being evolved," said Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz on August 19, 1999. The daily Dawn (August 19), quoting sources, said that the proposed Pakistani strategic nuclear restraint regime had made a detailed reference to the need for developing respective command and control systems with a hotline between the two countries. "The development of our nuclear programme will be determined solely by the requirements of our nuclear deterrence capability which is now an indispensable part of our security doctrine," said Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmed the same day.

Pointing to the economic implications of India's nuclear doctrine, the leading Pakistan daily The Nation (August 19) says that India's ambitious nuclear programme as envisaged by its doctrine is actually a clarion call for more poverty and suffering for the vast mass of the Indian people. Says the daily in its editorial:
‘It will only lead to greater instability in the region and has a direct bearing on Pakistan, for if it is not country specific, it does not exclude Pakistan. It is time that Pakistan also made similar preparations and, at least, as publicly as India, for it will not be enough to be told, assured from one high up that necessary measures have been taken. As a responsible member of the international community, Pakistan must prepare a similar policy, certainly without any no-first-use pledge and perhaps with the declaration of an India-specific deterrent.’

After having eaten a humble (and not so scrumptious) pie in Kargil and faced with a toughened India now armed with both a nuclear device and a supportive nuclear doctrine, Pakistan has lately busied itself covering myriad chinks in its armour. It is not only vying with itself framing an autonomous and, at least seemingly, a markedly different nuclear doctrine, it has also been on a shopping binge for acquisition of sophisticated, state-of-art weapons and related technology. Today, despite former Army chief Mirza Aslam Beg's dissuasion that Pakistan should not make the hydrogen or neutron bomb, Pakistan not only claims to have the capability to build the neutron bomb as India does, the father of the Pakistani nuclear bomb Abdul Quadeer Khan also proclaims, rather chivalrously, to have Indian cities like Delhi and Mumbai within the range of Pakistan's Ghauri missile.

Pakistan is reportedly busy preparing for the test-firing of an advanced version of its surface-to-air 'Unza' missile which is said to have an active seven to nine kilometre range. According to a report, the Pakistani Air Force will shortly receive about 100 latest versions of the Chinese F-7 MG light fighter aircraft in a bid to augment its air power. Pakistan is also expected to have received from France eight of the 40 upgraded Mirage aircrafts equipped with latest avionics and delivery of the remaining aircraft is supposed to be completed by the end of this year.

So even as Western analysts and experts along with the Indian peaceniks have raised alarm about a nuclear war being in the offing in South Asia in the wake of the Pokharan II and Chagai nuclear tests, India by producing her nuclear doctrine, which is largely peaceful in nature, has tried to prove that it is no less responsible, if not more, than the Big Five. And even though Pakistan continues to shout from the rooftop, it has also underscored the imperative of maintaining restraint on both sides. And it was in keeping with this sprit that Pakistan expressed willingness to hold talks with India on the nuclear issue. Pakistan Foreign Ministry spokesperson Tariq Altaf said on August 22, 1999 that Pakistan was willing to hold talks with India, but they should revolve around both countries' resolve not to use nuclear weapons. "The talks should not only be for the sake of dialogue, but should be serious, fruitful and result-oriented," he said.

Conclusion

All talk of a supposed arms race and ensuing instability in the region and the global ramifications thereof notwithstanding, it has to be conceded that by producing the first draft of an Indian nuclear doctrine, the NSAB has provided a vital input into a critical area of national policy. While the suitability of the doctrine can and should be debated widely, it is quite remarkable that a Board of highly individualist experts representing virtually the whole spectrum of the Indian strategic opinion has arrived at a consensus. Given also the Indian state's commitment to opaqueness and the alacrity with which it usually buries reports—even vaguely related to national security—in a coffin of files, it is heartening that the recommendations have been publicly released.

Indubitably the draft is a commendable document, but it should not be seen as something which is cast in stone. As it stands, the document raises several problems which need to be fully discussed. The first is that of costs. While the NSAB has wisely avoided quantifying the credible minimum deterrent, its emphasis on survivability and retaliation even in a case of significant degradation by hostile strikes means India's arsenal is not going to be particularly small. In terms of delivery, the draft advocates a triad of aircraft, mobile land-based missile and space-based and other assets to provide early warning, communications, damage/detonation assessment.

When the cost of a robust command and control system is also factored, in it is clear that the fiscal impact will be far greater than what the Vajpayee-led government claimed would be the case after the Pokharan II tests. The NSAB's call for highly effective conventional military capabilities as a complement to the nuclear forces will further increase the financial burden. Secondly, the NSAB doctrine calls for various security and safety-oriented mechanism, but given this country's notorious record of public safety, there are bound to be widespread misgivings on this account.

When the government finds it impossible to prevent even routine train accidents, how competent is it to shoulder the responsibility of handling sufficient, survivable and operationally prepared nuclear forces, should be anybody's guess. The notion of designated successors to the Prime Minister in the event of a decapitating first strike is also bound to raise constitutional and political complications given the fractious nature of India’s polity. Apart from these questions, many other issues will arise following public scrutiny of the document. The scope and opportunity given for this discussion should help to validate both the draft doctrine and the democratic sovereignty it seeks to protect.
 (1998)