National SECURITY MANAGEMENT: Some Reflections
Saumitra Mohan

National security is a term, which is used very loosely today in common parlance. It is often associated with safeguards either against an enemy country's hostile incursions or manoeverings or against armed non-state actors out to challenge the authority of the state and cause irreparable damages to the unity and integrity of the state. However, national security subsumes these aspects and goes much beyond them and is much more inclusive and broader than commonly understood.

The theme of this paper as mentioned at the outset includes three terms namely 'national', 'security' and ‘management’. Before we go on to discuss the theme in detail, it would be better if we seek to understand what these terms stand for. The first of these, i.e. 'national' means something that is related to 'nation' which is regarded as being co-terminus with the 'state'. In case of India, it has often been said that it is more of a 'state-nation' than a 'nation state.' This is an allusion to the plurality of Indian society and to the fact that Indian state has not evolved as a nation like the European ones. Being a multi-cultural and multi-national State, some sections of Indian society are yet to come to terms with the 'imagined' Indian nation.

The common thread that arguably joins different ethno-cultural-linguistic groups within the Indian state is weakened by the idea of an essentially Hindu cultural unity—interpreted in cultural, geographical and religious sense – as it tends to have a sectional flavour and leaves out a sizable chunk of Indian society and often alienates them. The historical reality of partition of British India on the principle of 'Two Nation theory' has its own corrupting influence on the making of the 'state nation'. The disaffection or dissatisfaction of ethno-cultural groups—who define themselves in national terms—often poses security threats, when it matures into separatist or secessionist movements. It has to be properly factored into national security management.

The second and most important of the three terms is 'security'. Security is much more than the mere defence of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country. Security of the nation means her security in every aspect of the national life including political, economic, cultural, environmental and social.

The last of these three terms i.e. 'management' means the process of managing and relates to the administration and regulation of available resource to achieve the organizational goals. So, taken together, 'national security management' means the proper administration and regulation of a country's entire available resources to provide effective security to the nation and its nationals in every sense of the term.

Today, India is facing threats to her security from various quarters. The threats are both from within and from without. The threats are in the forms of outright enemy incursions as reflected in such instances as Kargil, low-intensity proxy war as in Kashmir, threats like nuclear strikes from unidentified sources or non-state actors, refugee influxes from across the border threatening the country politically, culturally and economically, religious fundamentalism, narco-terrorism, proliferation of small arms, many environmental hazards flowing in as a result of indiscriminate use of earth's resources by developed and developing countries, cultural invasion through media and economic insecurity of the country induced both by instability in the world market and inability at the domestic level to cope with changes induced by the forces of globalization.

The hydra-headed problems of poverty, weak economic base, unemployment, narrow regionalism, naxalism, communalism, infra-nationalism, secessionism, corruption, terrorism and weak institutional structure—all pose grave threats to the national security of this country. If we really mean to manage our national security well, then we would have to work at all these levels and take a comprehensive and holistic approach to the issue of national security in the absence of which the continued survival of Indian Nation may be endangered.

Before looking at threats from without, one should try to put one's own house in order. India's image as a 'soft state', as termed by Gunnar Myrdal in his celebrated work Asian Drama, has to be tackled first. This negative image perhaps derives from the fact that key institutional structures of the state are either in shambles or non-functional leading to her incapacitation at many levels and this has paralyzed the economy and polity in irrevocable ways on the one hand and encouraged fissiparous tendencies along the margins on the other. A run-down bureaucracy, a rickety legislature, an indecisive executive and an overall image of a non-performing government does impact negatively on national security.

The first task confronting the Indian state is to raise an effective institutional structure to manage the affairs of the state and this will have its beneficial effect on the issue of national security in the long run.
It is argued that a good infrastructure and responsible government would be of no use unless and until we have a very alert, awakened, responsible and participative civil society. And to have such a civil society, there is a need to invest a lot in the human resource of the state. This would also mean that everyone is well-fed, well-clad and well-cared-for. Otherwise, a starving and unemployed populace often transforms into a disaffected subject and poses new threats to national security, as was also attested to by Kautilya in his famous book, 'Arthashatra'. Moreover, Indian state has to demonstrate its impartiality in the authoritative allocation of values and resources.

It is a fact that the Indian nation is facing lot many challenges from many disgruntled sections of Indian citizenry, because of a perceived bias in terms of value allocation by the Indian State. Hence, the people managing state power have to be careful in securing—what Rawls once said—'distributive justice' for its citizens and they have to ensure that the developmental pie does not get so unevenly distributed as to engender such circumstances which threaten the very survival of the state or nation. It is absolutely necessary to engineer developmental processes in such a manner that all the sections of Indian society are co-opted respectfully into the national mainstream. The government of the state should also see to it that there is no social injustice or inequity in the society as that often engenders social unrest leading to the break-up of the country—as was the case in East Pakistan in 1971. To misquote Machiavelli, the government should not only be doing justice, but should also appear to be just.

Also, the galloping rate of population growth needs to be brought down to match the resources of the country. In has definitely outpaced the resources at its command. The mismatch often creates instability and unrest in the society, which definitely is not good for the country. To ward against this, we need to have a very healthy economy with an efficient industrial and agricultural base. Again, a healthy economy requires good infrastructural base and a good mix of economic policies to support it.

Then, the political culture of a country should also be such as to provide a cushion to its national security. In a country like India, very often, competitive/populist democratic measures create problems like narrow regionalism, communalism, secessionism and infra-nationalism, which also prove suicidal to the national security. So, an effective national security management could be predicated on a reasonably responsible political culture with a very wide democratic base meaning thereby that we need to have an effective all-inclusive participatory democracy.

After we have all the above, we could think of other aspects of our national security. It is often said that India does not have a national security doctrine and it is often said to be toying with a concept of 'strategic ambivalence'. A very reputed security expert, George Tanham also feels that India lacks a 'culture of strategic thinking'. And even after the National Security Advisory Board led by the doyen of Indian strategic think tanks, Mr. K. Subrahmanyam came out with such a doctrine, we have not bothered to accept the same.

India's national security management continues to be ad hocish and reactive. The Kargil Committee Report pointed out many chinks in our security armour and, then, there was a Group of Ministers Report, which visualized many changes in our national security management, but we are yet to see some positive changes on the security front. The National Security Council, formed to effectively manage country's security has proved to be still-born with the government hardly using it as a tool for security management.

All one means to say here is that the government needs to be more serious and systematic about the national security management. It should not only have a crystal clear perspective and policy on national security, but it should also put in place the required institutional structures. National security is a full time job and requires a full time National Security Advisor rather than the one who also works as the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister. The long-felt need to have a Chief of Defense Staff for proper coordination among the different wings of our armed forces also needs to be seriously considered.

At a time when Alvin Toffler's Third Wave' (i.e. communication and information revolution) is sweeping the world, we have to see to it that we are not unsettled by this phenomenon—more so when we claim to be good at it and propose to make India a 'knowledge society'. And to the credit of the government, we already have the Report of the Information Task Force (led first by Jaswant Singh and later by K.C. Pant), which has extensively talked about this aspect of national security. The point one is trying to make here is that we should be ready against any attempt to invade our vast vital database through an information warfare either by enemy states or non-state actors. E-governance and e-security should go hand in hand for best results.

George Washington, the first President of the United States of America, had said, "If you want peace, be prepared for war". So, even though we may be the professed messiah of peace, we should keep our war machine properly oiled—meaning thereby that we need to be extra careful not only about our intelligence-gathering and processing, but we also need to take proper care of the training of our soldiers so as to enable them to face new security challenges more effectively. At a time when we have openly professed to have a nuclear deterrence and have declared to use the same in case there is a nuclear attack against this country, we need to have a very well-managed command, control, communication, intelligence and information (C3I2) system in place otherwise this nuclear God may turn out to be Frankenstein's Monster or our own 'Bhasmasur' which could devour its own creator.

Then for any country to manage its national security well, it is important that she is self-sufficient in her defense procurements. For a very long time, India has been dependent for her defense procurements on Russia or erstwhile USSR. But for an effective national security management, a country should diversify her defense procurements, which India has already been doing as reflected in her procurements from Germany, France, Israel, United States of America, United Kingdom and Netherlands. But as far as possible, it is always advisable that a country should be self-reliant in production of its vital defense equipment otherwise this may expose her weaknesses in times of crisis. And thankfully, India has come out with a 'Vision 2020', which aims at meeting, at least, 70 per cent of her defense requirements through domestic production by the year 2020.

But as mentioned above, today threats to national security comes not only from enemy states, but also from myriad sources and they all need to be attended to for a better national security management. And this is an ea of 'complex interdependence' as described by security experts Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane. Today, it is difficult to define security in terms of 'mine and thine'. Today, security means mutuality of approaches while dealing with security threats from various corners.

So, for tackling security problems like proliferation of small arms, environmental catastrophe, refugee influxes, international energy crisis, food crisis, religious fundamentalism, narco-terrorism, international terrorism and multiple threats from sinister non-state actors, we need to enter into global alliances. There is already a talk of 'Concert of Democracies', but we should also cooperate and collaborate with other countries (which do not carry the democratic labels) with a stake in international peace and security.

Problems of global nature require global cooperation to tackle them and here the high and mighty in the Comity of Nations should realize that they can not continue to be islands of prosperity amid all round deprivation and at a time, when a 'revolution of rising aspirations' is taking place all over the world. After all, instability and insecurity elsewhere does not stop at one's borders. In fact, such phenomena do not recognize borders at all and easily cross over into other's territory, jeopardizing latter's national interests and national security in the process. So, if the affluent countries want to secure their national interests effectively, they have to make compromises so that others, at least, can live a dignified life.
Only, through international cooperation, can a nation manage these aspects of threats to its security, and not by riding roughshod over such endeavours as the United States of America is trying to do by jettisoning the Kyoto Protocol and thereby inviting environmental insecurity for all. One can say that today security of one means security of all. In today's world, Alexander Dumas' famous motto (in his novel, The Three Musketeers), 'all for one and one for all' should be the motto of all the countries, if they are really serious about their national security management.

Even though there are always chances of one or the other country working against such principle of international cooperation, as far as possible, a nation should try to build defenses against war by investing more and more in peace. As the preamble to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization says, "It is in mind that war starts and it is there that the defenses of peace should be built". So, while a country needs to guard against the unwarranted invasion of its national culture, it should also see to it that an international culture of peace and prosperity develops through mutual cooperation and collaboration.

A country not only needs to manage her bilateral and multilateral relations well through effective confidence building measures, but should also try to promote international treaties in disarmament and arms regulation aiming at the larger goal of international peace and security. For this, we also need to have strong international organizations in place and need to provide more teeth to organizations like the United Nations. Besides, potential of such established forums as Non-aligned Movement, G-77, G-24, G-15, ASEAN, SAARC and APEC need to be properly harnessed towards national and international security management as both the issues are intertwined.

Also, as far as possible a nation should try to use its diplomatic resources to the best. It should not only try to presume and neutralize possible enemy moves and manouevrings through confidence building measures and through proper preparations, but should also try to expand her area of cooperation by either co-opting neutral and friendly countries to its side or by trying to get a toe-hold in their area of influence. As about India, one can say that India should strive to be a part of influential regional and international groupings like APEC, Asia-Europe Meeting and United Nations Security Council.

Diplomatic resources should be properly harnessed and deployed for wooing the powerful members of international community to a country's own point of view, for promoting its values, for cooperation is such fields as technological exchange and economic cooperation.

Also, India should utilize Indian diaspora and its resources abroad in such diplomatic exercises. India also has to realize that she cannot make much headway in national security management as long as South Asia remains hostage to the continuous confrontations between India and Pakistan. So, national security for any member country of South Asia should also mean rapprochement between India and Pakistan and only then can the vast resources of the region be properly channeled towards development. Hence, India, as the most powerful country in the region has to see to it that Cold War, which has ended elsewhere, ends in South Asia as well.
Apart from all the above, it is always advisable to have an inner circle of close allies and in India's case, such allies could be Russia, Israel, China and France and at the same time India can improve its strategic relationship with the USA. There is already a talk of a 'strategic triangle' among India, Russia and China. India should seriously explore the feasibility of such a concept.

To conclude, one can say that an effective national security management requires strong institutions, a responsible government, an effective national security policy, a participative and vibrant civil society, a just social structure, a well-oiled economic and political system with a sense of distributive justice, a healthy culture of peace, a better war-preparedness, a good diplomatic machinery and cascading international cooperation in different spheres through continuous confidence building measures.
 (2002)

Middle East Peace Process: An Overview
Saumitra Mohan

Since the conclusion of a peace accord between the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and the State of Israel, on September 13, 1993, the peace process in that conflict-ridden region has generated a lot of hopes for the elusive peace there, which finally seems to be within the reach. The peace accord on that fateful day marked the beginning of a credible settlement of the contentious Palestine question, which had cast its baneful shadow on almost all events and developments in the region for close to three quarters of a century. Though still not fully settled, the entire peace process shows as to what could be achieved if the requisite political will is there in abundance to take on a problem which for long evaded a solution acceptable to both the parties.

The conflicting claims of the Jewish and Palestinian people lay at the heart of the Palestine question. The Jews staked their claim on Palestine because it was the seat of the ancient Kingdom of Israel from which they had been expelled by the Babylonians, and later once again dispersed by the Romans, in the distant past. During their long diaspora in Europe, the Jews endured discrimination and injustice at the hands of the European Gentiles. Towards the end of messianic movement, called the World Zionist Organisation, which promised resurrection of a Jewish national state in Palestine, this object could be achieved only at the expense of the Palestinians, who had been living in that country since time immemorial.

When, soon after the First World War, Jews from Europe began to enter Palestine under the protection of British arms to set up a Jewish national home, the seeds of a Jewish-Palestinian conflict were sown. Subsequently, as more Jews fleeing Hitler's persecution in Germany began to enter Palestine, Jewish-Palestinian frictions assumed grave proportions. During its 30 years rule as a mandatory power, Britain made a terrible mess in Palestine and, at the end of the Second World War, decided to hand over responsibility to the United Nations. Whereupon, the United States of America, the home of the largest concentration of Jewish population in the world after the holocaust in Hitler's Germany affecting six million Jews, jumped into the fray to muster a two-thirds majority in the UN General Assembly for creating a Jewish state in a good part of Palestine, leaving the rest for the Palestinians.

There was, thus, an international entanglement in Palestine which assumed sharper dimensions when, in the years following creation of Israel, in May 1948, American patronage of Israel was matched by Soviet support for the Palestinians and the neighbouring Arab States, which vociferously opposed the rise of Israel. In so far as the Arab States surrounding Palestine viewed Israel as an imperialist transplant in their midst and resisted its emergence by means of arms, the Palestine question took on a Arab-Israel dimension as well.

The Palestine question, as it stood in the aftermath of partition, centred on two issues; land and people. Partition opened the way for the in-gathering of the Jewish diaspora in Israel and the simultaneous expulsion of some 800,000 Palestinians from their homes. Some more lost their homes as a consequence of the 1967 Arab-Israel War. Current estimates put the total number of Palestinians at over six million. Of this two million live in the occupied lands including East Jerusalem, one million in Jordan and another one million in Israel proper. The remaining two million are refugees scattered all over the world. Hence, with the exception of those who have become nationals of Israel or Jordan, the vast majority of the Palestinians live either under Israeli military occupation or as refugees.

As for the land, Israel took over in 1948 some 77 per cent of the Palestinian territory, even though the UN partition plan had assigned it only 55 per cent of the total. During the 1967 war, Israel seized the remaining 23 per cent as well. In addition, Israel took possession of the Golan Heights and the Sinai Peninsula, belonging respectively to Syria and Egypt. Soon after, Israel started setting up Jewish settlements in the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem. The Palestinians were thus deprived of a good chunk of their best agricultural and urban lands for the benefits of Jewish settlers.

It is important to note that, for nearly 20 years following the establishment of Israel, the Palestinians depended entirely on the frontline Arab States to fight for their rights. However, after the shattering defeat of Egypt, Syria and Jordan at the hands of Israel in the 1967 war, the Palestinians resolved to organise themselves to carry on their struggle for self-determination and for an independent Palestine State. Al Fatah, founded in 1965, joined the umbrella organization, called the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), in 1968. Other guerrilla formations followed Al Fatah in 1969. The PLO carried out hit-and-run battles against Israel from its Jordanian base until 1970, when it moved into Lebanon, following a bloody show-down with King Hussein’s army. In 1982, the Israelis invaded Lebanon to flush out the Palestinians from their bases in that country. The PLO then shifted to far away Tunis in North Africa. This marked the beginning of a lean phase in the fortunes of PLO, which, however, turned out to be the proverbial lull before the storm. December 1987 witnessed the outbreak of the intifada, or the Palestinian uprising, in the occupied West Bank and Gaza.

It is necessary also to mention some major international efforts towards unraveling the Palestine tangle. The Security Council resolution 242 of November 22, 1967, emphasizing inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by conquest, called for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from territories occupied in the June 1967 war and the termination of belligerency between the regional states (tacitly implying recognition of Israel by the frontline Arab States). With its overwhelming military superiority over the Arabs, the Israelis did not feel obliged to comply with the Security Council resolution until after the October 1973 war, which created the setting for American mediation. The Camp David Agreements of 1978 envisaged a comprehensive peace, including the creation of an autonomous Palestine in federal linkage with Jordan. But its immediate outcome was separate peace between Israel and Egypt. The core issue of Palestine was sidelined. The same held good for the Golan Heights. It, indeed, needed catalysts of the magnitude of the Gulf War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, which left America as the unchallenged power in the region, to break the impasse.

Over the years, the Palestinian cause gained strong international support, especially in the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) and at the United Nations. In November 1974, Yasser Arafat, Chairman of PLO, was invited by the UN General Assembly to address its special session which subsequently adopted a resolution reaffirming the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people in Palestine, including (a) the right to self-determination without external interference; and (b) and right to national independence and sovereignty. Mention must also be made of India's unwavering support to Palestinian rights, going back to the 1920's, when India itself was engaged in a titanic struggle for freedom from the British rule.

What gave a real big push forward to peace efforts more recently was the combined effect of Intifada, the outcome of the Gulf War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. It generated potent incentives for the three principal actors-the PLO, Israel and the United States-to start moving in the same direction with unprecedented resolve.

The United States achieved a decisive victory in the Gulf War, securing in the process, its own vital interest in the region's oil, as well as its market. The collapse and disintegration of the Soviet Union, which more or less coincided with the Gulf War, left America as an unchallenged power in the entire West Asian region. In the emergent situation, it was not in America's best interest to allow the chronic Arab-Israel problem to fester. Nor could the image of an America underwriting Israel's territorial expansions through military, economic and diplomatic support, be an asset to what followed on September 10, by exchange of mutual recognition by the PLO and Israel. On that day, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin signed a short letter recognizing the PLO as the "representative of the Palestinian People" and pledging to negotiate peace with that Organisation. PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat reciprocated by recognizing the "right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security" and committing the PLO to "a peaceful resolution of the conflict". He further affirmed that these articles of the Palestine Charter, adopted by the PLO in 1968, "which deny Israel's right to exist" and any other provisions that are "inconsistent with the commitments of this letter, are now inoperative and invalid".

Finally, at a historic ceremony at the White House in Washington, on September 13, 1993, Rabin and Arafat promised to end long years of enmity and mistrust between their peoples, as Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and PLO executive member Mahmood Abbas signed Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles (DOP), the epoch-making agreement heralding peace. The DOP, inter alia, called for concluding an agreement by December 13, 1993, on Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho and the structure of the withdrawal; compelling Israeli withdrawal and transferring authority in Gaza and Jericho to the Palestinians by April 13, 1994; elections for an interim self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza by July 13, 1994.

The Israeli-Palestinian negotiations on the implementation of the first stages of the DOP began in Cairo and the Red Sea resort of Taba on October 13, 1993. However, due to the serious differences, for example, different definitions on what constituted the geographical area of Jericho, release of Palestinian political prisoners in Israeli prisons, and violence in West Bank and Gaza, the agreement could not be implemented.

In January 1994, Yasser Arafat and Shimon Peres met in Switzerland to resolve the differences that were preventing the signing of an agreement on the implementation of the Gaza-Jericho component of the DOP. Sufficient progress was made and an agreement was reached on most of the issues. However, there was no resolution of the dispute over the size of Jericho enclave.
The peace process suffered a setback again in February 1994, When Baruch Goldstein, an American-born adherent of the extremist Kach movement carried out an armed attack on Palestinian worshippers in Hebron. In the beginning of April 1994, the PLO agreed to resume negotiations with Israel and amidst the unabated violence, the Israeli and the PLO officials signed the agreement on the implementation of the autonomy for Gaza Strip and Jericho on May 4, 1994 in Cairo. In the same month the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) evacuated the Gaza Strip and Jericho area and the Palestinian forces replaced them. For the first time, the PLO succeeded in establishing itself inside Palestine.

In the meantime, Israel signed a peace treaty with Jordan and it was feared that having achieved peace with Jordan, the Israeli government would not be pressed to pursue the negotiations on implementing the DOP. As feared, the negotiations were deadlocked by autumn of 1994. Though an ‘Early Empowerment Agreement’ was reached between them for the transfer of control in the fields of education, tourism, health and social welfare from the Israeli civil administration to the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), it did nothing to resolve the other serious differences.

On the other hand, the series of violent incidents intensified when Israel decided to expand its settlements. At the end of April 1995, Rabin supported the construction of 7,000 new homes in East Jerusalem and announced plans to confiscate 130 acres of Arab land to facilitate the project. The deadlock over the signing of the Israeli-Palestinian agreement on the interim stage of Oslo II was broken and the two sides signed the Taba Agreement on September 28, 1995, which set the terms for the second stage of the peace process. In accordance with the Taba Agreement, the IDF began its phased redeployment on the West Bank in mid-October 1995, which was completed by the end of 1995. It opened the way for elections to the Palestinian Legislative Council.

In Israel, the elections in May 1996 brought the right wing back to power. Benyamin Netanyahu, associated with the nationalist hardliners in the Likud Party became the Prime Minister. His pre-election pronouncements included total opposition to the Palestinian self-determination and no change in the status of Jerusalem. Though he pledged to continue the peace process, his policies ran counter to the Palestinian expectations. Netanyahu announced the establishment of eight new settlements in West Bank. The Israeli Defence Minister, Yitzhak Mordechai, decided to reintroduce IDF undercover units to the West Bank and to expand their operations to include areas of PNA- Palestine National Authority control. In the first official contact between the PNA and the Netanyahu government, the Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs, David Levy, informed the PLO leaders, that there would be no progress on resolving the outstanding issues of the interim phase period until certain conditions were fulfilled.

The implementation of the agreement of September 1995 on redeployment from Hebron had been postponed. During the electoral campaign, Netanyahu insisted on revising the terms of the agreement before committing himself to redeployment. Netanyahu and Arafat signed the Hebron agreement on the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Hebron on January 15, 1997, According to this, Israel accepted a proposal to complete its final West Bank redeployment by March 1998.

In addition, Israel agreed to begin immediate discussion on the outstanding interim issues of Oslo II, most notably the question of Palestinian detainees, Gaza airport and a West Bank-Gaza corridor. Also, in order to please the Israeli rightists Netanyahu decided to build 6500 new Jewish settlements at Har Homa (or Abu Ghneim), a hill-top between East Jerusalem and Bethlehem. As a result of these settlements, the negotiations were suspended by March 1997.

All this led to the renewed US efforts to save the Oslo process. The Clinton Administration pressed Israel for a pull back from at least an additional 10 per cent of the West Bank, which Israel did not accept. On the contrary, it offered a withdrawal from less than 10 per cent of the West Bank, in three phases over several months. In other words, it wanted to carry out only one withdrawal from the West bank matched by the reciprocal Palestinian actions against terrorism, before final status negotiations on a permanent settlement were held.

To achieve a breakthrough, the Clinton Administration called on Israel to withdraw from 13.1 per cent of the West Bank during second of the three slated interim stage pullbacks from the occupied Palestinian territory, over a period of three months, in exchange for specific Palestinian security measures. While Arafat agreed to the US plan, Netanyahu refused to accept it.

The US efforts led to the signing of the Wye River Accord between Israel and the Palestinians in October 1998. This agreement stipulated that the two sides will embark within a few days on direct negotiations on final status issues namely Jerusalem, the colonies (the settlements), refugees, border and water. The agreement also provided for an Israeli withdrawal from 13 per cent of the West Bank to be carried out in three stages. It also provided for the release of the 750 prisoners from occupation jails and the establishment of two safe passages between the West bank and Gaza. The agreement also called for starting work on the airport and forming a special committee to begin work on the Gaza sea port and forming a bilateral Palestinian-Israeli committee that will discuss over a period of four months the third Israeli redeployment in accordance with the letter of assurance of former US Secretary of State Warren Christopher. As far as the security was concerned, this agreement included an independent security document that outlined the measures that need to be taken by both sides regarding security. Regarding unilateral measures, it was agreed that the US President Bill Clinton will address separate letters to the Palestinian and the Israeli sides specifying each side’s commitment to refrain from taking unilateral measures that would affect the status quo of matters on the ground.

Regarding the clause forbidding the unilateral steps, Netanyahu held that it did not apply to building new settlements but to the Palestinians, who could not unilaterally declare a Palestinian State. Netanyahu by the present accord had delayed the third Israeli redeployment under the Oslo accords, while final status talks were to start ten days after the memorandum entered into force. Even after these agreements were signed, he continued to build new Jewish settlements and expand the existing ones.

In December 1998, Israel suspended the implementation of the accord, charging the Palestinians with failing to carry out their obligations. He listed five conditions, which he expected the Palestinians to fulfil. Those were: Palestinians must uphold their commitments, they must withdraw their intention to declare the establishment of a Palestinian State and their intention to declare Jerusalem as its capital, and that they must stop violence. Israel would not release prisoners with blood on their hands and that Palestinians must remove all illegal weapons.

Yasser Arafat embarked on a campaign in order to consult the Arabs and other countries regarding the controversial plan to declare the Palestinian Statehood by May 4, 1999, to persuade them to support the declaration and to urge Israel to implement the Wye Plantation Land-for-Security Accord. All the States whom he had consulted were in favour of postponing the declaration. The establishment of the Palestinian State was hence deferred as it required international support and recognition.

Moreover, Israeli election, which was on the cards, was also a factor in Arafat's decision of postponing the declaration of Palestinian State as Netanyahu was threatened from within his coalition especially by the National Religious Party, that the government would be brought down, if he handed over more territories to the Palestinians. The difficulties in his cabinet made the election inevitable. During the election, Ehud Barak, Netanyahu's main rival from the Labour Party registered a decisive victory over him. With the sidelining of the Netanyahu government, the prospects of peace in the Middle East became bright. Resolution of issues related to the Palestinians could now be hoped for.

Barak projected himself as being security-oriented, but willing to reactivate the peace process with the Palestinians. He promised a Palestinian State within four security red lines which were: a united Jerusalem under Israel's sovereignty as the capital of Israel, no return to 1967 borders, no foreign army west of Jordan River and most of the settlers in West Bank and Gaza will be in settlement blocs under Israeli sovereignty.

During his time, the differences between the Israelis and the Palestinians continued on setting the timetable for redeployment, safe passage, seaport and economic issues. There was also a wide disagreement on the release of Palestinian prisoners by Israel.

However, in order to implement the Wye River Accord, "Sharm El Sheikh Agreement" was signed between Israel and the Palestinians in the first week of September 1999. According to this agreement, talks on the permanent status between Israel and the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) have opened. A framework agreement outlining the permanent status principles would be reached by February 2000 and the permanent status agreement would be drafted within a year (by September 2000). With the completion of troop redeployments, as the agreement envisages, the PNA will exercise control over civil affairs in 40 per cent of the West Bank. It will also be in-charge of security affairs in a part of the 40 per cent of the West Bank, while Israel will retain an overall supervisory role in respect of security affairs in the remaining area. Sixty per cent of the West Bank will remain under full Israeli control in respect of civil and security matters.

Within the next few months the two sides are scheduled to firm up an agreement on the opening of a seaport in the Gaza Strip. If this deal does come through, then Palestinians, whether living in the Gaza Strip or the West Bank, will be able to ship their produce out without being dependent on the Israelis or the Jordanians. The seaport is likely to remain under some form of Israeli control like the airport that was opened earlier this year, but, at least, the delays and other forms of harassment will be reduced. With the signing of the Wye II agreement, Israel reconfirmed the plans to open a safe corridor between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.

As the Israelis and the Palestinians set out on the road to a final peace, both sides defiantly laid down their own terms. Israel is adamant that it would come to the permanent status discussions guided by four security red lines spelled by Barak. The Palestinian side too outlined a list of demands sharply at odds with the Israeli position. They aspired to live within the borders of an independent Palestinian State on June 4, 1967 boundaries, with holy Jerusalem as its capital. They also demanded full cessation of all Israeli settlement activities.

Today, PNA President Yasser Arafat is accorded the protocol due to a head of a sovereign state whenever he makes a diplomatic excursion and his officials are treated like representatives of a full-fledged government. It is also more than likely that most countries will extend recognition to the Palestinian State if Arafat declares statehood in a reasonable and responsible context and now in keeping with the spirit of the Wye II agreement whereby he is not supposed to act unilaterally, that is without taking Israel into confidence. Israel is keen to restrict the Palestinian's treaty-making powers so that they do not make alliances with countries hostile to Israel.

Arafat seems to have little hope of regaining those portions along the "Green Line" (the border between Israel and the West Bank after the 1948 armistice until the 1967 war), which Israel has built as if it was its own territory. About 90 per cent of the Israelis in the West bank live in this thickened "Green Line" and successive Israeli governments have indicated that they will not let go these areas of land. Both Arafat and Barak would have to find a suitable middle ground so as to come to an understanding in respect of these areas without compromising each other's vital interests.

Today, about five million Palestinians live in refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon and the Gaza Strip, not to count others scattered all over the world. Since they are classified as refugees, they are entitled to return to the lands from which they were ousted, which means to sites that are now part of Israel. But it is inconceivable that Israel can be persuaded to allow the Palestinian refugees to return to Israel proper. It has taken a tough position on allowing the refugees to return even to the territories that it will hand over to the Palestinian Authority. Besides, Israelis also nurture a fear that the Palestinians might block their access to holy sites in and around the Walled City, if East Jerusalem were to be handed over to them.

In fact, there are many scruples which keep haunting both the parties, and both harbour doubts about each other's real intentions but notwithstanding that, they would have to move along the extant path of peace if only to give peace and security in that hapless region a chance.

Given the sharply divided views, no immediate solution seems to be in sight. It requires a tremendous amount of hope to believe that the talks would be settled in favour of both the parties. Bark seems to be dodging already—"If the two sides do not agree to as outlined by February (2000), they might have to settle for mutually agreed long term interim agreements on most issues". This would mean that they would fail to get a genuine final peace accord. He has pledged to strengthen the largest Jewish settlement in the West Bank, Malleh Adumin and intends on cultivating the hard-liners even as he moves to revive the peace process. The talks on issues particularly "Jerusalem" and "settlements" might take months. One wonders if it would be settled on Israeli terms.

Barak is, as one observer says, 'fortunate to have the international community, including the United States, on his side'. With all hopes pinned on him, the day is not far when the peace that has eluded the region for years would prevail between the Israelis and the Palestinians.
(1999)

The Kosovo Problem: Implications for India
Saumitra Mohan

The tinder-box of the Balkans is again in flames and even threatens to spin out of control. The conflict over Kosovo has gone far beyond the "humanitarianism" that informed the collective intervention in Somalia about half a decade back. Even a greenhorn unschooled in international relations can sense the dangerous portents in Yugoslavia. The smoke wafting away from Kosovo may one day garrotte the world if it continues to be a mute spectator over a conflict which has serious implications for the concretizing post-Cold War world order.

Though India has lately undertaken a few proactive steps towards the resolution of the Kosovo tangle, Indian reactions so far have been quite restrained and stopped short of an outright condemnation of the US misadventure in Yugoslavia. The Indian response is informed more by her own substantial economic interests in trade with the US and Europe which together account for more than 40 per cent of the two-way trade with this country. In this context, it would definitely be worth its while to see as to what could be the ramifications and repercussions of the Kosovo crisis and its implications for India. But before that, a small backgrounder of the Kosovo crisis seems to be in order.

The seeds of conflict in Kosovo were sown simultaneously with the NAM (non-aligned movement) appeal to eschew designs for domination. In June 1989, just about two months before the NAM summit in Belgrade, Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic had celebrated in Pristina, the capital of Kosovo, the heroism shown by the Serbs in the war against Turks 600 years ago in 1389.[1] It was a demonstration of Serb chauvinism that had been rearing its head in the post-Tito Yugoslavia. The federalism on the basis of which Tito had evolved composite Yugoslav nationalism by equal treatment to diverse ethnic groups and regions began to be eroded. The result was in the first place, the breaking away of Slovenia and Croatia and subsequently unrest in Bosnia, Kosovo and other ethnic minority regions.

The growth of fissiparous tendencies was seen as an opportunity by the West European nations to expand their sphere of influence. Despite most of the federating units breaking away, Kosovo somehow survived the contagious urge for a separate nation-state. But the smouldering embers of nationalism got fanned by the collusion and connivance of the Western powers and the Dayton Accord in 1995, ironically, provided the last whiff of air needed to turn it into a conflagration. The non-violent resistance of the Kosovar Albanians turned violent and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) accelerated its activities with aid flowing in from the West.

The beginning of 1998 marked a turning-point upsetting the delicate balance that had existed for nearly eight years since the break-up of Yugoslavia. Crucial in this respect were the events unfolding in February 1998 when the Serbian authorities launched a full-scale offensive against the ethnic Albanian populations which by the end of March 1999 had left some four thousand dead and hundreds of thousands taking shelter in neighbouring countries. Attempts of the ‘contact group’ comprising the USA, Britain, Russia, Germany, France and Italy to strike a compromise came unstuck owing to intransigence of Serbia and the KLA. To the KLA, nothing short of independence was acceptable. The 17-days-long peace conference on Kosovo held in Rambouillet, France, in February 1999 failed to achieve any breakthrough. The threat of possible NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) strikes failed to deter Milosevic. Finally, NATO began its air strikes on March, 24, 1999.

The Kosovo crisis has raised sundry questions. The most pronounced one is regarding the legality of the NATO operations. The situation in Kosovo never reached a stage which could not have been managed through diplomacy and in no case was there any ground in international law for legitimating the NATO aggression to force a sovereign country to agree to its territorial disintegration. There is nothing in the UN Charter which would permit such interference in a sovereign country's internal affairs. Article 2, sub-clause 7 of the UN Charter explicitly bars the world body to "intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state".[2] But there could be situations where such interventions could be permitted under the Charter, but the US and her allies never expected to obtain a mandate for armed operations from the UN. Hence, the short shrift to the latter.

Yugoslavia has argued that the attack is unlawful since it had been initiated after bypassing the UN Security Council.[3] It insists that Yugoslav security operations in Kosovo have been those of a sovereign state protecting its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Its actions, Belgrade says, have been directed solely at the KLA, which has been working to detach Kosovo and create a greater Albania. Yugoslavia has told the International Court of Justice (ICJ) that the NATO aggression has claimed more than 1000 civilian lives so far and that 4500 others have been grievously wounded; in addition, there has been massive damage to bridges, factories, schools and hospitals.[4] According to Western media estimates, Yugoslavia may have suffered material loss exceeding 100 billion dollars. According to one analyst, the main US target now is to overthrow Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic who, like Saddam Hussain of Iraq, has dared to defy the sole super power.[5]

Even if the far-fetched allegations about genocide are true, the 1948 International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide does not allow states to use force arbitrarily and is in contravention of the UN Charter[6] in order to prevent genocide. In fact, Washington has set a dangerous precedent in Kosovo. With the UN being sidelined on important issues, the West could try to impose Kosovo like solutions on other countries as well. And after the recent Washing summit of NATO whereby NATO officially assumed the role of a global policeman bypassing the UN Security Council,[7] this is a strong possibility.

Meanwhile, many observers have begun to question the criteria being adopted vis-à-vis Kosovo. Why are the Kurds and Palestinians not being given the same treatment as the Kosovars?[8] Despite the fact that the Kurds demand only autonomy and not independence, the Turkish Army is allowed to go on the offensive against them. One can also ask: will NATO ever send in its planes to bomb Tel Aviv for Israel's non-implementation of the Oslo accords?

As far as India is concerned, some of the fears expressed above extend to India as well. Observers here have argued that, if uncriticised, the US may one day try to play the Daniel in Kashmir as well. Even though a desperate Pakistan has called Kashmir as their Kosovo, let's see how far the comparisons hold.

To begin with, there have not been any large-scale human rights violations in Kashmir to attract the wrath of the super cop and whatever stray incidents have taken place, they have largely taken place due to the exigencies of terrorism. Also, a large number of such human rights violations remain in the nature of allegations and are still unsubstantiated. Unlike Yugoslavia, India has allowed human rights bodies from abroad to check the truth for themselves by visiting Kashmir and there has not been any criticism of serious nature from them.

Then while Kosovo's problem has aggravated due to aiding and abetting from many neighbouring countries aimed at the former's independence, here the Kashmir problem is the handiwork of a single country with sinister designs over Kashmir. Pakistan's involvement in various terrorist activities in this country in general and in Kashmir in particular is well documented. The US State Department itself has from time to time brought out reports confirming active Pakistani involvement in terrorism in Kashmir.

Also, Kashmir is so divided between India and Pakistan that there is no possibility of an independent Kashmir. Pakistan, which has already lost a major part of her territory in 1971, is active in Kashmir only to grab more territory and not to allow an independent country acting as a buffer between India and herself. An independent Kashmir would redound to further Pakistani loss of territory as it would envisage Pakistan also foregoing her part of Kashmir to which it would never agree. To Pakistan, Kashmir's right to self-determination ends at its unification with the former. After the end of the Cold War, Pakistan does not have much geo-strategic significance left for the US. So, with almost no stakes in Kashmir, the US had better let the status quo continue if only to have both the South Asian giants over the barrel.

Again, the so-called independence movement is already petering out in Kashmir as in Punjab and after the installation of a popularly-elected government, the State is back into the electoral process. Fed up with Pak-sponsored terrorism, Kashmiris have come down heavily on Pakistan and have been helping Indian troops lately in fighting terrorism. It is notable that the tip-off on Kargil came from a Kashmiri shepherd.

With India being a vigorous democracy, a major economic partner and a prospective ally vis-à-vis China, the US is not going to alienate India. Not only this, the US is not going to get the same support from her allies in the assumed incursion overriding roughshod over the world public opinion very soon and becoming villain of the piece in the process. Also, if at all the US decides to go on her own in Kashmir, her operations in Kashmir is not going to be as easy as in Yugoslavia. Unlike Yugoslavia, India has a nuclear deterrent in her armoury now and is equipped with Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) and other state-of-the-art weaponry. So, a feeble Yugoslavia may not be able to respond, but the same is not going to be true of India. The US may end up in a situation worse than that of Vietnam and might even get a bloody nose in the exercise.

So, even though India is not Yugoslavia and is a rich multi-religious, multi-cultural, multi-linguistic, multi-national and multi-ethnic country with a good record in Kashmir with much of the stray human rights violations stemming from Pakistan-inspired terrorism, in all likelihood the US is not going to act soon (if at all it does) in Kashmir as the costs involved are substantial. The US quick intervention may also lead to the entire world speaking out against her much to her detriment. So, after the Yugoslav operations, the US would have a prolonged breathing space before setting off on another such venture.

At a time when the post-Cold War world order seems to be consolidating in favour of the sole superpower with a countervailing force yet to emerge, a country of India's size should not bank on anyone else for her security. While she should keep on exploring the possibility of a joint front with Russia and China to act as a counterforce to the US, she should simultaneously start working towards development of an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defence system and Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) with stronger AWACS (Air-borne Warning and Control System). Just because our record is good, the US has no stake in South Asia, India is a major economic partner or Kashmir's is a unique situation owing to Pakistan's disinclination to forego her part of Kashmir; India should not bank on the United State's good sense. She should keep on strengthening her security so as to make her impregnable to any such future aggression.

After the Chagai Nuclear tests, Pakistan has attained parity with India and should have no security threat (if at all one was assumed to be there) from India. So, now there can be no 'relative gains' problem (that India would benefit more from any bilateral cooperation) and it is possible to convert competitive security scenario into a positive-sum game (where both partners benefit) by indulging in functional cooperation in several areas of mutual interest. Nawaz Sharif has slowly been able to assert civilian supremacy in a Pakistan whose history has been marked with military interventions and dictatorships. But, Pakistan still has a long way to go as the military establishment there is still autonomous enough to set the agenda for the civilian authority when it comes to national security. It is hoped that Sharif would one day get out of the time-warp by further restraining the military-bureaucratic establishment without undermining their defence potential and lead his country to work with India in consonance with the Lahore spirit in the interests of both the country and South Asia as a whole.

If somehow it happens, Samuel Huntington's assumed "Clash of Civilisations" would not longer describe the situation in South Asia.
Reference
[1] D.R. Goyal, "US Challenges World Community", Politics India, May 1999, New Delhi, p. 3.

[2] Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice. United Nations Department of Public Information, New York, 1993, p. 5.

[3] D.R. Goyal, op, cit., p.3.

[4] John Cherian, "NATO : Geeting Out of Control", Frontline June 4, 1999, p. 59.
[5] Surendra Kumar "Kosova : Boiling Cauldron of Balkans" Politics India, May 1999, New Delhi, p. 34.
[6] The UN Charter itself vide Article 2, subclause 4 forbids members to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.
[7] Ramesh Chandran, "NATO widens scope for intervention", The Times of India, April 26, 1999, p.1.
[8] John Cherian, "Kasovo Stalemate", Frontline March 26, 1999, p. 51.
(1999)

KASHMIR: THE Pakistani Perspective
Saumitra Mohan
Kashmir is a long festering dispute between India and Pakistan spoiling for a just solution to provide succour to all the parties involved. On its resolution depends not only the future of South Asia, but that of world peace and security as well. After all, Kashmir is one of the prime reasons that keeps the South Asian sub-continent always on the boil, keeping alive a tinder-box situation ready to explode anytime.

But being in India, most of us are only cognizant of the arguments strengthening the Indian case on Kashmir. Though Kashmir's accession to India is a fait accompli today, so much of water under the bridge under the vastly changed circumstances than it was in the 1940s, but going by the United Nations Security Council debates that followed India's reference of the Kashmir issue to the UN, it seems that Pakistan was on a stronger wicket then than it is now.

Since Indian arguments on Kashmir are very well-known, I would here outline only the arguments presented by Zafarulla Khan, Pakistan's representative to the UN, during the debates in the Security Council. Without compromising the force, tenor and import of his arguments, I have condensed his arguments running into hundreds of pages for the purpose of this article. For effect, Zafarulla Khan's arguments are presented here in first person as if he himself is speaking. Where his arguments are quoted verbatim, they are within quotes.

Jammu and Kashmir (henceforth Jammu and Kashmir is referred to as Kashmir) is naturally and geographically integrated to Pakistan than it is to India. The state gets disconnected from India for about half an year, but it remains integrated with Pakistan throughout the year. Its rivers and roads run along Pakistan's borders. All the three Kashmiri rivers flow into Pakistan and the only rail link is also with Pakistan. Even Kashmir's trade and business are mostly with Pakistan and all the major markets for Kashmir's products are in Wazirabad and Rawalpindi in Pakistan. The economy of Pakistan is much more dependent on Kashmir as its 19 million acres of land are irrigated by the three Kashmiri rivers.

Again, Kashmir is not as strategically important to India as it is to Pakistan. Kashmir's accession to India would put enormous defence burden on Pakistan and also to some extent on India. Kashmir can add nothing to India, neither strategically nor economically, but if India succeeds in securing Kashmir's accession, it can break Pakistan in future when it wants to do (This argument of Mr. Khan seems to have proved prophetic). Also Poonchis in Pakistan army would be highly demoralized if Kashmir accedes to India and it would demoralize the whole of Pakistan's army in general.

Also, culturally Kashmir is much more near to Pakistan than it is to India. We have martial and religious ties with Kashmir. About 77 per cent of Kashmir's population is Muslim and according to the partition formula of Muslim majority states acceding to Pakistan and Hindu majority state acceding to India, Kashmir belongs to Pakistan. On 15th august, 1947 when British paramountsy in Kashmir ended, there was jubilation all over Kashmir for liberation from the tyrannous 'Dogra Raj' of the Maharaja. Pakistan Day was celebrated in Kashmir with jubilation. But very soon, a reign of terror was unleashed in Kashmir by the Maharaja to suppress people's movement there and unauthoritatively acceded to India when it failed to repress a genuine people's movement.
We similarly don't recognize Kashmir's accession to India as India did not recognize Junagarh’s, Hyderabad's and Mangrol, Manavadar and other states of Kathiawar which lawfully acceded to Pakistan. India advanced the argument that a non-Hindu ruler can't decide the fate of Hindu majority states. If India does not recognize their accession to Pakistan, then why should we recognize Kashmir’s accession to India? And anyhow Kashmir's accession to India is provisional and not permanent as is obvious from the Governor General of India's letter to the Maharaja of Kashmir wherein he says, "In the special circumstances mentioned by Your Highness, my government has decided to accept the accession of Kashmir state to the Dominion of India in consistence with their policy that in the case of any state, where the issue of accession has been the subject of dispute, the question of accession should be settled by a reference to the people."

It was emphasized further in various pronouncements of the Prime Minister of India. The Indian government has also accepted that the matter would be finally decided by a plebiscite. Pandit Nehru's in his broadcast message of 2nd November, 1947, said, "The Government of India (GOI) is prepared, when peace and law and order have been established in Kashmir, to have a referendum held under international auspices like the United Nations." In his telegram of 8 November, 1947 to the Pakistan's Prime Minister, the Indian Prime Minister says that the GOP should repeat their declaration that they will withdraw their troops from Kashmir as soon as raiders have withdrawn and law and order is restored, that the Government of Pakistan (GOP) should publicly undertake to do their utmost to compel the raiders to withdraw from Kashmir, that the GOI and GOP should make a joint request to the United Nations to undertake a plebiscite in Kashmir at the earliest possible date.

According to the UN Security Council resolution, Pakistan is to withdraw first from the occupied Kashmir territory and the entire Kashmir is to be restored to the lawful government of Kashmir before any plebiscite takes place. The resolution also envisages demilitarization of Kashmir, but it is strongly resisted by India. One really wonders as to what are the Indian forces doing in Kashmir now that the tribesmen have been repulsed. Though we are to initiate the withdrawal, but how do we do that unless and until we could be satisfied of the Indian intention. Even if Pakistan was to initiate, it must have been synchronized with the Indian withdrawal. Unless we know the withdrawal plan of India, how can we proceed and GOI is not forthcoming on that.

Any plebiscite under the shadow of Indian forces and a pro-Indian government in Kashmir would be a farce. Sheikh Abdullah, who disputed the Dogra dynasty's claim over Kashmir and had led the 'Quit Kashmir' movement, has now been co-opted by the Maharaja and the Government of India. Sheikh Abdullah is today pro-Indian National Congress and also enjoys good rapport with Prime Minister Nehru. Today, Sheikh wants the Maharaja to be not only the Maharaja of Jammu, but also of Kashmir. He has travelled a long way and does not represent the true voice of the Kashmiri people. Kashmiri people are not duly represented in his government today.

The only time Sheikh Abdullah was popularly elected was on a Muslim Conference (MC) ticket, today he is out of MC and does not represent the popular voice. When asked about the release of MC leaders from the jail if a plebiscite takes place in Kashmir, Sheikh Abdullah said during a press conference, "Those who were likely to act as the fifth columnists of a foreign state would remain in jail." Here, allusion is to those who would support Pakistan. Definitely, any plebiscite under a partial government and in the presence of the Indian forces, would never be free and fair. But, the GOI is not ready to withdraw its forces or a pro-Indian government. If the GOI could summon the rulers of Alwar and Bharatpur and suspend their ministries for a free investigation into a police matter, what prevents it to do so in case of Kashmir?

The GOI could ask Kashmir's Maharaja to be out of state till the plebiscite was over under a neutral administration supervised by the United Nations as also suggested by the United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan (UNCIP). We won't take Indian's representative's argument that there would be no interference. We don't accept India's insistence to hold plebiscite when GOI's troops are stationed there in Kashmir and its nominees run the government. The mere presence of India troops, even in they do nothing, is enough to intimidate people in making free and fair exercise of their franchise during any such plebiscite. We also demand that the Muslim Conference leaders are released before any such plebiscite takes place.

The situation in Kashmir can be well guessed by what The Times, London says in its April 13, 1948 issue. It says, "The local administrators—all new men—chosen by Sheikh Abdullah are vociferously anti-Pakistan and the people, by nature excitable and easily malleable, have reacted accordingly." The UNCIP also did not recognize the sovereignty of any government in Kashmir and felt that the matter be best resolved by a plebiscite. The UNCIP in its resolution suggested an impartial-neutral administration or a coalition government of the two sides of the political parties. We are ready for both, but it is the GOI which is dragging its feet because it wants the military occupation of the whole Kashmir. The UNCIP also suggested that the matter can also be submitted to arbitration. Prime Minister Attlee of United Kingdom and President Truman of the USA also suggested arbitration. We agreed, but India backtracked. Why did India backtrack? Why did India develop cold feet, if it was so sure of its legitimate claim over Kashmir?

We are accused of sending tribesmen to Kashmir which is totally false. If we really had any territorial ambitions, then why would we send tribesmen? We could have very well sent a full-fledged army to occupy Kashmir, but we did not do that which we really regret now. I plead guilty on behalf of the people of Pakistan that when the persecution of Kashmiri people started, we should have sent our forces which we did not. We were under no international obligation not to intervene. It is India which committed aggression and not Pakistan. After all, the Maharaja of Kashmir wrote a letter to the GOI on October 26, 1947 and the Governor General of India sent him a reply on October 27, 1947 assuring him of Indian support. But by the morning of October 27, 1947, Kashmir had already been occupied by the Indian troops. Any such occupation would require enormous preparation because of the difficult terrain. So, it is obvious that before the Maharaja wrote a letter to the GOI, the latter had already decided on occupying the state by military force. It is definitely India which is an aggressor, and not Pakistan.

Today, about six to seven lakh Muslims from Kashmir are refugees in Pakistan. Why should they come to Pakistan, if they are as anti-Pakistan as India claims? Who are the aggressors and tyrants? We or they?

Coming back again to the allegation of Pakistan sending tribesmen to invade Kashmir, if one looks at the map it would be obvious that Parchinar, from where these tribesmen come, is up at the Kurram valley. It is inside, and far inside, the tribal area and is outside North West Frontier Province (NWFP). If was alleged that it was in NWFP. It is almost on the border of Afghanistan. It can't be said that we are sending them. We definitely had military posts there which we have withdrawn because of the huge expenses it involved and also because we wanted friendship with these tribes. If tribesmen move freely and intervene into Indian territory, we did not purport that.

It might be possible that some of these tribesmen would have intervened on their own to help their co-religionists who were being suppressed by the Maharaja of Kashmir, but the fact remains that there exists a genuine people's movement in Kashmir for Kashmir's liberation. So even if these tribesmen withdraw, the movement there won't end because it is the people of Kashmir who are waging it. An overwhelming majority of these tribesmen are ex-soldiers, so they are already experienced and trained; we are not training them. Today, the leaders of Muslim Conference are in jail, who are the real representatives of the Kashmiri people; their nomination papers were rejected during the Assembly polls in Kashmir.

India's secular credentials are belied by the large-scale genocide of the Muslims in India in the aftermath of the partition. Millions of Muslim were massacred and a Muslim-majority Kapurthala state was absorbed into India after its 65 per cent of Muslim population was either massacred or driven out. We received many telegrams from Muslim Conference leaders for help as oppression of Muslims in whole of Kashmir was going on untramelled. We were informed that the Maharaja even started importing Hindus and Sikhs from India to change the demographic Profile of Kashmir. We sent a telegram to Kashmir's Prime Minister to restore peace as our soldiers from Poonch and adjoining areas were getting disturbed. Even Sheikh Abdullah raised his voice against this oppression before his cooption. We received many telegrams from Muslim Conference detailing massacres of Muslims by Dogra military. All this point to the repression unleashed on an unarmed people's freedom movement by the Maharaja of Kashmir.

Today, India says let's settle other outstanding disputes leaving outstanding disputes leaving aside Kashmir as it is before the United Nations. But keeping it apart means keeping it alive. What is the use of making pious declarations of friendship if a major dispute goes on with a risk that any day the fighting might flare up again? India has already absorbed Junagarh and Hyderabad and is in occupation of the major portion of Kashmir. And now after losing so much, we are asked to make a declaration not to fight. What we argue is that let us settle the matter in advance of everything or if it can't be done, let us, at least, agree upon the procedure for the settlement and also for meeting any trouble that might arise during the procedure and then let us declare that we shall not fight.

Disbanding and disarming of Azad Kashmir forces was made a precondition for carrying out its obligation under the UN Resolution, but India deliberately ignores the fact that disbanding and disarming of Azad Kashmir forces was to be done at the plebiscite stage and not at the truce stage. India also conveniently forgets that according to the second part of the resolution, India was to withdraw bulk of its troops from Kashmir and those of remaining Indian troops at a latter state i.e. plebiscite stage.
M. N. Roy, a prominent Indian leader in his 'Radial Humanist' rightly attributed the entire Kashmir problem to India's lust for conquest of Kashmir. According to him, Kashmir should go to Pakistan as per the partition formula. To Roy, Maharaja has no locus standi to plead on behalf of the people of Kashmir as after the British paramountsy lapsed, sovereignty has reverted to the people.

So, we don't recognize Indian claim to Kashmir despite its legal accession to India as India did not recognize Junagarh's, Hyderabad's and many other small states' accession to Pakistan. We demand a plebiscite as per the UN Security Council Resolution under a neutral government, supervised by such international agency as the United Nations.

(1998)

Delineating the contours of indian polity
Saumitra Mohan
Just when you thought everything in this country was going right, the political upheaval created by the website Tehelka.com seems to have sent everything into tizzy. Even the feel-good factor created by the Finance Minister's New Delhi Budget seems to have evaporated if trends at the bourses suggest anything. And again the prophets of doom have started bawling, screaming blue murder over the systemic degeneration, which has set in this country. And they say that Tehelka epiphany and economic downturn are nothing but symptomatic of the overall crisis afflicting this country.

Things like corruption, nepotism, communalism, linguistic fanaticism, terrorism, infra-nationalism, secessionism and all other such cognate problems go on to show that unless something is done urgently, the very survival of this country is doubtful. But wait, do our intelligentsia and think tanks really need to get so down in the dumps. Well, like Dr. Pangloss, the overoptimistic fictional character in Voltaire's classical work, 'Candide', I don't think so. Undoubtedly, measures need to be taken to stem the creeping rot, but there is nothing so untoward or unnatural with the overall scenario as to shadow this country's very existence.

When India commenced its odyssey as a state-nation way back in 1947, there were many naysayers believing that a country as diverse and huge as India would disintegrate sooner than later. Leading the juggernaut was Selig Harrison who predicted India's balkanization, but India hurtled on tiding over many crises which inter alia included offensive designs on her territories by the hostile neighbours and rise of authoritarian tendencies reflected in the imposition of emergency on June 26th, 1975. But a nascent nation fought back and was back on the rails with a reinvigorated desire to survive despite all odds. The people who were relentless in pouring vitriol on the parliamentary democracy of the country were on the back foot now. These gentlemen believed that an illiterate, indigent and gargantuan India needed an iron hand to be ruled effectively rather than a kid-gloved democracy. But they definitely seems to have been overwhelmed by amnesia because the very fact that they enjoyed the right to freely spout such nostrums from the rarefied rostrums was because of the democracy and once they were stripped of the same rights, they realized the importance of democracy and were quick to demand status quo ante.

In fact, while vetting something as important as a country's development and survival, one should keep into mind her capacities, constraints, liabilities, strengths and assets while simultaneously trying to avoid odious comparisons. So, while talking about India's developmental march from state-nation to nation-state, one should not compare its status with the First World countries like the United States and the United Kingdom though they should always be held as a beacon, as a milestone to be achieved, at least, in some respects.

So, when India earned her freedom on that fateful day of 15th August, 1947, she had not only inherited an emaciated economy from her colonial rulers, her social fabric was also in tatters. A country with a very low industrial base, a huge population with very poor social and physical infrastructure and an agriculturally dependent country was still trying to delineate the contours of her identity. And she was not alone. There were scores of other countries in Asia, Africa, Europe and Americas who had just won their freedom from imperial thralldom and were on the same developmental scale as India. And when compared with these countries, India appears to be a clear winner.

As these countries scurried forward in the developmental rat race, many of them fell by the wayside compromising the very principles, values and ideals they had cherished during their struggle for independence. So, when military take-overs, coup d'etat and authoritarianism seemed to be the order of the day, India continued as an island of hope where democracy, howsoever boisterous and unruly, continued to flourish and was successful in escaping the occasional sparks flying in the air. It not only successfully overcame the emergency monster, but was also able to overcome the Hindu rate of economic growth charting an independent course of economic development in the choppy waters of the Cold War days.

Yesterday what appeared to be an 'area of darkness' derided as a land of beggars and snake-charmers and seemed more like a pack of cards about to collapse any moment has been able to keep its flock together even though those casting an evil eye on its ended with a black eye and lots of eggs on their face. So, despite her defiance of those at the top of the international pecking order and notwithstanding her attempts to breach the nuclear monopoly, today she is a country which is avidly courted by all and sundry. India is not only the largest democracy in the world with the second largest populace to her credit, she is the third largest economy in terms of purchasing power parity, has the second largest army, third largest pool of techno-scientific manpower, fourth largest air force, a huge market with 350 million consumers with effective purchasing power, ninth largest industrial power, third largest English-knowing population, has a well-entrenched legal system so crucial to the functioning of a market economy and more importantly, has a conscientious civil society.

One may argue that after all these assets, why India still seems to be leading a hand-to mouth existence. If the picture is really so rosy, what do things like terrorism, secessionism, communalism, fundamentalism, et at insinuate at. One, of course, does not deny the threats these problems pose to the Indian polity, but they are not of such a magnitude as to endanger the very survival of the system. Rather than carping about the failure to successfully deal with these problems, it would be worth its while to find out the reasons behind those problems and proffer solutions therefor.

In fact, India hardly existed as a state before 1947 not to speak of its existence as a nation-state. Even though there was always an idea of India, but she did not exist as a reality armed with the trappings of an independent and sovereign state. But an idea of India was always there, so Jawaharlal Nehru did not have to invent an India, he merely discovered it as the title of his celebrated book, 'The Discovery of India' itself reveals. Against her colonial background which underdeveloped her more than it developed and against her meagre resources and myriad constraints, if India has still managed to survive in one piece for more than five decades, that it itself is an achievement.

The problems which look so minatory do so because of this very fact, i.e., India's survival as a democratic state for over half a century. The very functioning of a democratic system quite naturally unleashed the democratic forces that now seem to have got so out of control as to threaten the very system. The competitive party politics which form the very pith and substance of an open, liberal-democratic system has in all these years mobilized the teeming millions of this country and this mobilization has been accompanied by a deinstitutionalization process which has only worsened the problem further.

The problem of deinstitutionalization has been noted and comprehensively discussed by the political scientists for quite some time which include people like Atul Kohli, Rajni Kothari, Sudipta Kaviraj, Partho Chatterjee, Paul Brass, Robert Stern and others. These scholars have noted as to how the political class in this country led by the Nehru-Gandhi family has been constantly chipping away at the various institutions of the system. The party system, bureaucracy, police, parliament, panchayati raj system, judiciary and all other such institutions which should have been there for the smooth functioning of the system and to carry forward the developmental agenda, have all ended up emasculated at the altar of the political Moloch.

The institutions whose better functioning could have added to the strength of the leadership in the resolution of the sundry problems facing this society, their weakening only reinforces and aggravates those problems and leave us with no strength to deal with those problems. In their bid to harvest rich electoral dividends, the political class has not only compromised on the very democratic ethos which inform our constitutional structure, but they have also mobilized electorates on all those parochial and primordial grounds, which if stressed beyond a point could turn into the veritable Frankenstein's Monster which eventually devoured its own creator.

But the employment of narrow identities provide very convenient grounds for predicating politics in a society where different sections and regions are on different scales of development and where owing to corruption and such other reasons including the deinstitutionalization of the system, leadership finds it difficult to attend to the real issues. Here, primordial identities and iniquitous developmental process provide easy fodder for the political machine. Ethical degeneration further removes those pangs of conscience which could have acted as a barrier to such petty politics. Also, the very fact that our society is still very backward in more sense of the term, rooted deeply in its primeval identities and is not educated (the national literacy level still hovers around 70 per cent if a recent survey is to be believed) and aware enough as not to be preyed upon by the populism of the reckless politicians.

But as discussed above, there is nothing to be very despondent about. A country as huge and as diverse as ours, is bound to have many teething troubles before it competes its journey from a state nation to a nation state. India has always been a civilisation entity and has never existed as a state. As I pointed out earlier, even though the idea of Bharat howsoever abstract was always there, it was only in 1947 that India as a state was born and since then been trying assiduously to transmogrify itself into a nation state. Its constitution was accordingly tailored to attain this end and by the hindsight one can say that it has stood us in good stead despite its various flaws. The kind of flexibility and adaptability it has shown to keep up with the times has only helped India's ontological problems to a great extent. India was fortunate enough, at least vis-à-vis her many time twins, to have a visionary leadership to start with, which was relatively committed enough to provide a solid foundation to the infant Indian State and their prolonged presence only helped the matters.

One feels that today slowly but steadily the Indian state is consolidating itself and the various problems it seems to be swamped with will go with time and the signs thereof are there for all to see. Over five decades of democratic existence has given birth to a lively civil society which spurred by the demonstration effect in the age of information and communication boom is spoiling for more. The revolution of rising expectation has been taking on various hues and expressing itself in such forms as the increasing assertions of the civil society aided by the instrumentalities of public interest litigations, activism by various non-governmental organizations, conscientious societal leadership exemplified by such people as Anna Hazare T.N. Sheshan, Alphonse and G.R. Khairnar.

The homeostatic checks and balance mechanism has been slowly evolving and has prevented any particular interest or force to rule the roost in a manner as to threaten the flourishing of other interests or forces. And in a highly inegalitarian and hierarchised society like ours when the state fails in its duty, the people would naturally be left to their own resource. And in a competitive democratic political system, identity politics come very handy as that is the only resource people have in a system where heads count. By pooling their numerical strength, they try to compete with others in the political market place simultaneously trying for more value allocations in their favour. Scape-goating other communities or groups is only one of the many strategies employed by them to advance their interests and things like communalism and regionalism are the outcomes of such politics.

One strongly feels that the panchayati raj institutions aimed at the decentralization of power would eventually see the percolation of power to the grass root and would lead to people developing a stake in the system and once this happens, Indian political system would no longer be a hostage to the whims and fancies of the crooked politicians. After all, some one has rightly said that you can fool some people all the time, all the people for some time, but you can definitely not fool all the people all the time. The point is that there are so many interests operating in the society, that none would like to be left behind and in that scramble for power and increased share of the national pie, all operate in a way to check and balance each other. The Tehelka and many other such sting operations are only one of many such expressions.

And despite the instances of terrorism, secessionism, communalism, et al, the national integration seems to be steadily consolidating. There are many signs to that effect. The very fact that today the Indians all over the country enjoy the game of cricket and root for the Team India proves the fact that the 'imagined community' that Benedict Anderson talked of has slowly been evolving. Pokharan-II led to the same pan-Indian rejoicing. Kargil further corroborated this. And if there was any scruple left, the overwhelming response to the Gujarat earthquake removed that.
Our political class may be very irresponsible, reckless and unscrupulous, but when it comes to national integration, it has not compromised. One remembers very vividly as to how the United Front Government led by I.K. Gujaral did not yield to the sinister demand made by the then Congress leadership to drop Dravida Munnetra Kazagham as an ally as a pre-condition for continued support to his Government. The Congress demanded so because the Jain Commission investigating into the assassination of the former Prime Minister Mr. Rajiv Gandhi had criticized the people of Tamil Nadu for their alleged role in the assassination. If conceded, it would have gone down in history as stigmatizing an entire community and, thus, creating enough ground for disaffection. The Government fell, but it saved the nation from alienating a section of the Indian citizenry. All these are nothing but various expressions of a growing nation.

The apprehensions about growing religious fundamentalism in Indian society, despite being justified, would not be more than that. It is, as pointed out earlier, but an exercise symptomatic of competitive party politics where sans effective issues for popular mobilization, the political class tends to fall back on easy resource for electoral mobilization, howsoever unethical and unscrupulous that might be. And people answer to such calls because that appears to them to be the only hope or salvation amid the overall scenario of gloom and doom and also as the only way to ameliorate their condition. Once a basic equity is achieved in resource allocation and once our human resources get educationally and cognitively enriched, there would be little scope for such parochial politics.

One hopes that in a better developed and more egalitarian Indian society, caste, religion, language, et al would at best be only one of the various factors in politics and would not dominate the political skullduggery the way they do now. A section of the intelligentsia has also been apprehensive about the growing stature of such right-wing organisations as the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). But the point is what one could do about it? Can one think of banning such organizations or their style of politics? Certainly not, more so in a democracy like ours. Banning or stigmatizing them would only aggravate the problems further. As someone rightly said about someone that it is better to have him in and spite out rather that have him out and spit in. So, our attempt should be at finding ways to restore them to the system. The massive RSS membership, if positively channelled, could prove to be a great national asset. Also, if its membership starts reflecting all the constituent units of Indian population, then it would be all the better and one more step in our nation building exercise, but for that it would need to reinvent itself.

Notwithstanding all those apprehensions about BJP, it has greatly modified the content and style of its politics as it learnt only too well that with a confrontationist politics which excludes a major section of the Indian society, it could not hope to go very far. The way Indian society has become polarized lately, no political party can hope to form a government on its own accord. And for the BJP, none would touch it even with a bargepole until it diluted its ideology and extremist political style. The BJP has been slowly inching towards the centre of the ideological spectrum and has emerged as the second largest national party in the country after the Indian National Congress. It also shows as to how the party system has been evolving in this country.

Having only one dominant political party could create its own problems as happened in the hey days of the Congress Raj. It could not only get complacent about the overall developmental project, but could also start developing a sense of invincibility which could make it irresponsible and autocratic enough as to endanger the very survival of the system. Here, one would quickly like to add that the bloated fear about the loss of the era of stable government is also unfounded. Stability is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for socio-politico-economic development of the country.

And asked to choose between stability and responsibility, one would readily plump for the latter. A government with an absolute majority could become autocratic and conduct itself in an irresponsible way, but the constrains of a coalition government force it to behave responsibly. And that is what should matter more. And the multifarious forces would always be there to make it behave itself. Also, as long as there is a consensus on basic policies, instability should not be worrying. Since 1991, several governments have taken their turns at the Centre, but the basic policy has remained the same. Despite, all the rhetoric against the liberalization and privatization of the Indian economy, none has been able to reverse it.

So, every though the Indian nation state has been slowly emerging, consolidating and strengthening itself through the bumpy electoral politics in world's largest democracy, one would like to enter several caveats here. We not only need our leadership to behave more responsibly than they have so far, playing ducks and drakes with the many opportunities provided. A dedicated, committed and responsible leadership with a vision is what this country sorely needs rather than just a nuclear muscle power. A leadership that fattens and grows at the expense of its people, which dwarfs its own people and erodes their capacities, would eventually discover that with pygmies (in terms of capacities) dotting the length and breadth of the country, it can't make the country great. So, even while we liberalize and globalize our economy realizing a minimal state in the process, the same should not result in the complete withdrawal of the state from the social sectors. That is one lesson that we should learn from not only the developed countries, but also from our East Asian brethren whose developmental achievements have been predicated on a healthy and educationally enriched human resources.

A democratic system runs on the principle of majority and a government that neglects this majority could not afford to rule longer and, thus, the sustainability of a polity which nixes the interests of the predominant majority also remains doubtful. Ergo, if liberalisation-privatisation-globalisation policy package has to continue, the Government has to cater to the basic needs of the predominant majority, otherwise the inegalitarianism which is said to be resulting since 1991 would finally not only reverse the entire process, but would also create fertile ground for social tension. The Government, therefore, does not only need to spend massively in the social sector as the private sector can not be expected to venture out there though they can be made to share the responsibility in various ways. The latter would not mind shouldering such a responsibility as a rich human resource and an affluent society are preconditions to its own sustained growth as the latter provides and creates the demands so crucial to it. The Government has also to see that it does not yield to the various forces within and without the country to withdraw from the social sector as it would do so at its own peril.

Also, our leadership has to do something about the institutional revival in the country and this has to be done in co-operation with the intelligentsia, media and the civil society. If all of them act in tandem, we would soon be living in a developed India, an India in keeping with the ideals, values and principles enshrined in our Constitution, an India all of us have cherished and yearned to live in.
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(1998)

Kargil And Indo- PAK RELATIONS: Some Lessons
Saumitra Mohan
India might be tempted to flaunt its diplomatic success over Kargil and tom-tom the fact that it has isolated Pakistan in the international community. But Kargil, to say the least, has exposed many weaknesses in our system.

If Pakistan, often called a 'failed state', can carry out such aggression so meticulously, there must be some thing seriously flawed with our whole system which has never showed 'failed state' symptoms and even then finds itself hamstrung when it comes to protecting our national interests.

Kargil has underscored the need to do certain things urgently. Even though Pakistan has vacated Indian territory following the Clinton-Nawaz summit, India should not lower its guard. It should capitalize on the favourable international mood and try to highlight how Pakistan as a state has posed a threat to international peace and emphasise the need of the international society to deal effectively with the problem state that Islamabad has become.

These efforts have to succeed if Pakistan is to realize the costs of the brinkmanship it indulges in off and on. Also, India should do its best to make international opinion veer round to its view on Kashmir. Despite the fact that there exists a parliamentary resolution asking for re-occupation and reintegration of Pakistan-occupied-Kashmir (PoK), India should get the world to tighten the screws on Islamabad to convert the Line of Control (LoC) into a permanent international border between India and Pakistan.

This is the only viable solution to the Indo-Pak problem. Even otherwise, the people inhabiting PoK are not of Kashmiri stock and are ethnically more close to people living in North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Pakistani Punjab.

Besides, India should ratchet up her efforts to bring into the mainstream the people of Kashmir by devising a suitable package. Such a package may include undoctored political autonomy, more financial assistance and respect for human rights and the socio-cultural identity of the Kashmiris. This could evolve into a model of cooperative federalism which could later be replicated in other parts of the country as well as in the ongoing decentralization scheme.

While we have eventually succeeded in vacating the aggression, India should do something urgently to beef up its security and intelligence mechanism, revise and reorient its foreign policy, pro-activise its diplomacy and try to speak in one voice on issues of national interest.

Also, India should not let the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) get derailed and go ahead with its stated objectives with other countries of South Asia. Perfidy, backstabbing, breach of trust and many other such expressions have been employed to describe the Pakistani intrusions in Kargil. But the fact remains that Kargil caught us napping.

As the entire country led by A.B. Vajpayee was raising a toast to the success of the bus to Lahore and the consequent Lahore Declaration, Pakistan was engaged in dispatching its troops to the icy heights of Kargil. Though India has remonstrated against this breach of trust, the flare-up in Kargil exposed in sharp relief the umpteen chinks in our defence armour.

And, it is not the first time that we have been caught unawares. Such intrusions have taken place on numerous occasions in the past as well, like those in 1965 in the Rann of Kutch and in the Sumdorochung Valley in 1983. But, then when you fail to learn from history, history repeats itself and this time it did so in Kargil.

It is immaterial whether the Kargil misadventure by Pakistan had the consent of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif or not. For us, the bottom line should be being ever prepared to deal with a hostile neighbour whose very existence is predicated on perpetual hostility with India.

It is this bad blood that provides Pakistan with its raison d'etre; so at least, it emerges from a study of Pakistan's behavioural pattern. A Pakistani youth displayed this mentality on a PTV chat-show after the signing of the Lahore Declaration. He had asked innocently "If we want friendship with India, why was Pakistan created?"
One also can not agree with those observers whose comments are tinged with "we said so" assertions. According to them, had India not gone nuclear, Kargil may not have occurred. But these gentlemen forget that just the other way round could also have been true. If India had no nukes as it has today and had meekly gone ahead with signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), there might have been more Kargils and on a larger scale.

Knowing very well that Pakistan acquired its nukes in 1987, that Pakistan had continuing military cooperation with China and that the verification mechanism under the NPT and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) could never be made foolproof enough to prevent cheating by a state, and that there was always a probability that Pakistan, aware of India’s lack of effective intelligence and surveillance system might have been tempted to resort to brinkmanship more dangerous than Kargil and, therefore, there might have been more Kargils and on a much larger scale.

Where civilian authority is still trying to find its feet and with the kind of state it has become, Pakistan can never be trusted. So, India was very right in going nuclear. Any other policy decision could only have brought more disasters.

A Pakistan which is still struggling to wean away its military from the inveterate habit of wanting to rule the country will take much more time than commonly thought to democratize itself. But, in no way can we term Pakistan's conduct irrational and irresponsible as some strategic observers are wont to. Pakistan has done its homework. At least, in so far as its own national interests are concerned.

Grabbing Kashmir by hook or crook from a country which caused its bifurcation in 1972 has for long been on top of Pakistan's agenda. Its defence and foreign policies are guided by this overriding objective. Sustaining an anti-India hysteria internally and trying to 'expose' the so-called human rights violations in Kashmir in its bid to internationalize the Kashmir issue have been the subsidiary objectives of Pakistan and it has succeeded in that to a great extent, leaving India the option of only limited reactive posturings.

For the moment, Kargil has done, at least, one good thing to this country. Divisions among the political class notwithstanding, the Kargil crisis has shown that the whole country is solidly behind the armed forces and cutting across regions and religions, people have expressed their solidarity with them. This is an affirmation of the fact that despite all the divisions and disagreements within, the Indian nation-state is shaping up well.

Whatever Pakistan did or tried to do to India through Kargil, it has, at least, indirectly shown the vigour of the evolving Indian nation. For once, all Indians forgot their narrow identities to support their country with one voice. The nationalist frenzy witnessed during the Kargil crisis has consolidated the Indian nation-state, contrary to Pakistan's designs of breaking India.

Even though Kargilisation has dealt a heavy blow to Indo-Pak relations, India should not lose hope. As India strengthens its security apparatus, it should keep engaging in confidence building measures with Pakistan. After all, there is no substitute for peace. Hopefully, the few sane elements in that country would prevail upon the leadership to usher in a strong bilateral relationship.
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(1999)