The Naxal Menace: Need for a National Policy
Saumitra Mohan

The recent naxal attack in the Giridih district of Jharkhand resulting in the death of 18 people has once again drawn attention to the dreaded malaise that naxalism has become in this country. Naxals’ increasing activism, growing reach and killing power should make us give a more serious thought to this problem.

Skilled in guerrilla warfare techniques, naxalites have excellent intelligence system. With committed leaders, motivated cadres, better trained armed militia and sophisticated weaponry, naxals, today, are better equipped to intercept police communication and strike the desired targets at will.

Spread over 170 districts, the naxals have been taking advantage of the rising agrarian distress, destruction of forests, uprooting of tribals and marginal peasantry due to predatory mining, irrigation, metallurgical and other developmental projects, not to speak of growing regional disparities. It is quite disconcerting to know that more than two-third of the severely naxalite-affected districts lie in the tribal areas.

The tribals and the marginal farmers form the main part of their cadre strength. They even have few doctors, engineers and educated persons providing the technical expertise required for their various subversive activities. With very committed and motivated leaders, legion of workers and sympathisers and with help from the forces hostile to this country, naxals have been growing from strength to strength, posing a real threat to the national security of this country.

The ‘Red Corridor’ comprising the so-called ‘compact revolutionary zone’ (CRZ) is said to stretch from Nepal through some of the most backward regions of the country including Bihar, Jharkhand, West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Madhya Pradesh, Chattisgarh, Orissa and Maharashtra. The naxals first aim to establish a base area inside the Dandakaranya forest, spanning MP, Chattisgarh, Orissa and parts of Maharashtra.

Termed variously as ‘the enemy within’, ‘the fifth columnists’ and ‘the Trojan Horse’, the naxals find it easier to operate from the backward and underdeveloped areas as people in these areas respond better to their propaganda machinery. Untouched by the light of education and benefits of development, the poor and hungry fall easy prey to disaffecting influences from the naxalites.

In some of these predominantly tribal areas, naxals are known to run parallel administration. They run Kangaroo courts called ‘Jan Adalats’, schools, primary health centres, and taxation system imposing levis on contactors, mine owners, businessmen and even on government officials.

Fearing loss of popular support, the naxals conveniently oppose any developmental activities inside the forest areas misinforming people that such acts are directed at taking their lands, mineral and forest wealth which rightfully belong to them. Successful governmental initiatives and intervention may deprive them of the issues for popular mobilization against the government. Continued underdevelopment and backwardness make it easier for them to mislead and misguide the innocent people against the government.

It is more that established now that naxals have fraternal ties with disruptive and fissiparous forces within and without the country. They also support many such separatist forces and their nefarious cause including their right to self-determination which has serious implications for the security and integrity of this country. With such ideological stance, it does not leave them any scope for pangs of conscience to affect them, while tying up for ulterior purposes with anti-national forces. In fact, they pose a great ideological threat to the Indian State as they question the very legitimacy of the same. To naxals, ‘naxalism’ in not a problem; rather it is a solution to the many ills afflicting the country.

Naxals are learnt to have teamed up today with Nepal’s’ Maoists to create disaffection among people of Nepalese origin who have been living for generation in Darjeeling and Dooars regions of West Bengal and lower Sikkim. Their purpose is to engineer a movement for ‘self-determination’, which could unleash violence on a wide scale, much worse than what was witnessed during the ‘Gorkha Land’ agitation.

Today, naxalites are being used by Pakistan’s ISI for carrying out subversive activities in this country including drug trafficking and fake currency rackets. In return, the ISI is providing the naxalites with sophisticated weaponry and know-how for making and using improvised explosives devices. Seized weapons and ammunition bear witness to this. There is an increasing possibility of the emergence of a grand coalition of Islamic fundamentalist and Marxist-Leninist forces who are united by the common purpose of subverting the Indian state.

More than a law and order problem, naxalism needs more specialised attention and coordinated action than seen so far. We need to explore and address its socio-economic dimensions.

Today, if we really mean to solve the naxal problem, we need a multi-pronged strategy therefor. A pro-active planning and better synergised coordination among the central and affected state governments through a well-thought out national policy on naxalism is the first step in this direction. We not only need to modernise our police forces and equip them with state-of-the-art weapons and equipment, there is also an urgent need for enhancing our force levels. Better training, better area-specific counter revolutionary strategies and better motivation of forces are other important pre-requisites for tackling the naxal threat.

Such innovative measures as creation of a ‘public peace force’ as experimented in Chattisgarh in the form of ‘Salwa Judum’ where locals have been employed as ‘Special Police Officers’ with a monthly remuneration of Rs. 2000 need to be reconceived and reorganised in the light of experiences gained since its inception in 2005 in Dantewada district. Such an experiment has contributed positively towards counter-terrorism efforts in Jammu and Kashmir and there is no reason why the same should not succeed vis-à-vis naxalism in other parts of the country. But it should be seen that such a measure does not result in the vertical divisions of the civil society to the detriment of the larger public good.

And, if any such counter revolutionary planning has to be successful, the local people of the naxal-infested regions should definitely be taken into confidence. The government machinery must do the utmost possible to neutralise the negative government image as created and sustained by the naxalites through their agitprop.

It should be ensured that the benefits of all government anti-poverty and development schemes including National Rural Employment Guarantee Programme, Member of Parliament Local Area Development Programme, Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan, National Rural Health Mission, Special Component Plan, Tribal Sub-Plan, Integrated Tribal Development Plan, Indira Awas Yojna, Integrated Child Development Scheme, Swarna Jayanti Gram Swarajgar Yojna, Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojna and Pradhan Mantri Gramin Rojgar Yojna reach the targeted beneficiaries.

Special schemes and programmes aimed at the overall economic development of naxal affected regions should be chalked and implemented. Improved and pronounced government interventions and presence would also help bridge the confidence gap between the government and the public, thereby strengthening the intelligence set-up, so required for countering the naxal menace.

Growing Naxal Threat in West Bengal
*Saumitra Mohan
If recent patterns of naxal violence and activism in West Bengal are any indication, the Maoists’ new strategy seem to be setting up bases in newer regions by means of taking up such emotive issues as forcible displacement caused by industrialization and infrastructure development projects. The reports of alleged involvement of the naxals in recent ‘ration riots’ across West Bengal also give a tell tale hints of their changing tactics.
With Singur and Nandigram coming into focus, naxalites seem to be placing more reliance on agrarian revolution and protracted people's war as the path for their so-called ‘new democratic revolution’, as seen during the heydays of the Naxalbari upsurge in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The motivation for reversion to the nearly four-decades-old agenda is the temptation to capitalize on the controversy revolving around the conversion of farmlands into industrial zones.
The naxalites have, indeed, successfully cashed in on the popular resistance to the proposed land acquisitions in Singur and Nandigram, if reports of their expanding mass base in such areas are to be believed. They further plan to use resistance to the SEZ phenomenon as a means to extend their presence to new areas.
The recent surge in naxal violence in West Bengal has established beyond doubt that naxalism is no longer a mere law and order problem here. Naxalites are learnt to have teamed up with Nepal’s Maoists to create disaffection among people of Nepalese origin, who have been living for generations in Darjeeling and Dooars regions of West Bengal. They intend to engineer a movement for ‘self determination’ which could unleash violence on a wide scale and much worse than that was witnessed during the hey days of ‘Gorkha Land’ agitation.

Not only this, they have also been linked up with the extremists of the Kamtapur Liberation Organization (KLO) whom the former have been allegedly providing moral and logistical support for carrying out agitation for the creation of a separate Kamtapur state to be carved out of the areas in North Bengal and Assam. Closure of many tea gardens and continuing industrial sickness in the tea gardens of North Bengal has provided them with a potent issue to expand their network and activities in the region.

The perceived administrative inefficiency and relative underdevelopment in the districts of West Medinipur, Purulia, Bankura and parts of East Medinipur and Burdwan have given them enough leeway to grow in size and they seem to be running parallel administration in the so-called ‘liberated zones’ of these districts. They have been striking at will as reflected in the frequent naxal attacks on some police posts and establishments of party offices in Belpahari, Bandowan and other such places resulting in the killing of some policemen and party cadres.
Naxalites are known to follow flexible tactics. If the situation warrants, they restrict the movement at the level of political mobilization, highlight local issues through front organisations and organize meetings in strongholds to garner popular sympathy. They are believed to be working at a counter strategy including exploring newer ways to intensify the people's war by increasing their mass base across the state and strengthening its armed cadres.
The Maoists do not abruptly launch into 'armed struggle' or violence, but are known to proceed very methodically including conducting a preliminary study of local social, economic and political milieu and the vulnerabilities of particular populations before coming out with customized action plans. They prefer to maintain a low profile in adverse conditions. They deliberately keep violence low in border regions so as to keep away police attention, thereby facilitating intra-state movement. The porous borders with Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan provide them easier getaway for safer hide-outs in those countries.
If we try to see through the pattern, breadth and precision of naxal violence in the country, then we would find that the naxalites have not only been successful in strengthening the People's Liberation Army (PLA), the military wing of the CPI-Maoist, but have also succeeded in recruiting more cadres through militant, but populist mass movements against the neo-liberal policies of globalization, liberalization, and privatization. Their strategies seem to expand the armed struggle from 'guerrilla war' to 'urban and mobile warfare', focusing on industrial areas.
Taking a cue from their Nepalese counterparts, the ‘desi’ naxalites are learnt to have got into collusion with the sundry revisionist and secessionist forces in a bid to expand their support base. Maoists in Nepal had declared their support to eight minority autonomous regions during their armed struggle phase and thereby got immense support, in turn, from these areas.

Naxalites, here, similarly have been supporting demands for a separate state of Kamtapur as part of their larger goal of eventual setting up of a communist state in this country. Not only this, they also support the secessionist movements in north-east and Kashmir and as such they pose bigger threats to national security than we have cared to believe so far.
Now that increasing evidence is being found of their extra-national linkages with the forces hostile to the interests of this country, there is definitely an urgent need for a national policy on naxalism to evolve a well-coordinated approach towards the resolution of this problem.
Not only this, there is also a need for a reinforced and better targeted developmental efforts in naxal-affected districts apart from sprucing up the extant police machinery. The police need to be better equipped to deal with the naxal threat and evolve area-specific counter revolutionary measures for the purpose. Moreover, better awareness among the people of the affected areas about the real naxal intent to deprive the people of the fruits of development in a bid to grind their own axe can also come handy in tackling the naxal threat.
In fine, better counter revolutionary measures coupled with effective development initiatives and positive awareness among the people hold the key to the naxal problem.

Strengthening the Right to Information
Saumitra Mohan

It has been more than two years since the Right to Information Act (RTI) came into force in October 2005. Immediately after its enforcement, a concern was expressed in certain quarters about adequate efforts not being made by all those concerned to implement the Act in its true spirit. It was felt that vested interests were making an all out effort to sabotage the Act.

Lot of hue and cry was heard when there was an attempt from within the government to water down certain portions of the Act by excluding the details of information contained in an official note sheet on the pretext of administrative necessity and for securing the officials against victimisation.

But in this all, people failed to realise that the Act was in its infancy and would take its time before it starts working to its potential. And it was not very late before people actually started realising the import and power of the right emanating from this particular Act. Now they seem intent on using the right enshrined in the Act for anything and everything pertaining to their civil right in democratic India.

While there were very few petitions seeking information under RTI to begin with, today there seems to be a deluge of such requests in almost all government departments and agencies. It has not only resulted in increased confidence among the general public about the utility of RTI in ferreting out information from the government on a subject of their interest, the same has also made the different government departments more transparent and responsible than they had ever been, something which was the real purport of this Act.

The many path-breaking decisions and judgements consequent to sundry appeals for information under RTI by the Central Information Commission and various State Information Commissions, the veil of secrecy hanging over the official records has slowly been lifting, resulting in substantive dilution of the draconian Official Secrets Act, 1923 which had been the last resort of a reluctant bureaucrat for denying even innocuous information to the members of common public on one or the other pretext including the one pertaining to state’s security and integrity and the larger public interest.

Now, several landmark decisions and judgements of the Central and State Information Commissions later, it is reinterpretation of the same ‘larger public interest’, which is being proffered as a ground on which various wings of central and state governments should be sharing the information with the common public of this country. Even though today the right to seek information under RTI has come into its own and has become a powerful tool for exercising one’s democratic rights, one feels that still a lot needs to be done to further strengthen and reinforce this right before it can really become a genuine weapon of popular control exercising benign influence over the different government bodies.

Even though the number of petitions requesting information under RTI has gone up by leaps and bounds, this number could be much more substantial than it is presently. Still, there is a lot which needs to be done to generate awareness among the people about their powers under RTI, though various adverse judgements of information commissions resulting in imposition of pecuniary and disciplinary action against many government servants are also creating enough awareness by way of demonstration effect.

Many government departments and bodies including judiciary have made it costlier for the hoi polloi to seek and access information. The price to seek and obtain information has been made prohibitive by many agencies defeating the very intents and purposes wherefor RTI was conceived. Since it has been left to various state governments and autonomous governments bodies to frame such rules relating to the various charges for information sharing, they have found an excuse in the same by way of making the same ridiculously high.

While these prohibitive costs to seek information do discourage non-serious information seekers, they also repel the many genuine ones who are not well-off enough to be able to foot the bill for the purpose. However, there are specific provisions in the Act about the inadvisability of charging anything from people below the poverty line. But one has to understand that there are many millions others in the country who, even though above the poverty line, are no better. These people are, at least, definitely not so better as to be able to spend a princely sum for seeking and obtaining information under RTI.

Then, there is a practical problem which has come to the fore after the requests seeking information started to flow in thick and fast. The problem relates to the shortage of staff and officers for attending such requests. It is because of this that there has been an overload of pending requests with different information commissions and government bodies.

Since there has been many landmark judgements by now wherein specific pecuniary penalties have been imposed upon many government servants for deemed deliberate failure to provide information in time and since such penalties have to footed from one’s own pockets, government staff and officers are found to be on toes now to attend to such requests and provide the requested information within the statutory 30 days’ period as per the Act.

Today, when many government departments and bodies are already reeling under the shortage of staff and officers in these times of downsizing and rationalizing of the size of the government employees, the normal functioning of these departments and bodies are severely getting hampered. As non-compliance under the Act results in personal financial loss including the fear of departmental proceedings, a government staff or officer is more than keen to attend to RTI requests before anything else.

Some of these problems have arisen also because of the fact that many government departments and bodies have still not put the requisite in-house information into the public domain as they are supposed to do under RTI. This also results in delay or outright refusal in furnishing of the desired information to the petitioners. When a request to furnish information on National Policy and Action Plan on computerization of judiciary under RTI was sent to the PIO (Public Information Officer) in the Ministry of Law and Justice, the response was “the details of implementation of the plan are still being worked out. That being so, it is not possible to give any information in the matter at this stage.”

Not only this, many government departments and bodies have still not notified the Assistant Public Information Officer (APIO), Public Information Officer (PIO) and the Appellate Authority (AA) as warranted by the Act. This has resulted in many such RTI petitions being shuffled around among various government departments and officers on the pretext that one has not been notified as APIO, PIO or AA to be able to entertain such a petition or that the desired information is not readily available in sharable form frustrating the purpose of the Act further.

There is no denying that in order to exercise the freedom of speech and expression effectively, you need an informed public opinion and it is here that the right to information comes into play. The right to information, thus, flows out of freedom of speech and expression. The Right to Information Act, 2005 is not the repository of the right to information. Its repository is the constitutional right to free speech and expression. The Right to Information Act is merely an instrument that lays down the statutory procedure in the exercise of this right. It is, therefore, necessary that all exceptions and denials of the right to information must necessarily conform to the restrictions that bear a nexus to those mentioned in Article 19 (2) and to none others.

So, there is an urgent need to do some further soul-searching as far as implementation of the Act is concerned. All the government departments and bodies should not only put all the permissible information pertaining to their establishments in readily sharable form, they should also immediately notify and properly publicise the APIO, PIO and AA for accessing information relating their offices. Also, it is advisable that such notified authorities should remain in the same office for ensuring better efficiency and accountability.

In fact, it is proposed that as far as possible, a self-contained office should have APIO, PIO and AA in the same premises. It makes the system more efficient and also makes it easier for the common public. For example, if the District Magistrate starts entertaining all RTI petitions pertaining to every office under his/her control and supervision, then he/she would be left with no time to attend to his/her normal work.

So, it is advisable that various authorities to be notified remain within the same premises. Moreover, the central and state governments should make further clarifications to ensure that the cost of seeking and obtaining information under RTI does in no case become prohibitive. Also, the entire process of moving an RTI application has to be further simplified. The phone-in system, as instituted in Bihar, should now be extended to rest of the country. This avoids a common citizens several trips to the government office. E-governance should be utilised to the maximum for the purposes of RTI.

Moreover, there shall also be a need for dedicated staff and officers to attend to RTI requests and also to pre-empt the hampering of the normal functioning of the office by engaging regular staff and officers. There is also a need for grant of specific financial grant to a government office for meeting various expenses required to be incurred for provisioning of information (e.g. xeroxing et al) and for further strengthening and reinforcing the service delivery system under RTI for being able to serve the people better.

If we are able to modify and further refine the Act, one is sure that the powers granted to a common citizen here shall go a long way in strengthening and reinforcing our democratic foundations.

Policing an Anomic Society
*Saumitra Mohan

It is widely felt that the way our police is organised presently is eminently unsuited for the requirements of a liberal democratic country, strengthened by an active civil society and a very vibrant media. As of now, our police seem to be functioning in a highly authoritarian way informed by a feudal mindset and almost without any sense of service towards the people. At least, this is the popular perception of police and this is definitely something very uncharacteristic of a democracy.

There have been many incidents in recent times which have brought the role of our police into question, pointing fingers at the way they function. The police have found itself in the dock for the manner in which they have responded to many crisis-like situations or to the multifarious law and order problems. Police has been on the mat for the reported/alleged brutality attributed to them and has been accordingly been the butt of revulsion and criticism from the media and the civil society.

The police organisation has recently undergone a makeover across the country in keeping with the direction of the Supreme Court, based on the recommendations of Soli Sorabjee Committee, Justice Malimmath Committee and National Human Rights Committee. Now police appointment and tenure are subject to a more sedate and sensible Establishment Board rather than to the whims and fancies of the political class. There has also been the constitution of a State Security Commission and a Police Complaints Board in many states to ward off undue intereference in the functioning of the police and to entertain public complaints against the police. But their functioning over the past few months does not inspire much confidence in the reforms envisaged and effected with so much of tom-tomming.

After all, how do you explain the fact that even today a common man finds it difficult to lodge an FIR, something which should be normal and routine? But the fact remains that the acceptance of an FIR is often subject to many considerations and is accepted only after a few palms are greased or when the same becomes absolutely unavoidable. And even after one succeeds in lodging an FIR, one has to again cool one’s heel for aeons before some action is taken and, in fact, more often than not, no action is taken for a long time unless and until the same relates to cognisable/heinous crimes. For inquiry to commence, continue and culminate in mundane matters, often one has to go from pillar to post to in search of justice. The all-India rate of conviction of the crimes recorded and prosecuted still hover around a pathetic six to eight per cent.

It is this pathology of the system which has led to recrudescence of popular violence vis-à-vis petty crimes and criminals as seen recently from Kolkata to Agra, from Meerut to Nawada. A society desperate for security and protection for its life and property today finds itself helpless enough to dabble in uncivilised ways of dispensing quick justice. The very fact that certain members of our civil society feel encouraged today to take law into their hands also point to their belief of escaping the mythical long arm of the law. Public beating and shaving of two jawans in Jammu and Kashmir for alleged rape attempt, the beating and dragging of a chain-snatcher by the police on the roads of Bhagalpur, lynching of eleven petty thieves to death in Vaishali, beating up a local goon for alleged eve-teasing and harassment by local women in Pune, numerous other instances of locals lynching a rogue or a thief, instance of beating up the boss for alleged sexual harassment, beating up professors in Patna and Bombay for alleged eve-teasing, instances of beating up policemen for alleged failure or connivance – many such instances point to the increasing penchant of people to take law in their hands and all this definitely has something to do with the way our police functions.

Even though as an economy we may be growing at a break-neck speed of over 9 per cent, but the truth remains that the distribution of resources and assets is still quite skewed in our society, thereby making it a highly inegalitarian society, further rattled by sundry divisions and deprivations including problems like casteism, communalism, terrorism, naxalism, proliferation of small arms, regionalism and what not. All these problems coupled with a revolution of rising expectations triggered by the media-induced demonstration effect have led to growing demands on the state and with the state failing to meet those demands, the same results in the growing law and order problems, for which our law enforcement agencies are not adequately equipped.

Earlier the standard way of police managing a law and order crisis was to tackle the problem with the employment of violence and force, but now with human rights bodies, NGOs and Fourth Estate breathing down their throat, employment of force has ceased to be an option. At least, the same has to be used very sparingly. In fact, in these testing times, a high-handed police force has often been found at the wrong end of the stick as found in many instances where people have not hesitated to drag the police to court for the alleged human rights violations. Not only that, the better equipped and organised criminal gangs have often proved to be having an upper hand over the police, at least as far as the latter is supposed to play by the rules and the former is not.

That is why, you have more instances of policemen being killed in a mine blast or in a shoot-out or by getting trapped in the midst of an irate mob today than ever before. Today, we have an under-equipped, under-trained, under-motivated and under-resourced police force set against a highly demanding society, increasingly complex law and order situations where the difference between criminals and civilians often blur and against a very motivated and organised cartel of criminals. The politician-criminal nexus has made the situation worse with policemen often finding itself caught between a cleft stick. More often than not, the policeman finds it convenient to join the nexus and, thus, comes up what has come to be known as a police-criminal-politician nexus, something which has been playing havoc with our body politic.

It is because of all this that today it is unanimously agreed by all and one that our police organisation is in urgent need of a look-up, in keeping with the requirements of time, to be better able to face up to the newer challenges to the system. It needs to be modernised, reoriented, retrained and better equipped to tackle the complex law and order situations.

Today, crime and criminals have to be tackled not only within the confinement of one’s district, but goes beyond and the same today straddles many districts, many states and also, many countries, often with implications for inter-national relations.

Increasing expectations of the hoi polloi regarding prompt and effective police response to any situation of violence or distress and the necessity to secure scientific evidence that shall stand scrutiny in the legal system warrant the police to optimally harness science and state-of-the-art technology for criminal investigation. Hence, there is an imperative need to respond to contemporary challenges and demands by way of better training and spruced-up infrastructure. The qualitative improvement in the professional competence of police requires corresponding attitudinal change informed by the positive values of public service. The content of police training needs to change from a focus merely on law and order to greater sensitivity, appreciation and understanding of the human psyche and behaviour, coupled with better empathetic communication skills and development of pro-active citizen-oriented activities.

The already complex law and order situation is further worsened by a lopsided distribution of the police force. The ratio of police personnel to the total area served is also very poor and varies across the states. The all-India average stands at 42 per 100 sq km. Take the example of Chhattisgarh where this figure is just 17 per 100 sq km. For an area of 39,114 sq km, the five Police Districts of Bastar division have a total sanctioned strength of 2,197 policemen (5.62 policemen per 100 km). Actual availability is just 1,389, nearly 37 per cent short of the authorised numbers, yielding a ratio of just 3.55 policemen per 100 sq km.
With one policeman for 728 people, the police in India are stretched more than their counterparts in other countries. As per a report, there are nearly 6.5 lakh villages being policed by only 13,000 police stations. There are districts that run into hundreds of square kilometres, in one instance covered by merely six police stations. The government status paper on internal security situation recommends urgent steps to be taken to improve the existing national average of police population ratio of 1:728. Not only this, the teeth to tail ratio i.e. officer-rank ratio is also very poor and needs urgent attention if we really mean business about policing this humongous country.

Be it the spate of naxal attacks, terrorist violence or instances of police brutality across the country, the police seemingly appears to have been caught on the wrong foot. Reforms or no reforms, police is actually functioning in the same way as in the pre-reforms period. The positive pay-offs from the police reforms shall take quite some time, if at all, to translate into real positives. But the issue at hand is to provide functional autonomy to the police, unencumbered by interference from any corner.

For police reforms or for any reforms to be effective, there is first a need to effect change in the psyche of the police personnel and that is always a reflection of the civil society. The civil society led by the urban middle class in this country is still quite confused about the value system that guides it. There are a lot of contradictions in the way we respond to different incidents and situations. While many still commend and recommend the success of police action in Punjab in dealing with the terrorists there or with the naxals in West Bengal, there are many who have been rapping police on its knuckles for the alleged encounter deaths in Punjab, Gujarat or elsewhere.


The police alertness in bringing the culprits to book in such celebrated cases as the hit and run BMW cases, Priyadarshini Mattoo case, R.K.Sharma, Bitty Mohanty, Jessica Lal, Sanjay Dutt and Salman Khan has also been because of the constant media glare and civil society activism. The civil society and media have been having a salutary influence on police performance lately, a positive sign indeed.

So, we really need to decide as to what do we really want. Whether we want our police to continue functioning the way they have been or we mean business here. If so, there are a whole lot of things which need to be done than merely effecting some cosmetic changes here and there. We need to do something about correcting not only the police population ratio but also the teeth to tail ratio. The basic infrastructure, the weaponry, sophisticated gadgetry and equipment, better training and better motivation are the least required for policing an increasingly anomic society peopled by an impatient public wanting an instant justice. The government needs to think innovatively and creatively to generate resources for putting in place all these required for better policing including thinking of paid policing and taking user charges for certain services related to policing. One just hopes that something shall urgently be done about it all so that we can not only secure the basic liberty and life of our people, but can also recognise the true service and sacrifice made by our uniformed countrymen in policing this country.

Naxalism:The Enemy Within
*Saumitra Mohan

The way Naxal activism and related violence has been recurring with increasing frequency lately has really become a cause of serious concern for not only the integrity and security, but also the general well-being of this country. While neighbouring Nepal is witnessing a reconciliation with the Naxals, as reflected in latter’s participation in the new government, India continues to be a victim of their gory ways. The mainstreaming of the Naxal movement in Nepal hopefully marks the end of the Naxal movement in that country, India is still groping in the darkness to size up the real problem and come out with a suitable response in the form of a well-coordinated strategy to break this wild and intractable stallion called Naxalism.
The recent surge in naxal violence has established beyond doubt that naxalism is more than a mere law and order problem. And now that increasing evidence is being found of their extra-national linkages with the forces hostile to the interests of this country, there is definitely a need for a renewed thrust for tackling this can of worms. Army intelligence is reported to have proved a close connection between the Maoists and the terrorist organization Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). The arrest and subsequent interrogation of the Nepalese Maoist, Pasang Lama, on Indian Territory has only substantiated this link.
Hence, an emergent need has been felt to develop a more synergized strategy to tackle this menace. In fact, both central and state governments have been at the drawing table for quite some time to develop such an action plan. The recent Bhubaneswar meeting of National Naxalite Co-ordination Committee was one such step in this direction.
As of now, Naxal violence, today, has spread its tentacles from 156 districts in 13 states in September 2004 to 170 districts in 15 states in February 2005, affecting about 40 per cent of the geographical area of the country and 35 per cent of its population, if we are to believe recent intelligence reports. With the objective of establishing a ‘Compact Revolutionary Zone’ as typified by the Red Corridor, extending from the boondocks of North Bihar to the underdeveloped hinterland of Jharkhand, Orissa, Chhattisgarh, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Karnataka and West Bengal, in the heart of India, the Naxals aim to use the same, reportedly, for eventual seizure of the State Power leading to subsequent establishment of the Maoist State.

Be it the activism of Salwa Judum in Chhattisgarh, the attack on Jehanabad jail (resulting in freeing of about 340 prisoners and their leader Ajay Kanu) in Bihar, the heinous killing of Sunil Mahato, the JMM Member of Parliament or the recent attack on a police camp in Bastar killing about 56 policemen, Naxals have been evincing greater precision, penetration, organization and audacity in striking their chosen targets at will. Before that also, they have attacked many such symbols of state authority, mostly police, as witnessed in their incursions in Koraput in Orissa, Madhubani in Bihar, Giridih and Bokaro in Jharkhand and in Karnataka, killing hundreds of policemen, looting fire arms and money.

Transforming themselves into a modern guerilla force, Naxals, today, are equipped with sophisticated weapons and communication system. With the formation of a united outfit namely CPI (Maoist) along with the raising of an armed wing i.e. People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army through the merger of Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) and People’s War Group (PWG), the Naxal Movement has not only succeeded in getting over the problem of sanguinary infighting amongst them, but the Movement has also witnessed a shift in focus and strategy. Today, they are not only logistically better organized and better trained, they are also better motivated and better led.

With the programme of a New Democratic Revolution, the Naxals wish to attain their goals through the spread of disaffection amongst the rural poor, by creating an impression that the new economic policy, hegemonic and imperialistic as it is, is prejudicial to their interests. The newly acquired prosperity of the landlords, bourgeois traders and bureaucrats further annoys and frustrates them. They believe that the benefits of the Panchayati Raj have been cornered by a handful of well-to-do peasants. Hence, they have declared all landlords, big or small, and all bourgeois, powerful or petty, as class enemies and have been working for their elimination by violent means.

The new strategy is one of protracted armed struggle whose objective is not seizure of land, crops or other immediate goals, but the seizure of the state power. Within this perspective, participation in elections and engagements with the prevailing bourgeois democracy are rejected, and all efforts and attention are firmly focussed on revolutionary activities to undermine the state and seize power, by hook or by crook. They plan to mount further attacks against the symbols of ‘feudalism, imperialism and comprador bureaucratic capitalism’ and they also don’t mind supporting the struggle of nationalities for the self-determination, including the right to secession. They have also been paying special attention to mobilizing and organizing women as a mighty force of the bloody revolution they are waging.
Naxalites are believed to be working at a counter strategy including exploring newer ways to intensify the people's war by increasing their mass base across the country and strengthening its armed cadres. If we try to see through the pattern, breadth and precision of naxal violence in the country, then we would find that the naxalites have not only been successful in strengthening the People's Liberation Army (PLA), the military wing of the CPI-Maoist, but have also succeeded in recruiting more cadres through militant, but populist mass movements against the neo-liberal policies of globalization, liberalization, and privatization. Their strategies seem to expand the armed struggle from 'guerrilla war' to 'urban and mobile warfare', focusing on industrial areas.
With Singur and Nandigram coming into focus, naxalites seem to be placing more reliance on agrarian revolution and protracted people's war as the path for their so-called ‘new democratic revolution’, as seen during the heydays of the Naxalbari upsurge in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The motivation for reversion to the nearly four-decades-old agenda is the temptation to capitalize on the controversy revolving around the conversion of farmlands into industrial zones.
The naxalites have, indeed, successfully cashed in on the popular resistance to the proposed land acquisitions in Singur and Nandigram, if reports of their expanding mass base in such areas are to be believed. They further plan to use resistance to the SEZ phenomenon as a means to extend their presence to new areas. Today, as many as 250 proposals to establish SEZs in 21 states are awaiting approval and naxalites are reportedly busy chalking out plans for more such flare-ups. The mainstream parties here need to be more wary to preempt the naxalites from taking negative advantage of any such popular movement.
Taking a cue from their Nepalese counterparts, the ‘desi’ naxalites are learnt to have got into collusion with the sundry revisionist and secessionist forces in a bid to expand their support base. Maoists in Nepal had declared their support to eight minority autonomous regions during their armed struggle phase and thereby got immense support, in turn, from these areas.
Naxalites, here, similarly have been supporting demands for separate states like Telengana and Vidarbha with an eye to the eventual setting up of a communist state in this country. Not only this, they also support the secessionist movements in north-east and Kashmir and as such they pose bigger threats to national security than we have cared to believe so far.
Maoists’ new strategy seem to be setting up bases in new regions by means of taking up such emotive issues as forcible displacement caused by Special Economic Zones, industrialization, infrastructure development projects, caste oppression and religious fascism. Naxalites intend to turn the guerrilla war into mobile war and guerrilla zones into base areas. They have also been exploring newer tactics against the background of changes taking place in the agrarian situation including increasing resort to jail breaks and attacking the express centres of state power like police/military stations.
The Maoists do not abruptly launch into 'armed struggle' or violence, but are known to proceed very methodically including conducting a preliminary study of local social, economic and political milieu and the vulnerabilities of particular populations before coming out with customized action plans. They prefer to maintain a low profile in adverse conditions. They deliberately keep violence low in border regions so as to keep away police attention, thereby facilitating intra-state movement. Naxalites are known to follow flexible tactics. If the situation warrants, they restrict the movement at the level of political mobilization, highlight local issues through front organisations and organize meetings in strongholds to garner popular sympathy.
The Naxals, so far, have refused to see and acknowledge as to how the benefits of a consociational federal democracy and a plural welfare state have reached all and sundry, thereby pointing to the achievements of the nation-building efforts all these past years owing to which the Indian State has successfully avoided the pitfalls of a failed state, as seen in many countries in Africa and Latin America. By ignoring the urges of a growing nation to develop without any fetters, the Naxalites are refusing to see the writing on the wall. They would do well to understand that nothing has ever been achieved through violence and violence as a means to any goal has been a treacherous monster and, as such, has always devoured the users like the fictional Frankenstein.
No form of government has proved to be better than democracy which has responded and evolved as per the genius of its locale. Indian democracy has also been evolving slowly and has shown resilience and strength with every passing day. If the Naxalites still feel the other way round, they should come forward to discuss the same across the table. After all, there is nothing in the world that can not be discussed and resolved across the table.
Already, government has been responding to their basic allegations of inequitable and inegalitarian development and has come forward with a slew of development proposals to address the said inequity. Their support to secessionist and separatist movement is also greatly misplaced and points to their garbled conception of politics. By doing so, they are only helping the cause of those who love to see this country grovel in the dust.
By indulging in the brazen and unprincipled acts of violence, they are not only hurting the developmental cause of their own Nation, but they are also thereby playing in the hands of our enemies. For the government, it would be advisable to continue its efforts to bring them aboard, while continuing its developmental efforts simultaneously, without compromising with the security and integrity of the country.
Today, instead of focusing only on tackling the naxal violence, the government should also monitor the activities of the front organisations as well. Moreover, there is a need to strengthen the capabilities of the local police in action and in intelligence collection. The same can be done through specialized training and provisioning of better infrastructure to increase their overall efficiency and effectiveness. It is high time when we stop thinking of naxalites as ‘some misguided citizens’ and start dealing with them as outright enemies of the State.
The Nepalese Naxalites have shown the way by laying down arms and joining the mainstream political process. Our home-grown Naxals ought to take a cue from them.

National SECURITY MANAGEMENT: Some Reflections
Saumitra Mohan

National security is a term, which is used very loosely today in common parlance. It is often associated with safeguards either against an enemy country's hostile incursions or manoeverings or against armed non-state actors out to challenge the authority of the state and cause irreparable damages to the unity and integrity of the state. However, national security subsumes these aspects and goes much beyond them and is much more inclusive and broader than commonly understood.

The theme of this paper as mentioned at the outset includes three terms namely 'national', 'security' and ‘management’. Before we go on to discuss the theme in detail, it would be better if we seek to understand what these terms stand for. The first of these, i.e. 'national' means something that is related to 'nation' which is regarded as being co-terminus with the 'state'. In case of India, it has often been said that it is more of a 'state-nation' than a 'nation state.' This is an allusion to the plurality of Indian society and to the fact that Indian state has not evolved as a nation like the European ones. Being a multi-cultural and multi-national State, some sections of Indian society are yet to come to terms with the 'imagined' Indian nation.

The common thread that arguably joins different ethno-cultural-linguistic groups within the Indian state is weakened by the idea of an essentially Hindu cultural unity—interpreted in cultural, geographical and religious sense – as it tends to have a sectional flavour and leaves out a sizable chunk of Indian society and often alienates them. The historical reality of partition of British India on the principle of 'Two Nation theory' has its own corrupting influence on the making of the 'state nation'. The disaffection or dissatisfaction of ethno-cultural groups—who define themselves in national terms—often poses security threats, when it matures into separatist or secessionist movements. It has to be properly factored into national security management.

The second and most important of the three terms is 'security'. Security is much more than the mere defence of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country. Security of the nation means her security in every aspect of the national life including political, economic, cultural, environmental and social.

The last of these three terms i.e. 'management' means the process of managing and relates to the administration and regulation of available resource to achieve the organizational goals. So, taken together, 'national security management' means the proper administration and regulation of a country's entire available resources to provide effective security to the nation and its nationals in every sense of the term.

Today, India is facing threats to her security from various quarters. The threats are both from within and from without. The threats are in the forms of outright enemy incursions as reflected in such instances as Kargil, low-intensity proxy war as in Kashmir, threats like nuclear strikes from unidentified sources or non-state actors, refugee influxes from across the border threatening the country politically, culturally and economically, religious fundamentalism, narco-terrorism, proliferation of small arms, many environmental hazards flowing in as a result of indiscriminate use of earth's resources by developed and developing countries, cultural invasion through media and economic insecurity of the country induced both by instability in the world market and inability at the domestic level to cope with changes induced by the forces of globalization.

The hydra-headed problems of poverty, weak economic base, unemployment, narrow regionalism, naxalism, communalism, infra-nationalism, secessionism, corruption, terrorism and weak institutional structure—all pose grave threats to the national security of this country. If we really mean to manage our national security well, then we would have to work at all these levels and take a comprehensive and holistic approach to the issue of national security in the absence of which the continued survival of Indian Nation may be endangered.

Before looking at threats from without, one should try to put one's own house in order. India's image as a 'soft state', as termed by Gunnar Myrdal in his celebrated work Asian Drama, has to be tackled first. This negative image perhaps derives from the fact that key institutional structures of the state are either in shambles or non-functional leading to her incapacitation at many levels and this has paralyzed the economy and polity in irrevocable ways on the one hand and encouraged fissiparous tendencies along the margins on the other. A run-down bureaucracy, a rickety legislature, an indecisive executive and an overall image of a non-performing government does impact negatively on national security.

The first task confronting the Indian state is to raise an effective institutional structure to manage the affairs of the state and this will have its beneficial effect on the issue of national security in the long run.
It is argued that a good infrastructure and responsible government would be of no use unless and until we have a very alert, awakened, responsible and participative civil society. And to have such a civil society, there is a need to invest a lot in the human resource of the state. This would also mean that everyone is well-fed, well-clad and well-cared-for. Otherwise, a starving and unemployed populace often transforms into a disaffected subject and poses new threats to national security, as was also attested to by Kautilya in his famous book, 'Arthashatra'. Moreover, Indian state has to demonstrate its impartiality in the authoritative allocation of values and resources.

It is a fact that the Indian nation is facing lot many challenges from many disgruntled sections of Indian citizenry, because of a perceived bias in terms of value allocation by the Indian State. Hence, the people managing state power have to be careful in securing—what Rawls once said—'distributive justice' for its citizens and they have to ensure that the developmental pie does not get so unevenly distributed as to engender such circumstances which threaten the very survival of the state or nation. It is absolutely necessary to engineer developmental processes in such a manner that all the sections of Indian society are co-opted respectfully into the national mainstream. The government of the state should also see to it that there is no social injustice or inequity in the society as that often engenders social unrest leading to the break-up of the country—as was the case in East Pakistan in 1971. To misquote Machiavelli, the government should not only be doing justice, but should also appear to be just.

Also, the galloping rate of population growth needs to be brought down to match the resources of the country. In has definitely outpaced the resources at its command. The mismatch often creates instability and unrest in the society, which definitely is not good for the country. To ward against this, we need to have a very healthy economy with an efficient industrial and agricultural base. Again, a healthy economy requires good infrastructural base and a good mix of economic policies to support it.

Then, the political culture of a country should also be such as to provide a cushion to its national security. In a country like India, very often, competitive/populist democratic measures create problems like narrow regionalism, communalism, secessionism and infra-nationalism, which also prove suicidal to the national security. So, an effective national security management could be predicated on a reasonably responsible political culture with a very wide democratic base meaning thereby that we need to have an effective all-inclusive participatory democracy.

After we have all the above, we could think of other aspects of our national security. It is often said that India does not have a national security doctrine and it is often said to be toying with a concept of 'strategic ambivalence'. A very reputed security expert, George Tanham also feels that India lacks a 'culture of strategic thinking'. And even after the National Security Advisory Board led by the doyen of Indian strategic think tanks, Mr. K. Subrahmanyam came out with such a doctrine, we have not bothered to accept the same.

India's national security management continues to be ad hocish and reactive. The Kargil Committee Report pointed out many chinks in our security armour and, then, there was a Group of Ministers Report, which visualized many changes in our national security management, but we are yet to see some positive changes on the security front. The National Security Council, formed to effectively manage country's security has proved to be still-born with the government hardly using it as a tool for security management.

All one means to say here is that the government needs to be more serious and systematic about the national security management. It should not only have a crystal clear perspective and policy on national security, but it should also put in place the required institutional structures. National security is a full time job and requires a full time National Security Advisor rather than the one who also works as the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister. The long-felt need to have a Chief of Defense Staff for proper coordination among the different wings of our armed forces also needs to be seriously considered.

At a time when Alvin Toffler's Third Wave' (i.e. communication and information revolution) is sweeping the world, we have to see to it that we are not unsettled by this phenomenon—more so when we claim to be good at it and propose to make India a 'knowledge society'. And to the credit of the government, we already have the Report of the Information Task Force (led first by Jaswant Singh and later by K.C. Pant), which has extensively talked about this aspect of national security. The point one is trying to make here is that we should be ready against any attempt to invade our vast vital database through an information warfare either by enemy states or non-state actors. E-governance and e-security should go hand in hand for best results.

George Washington, the first President of the United States of America, had said, "If you want peace, be prepared for war". So, even though we may be the professed messiah of peace, we should keep our war machine properly oiled—meaning thereby that we need to be extra careful not only about our intelligence-gathering and processing, but we also need to take proper care of the training of our soldiers so as to enable them to face new security challenges more effectively. At a time when we have openly professed to have a nuclear deterrence and have declared to use the same in case there is a nuclear attack against this country, we need to have a very well-managed command, control, communication, intelligence and information (C3I2) system in place otherwise this nuclear God may turn out to be Frankenstein's Monster or our own 'Bhasmasur' which could devour its own creator.

Then for any country to manage its national security well, it is important that she is self-sufficient in her defense procurements. For a very long time, India has been dependent for her defense procurements on Russia or erstwhile USSR. But for an effective national security management, a country should diversify her defense procurements, which India has already been doing as reflected in her procurements from Germany, France, Israel, United States of America, United Kingdom and Netherlands. But as far as possible, it is always advisable that a country should be self-reliant in production of its vital defense equipment otherwise this may expose her weaknesses in times of crisis. And thankfully, India has come out with a 'Vision 2020', which aims at meeting, at least, 70 per cent of her defense requirements through domestic production by the year 2020.

But as mentioned above, today threats to national security comes not only from enemy states, but also from myriad sources and they all need to be attended to for a better national security management. And this is an ea of 'complex interdependence' as described by security experts Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane. Today, it is difficult to define security in terms of 'mine and thine'. Today, security means mutuality of approaches while dealing with security threats from various corners.

So, for tackling security problems like proliferation of small arms, environmental catastrophe, refugee influxes, international energy crisis, food crisis, religious fundamentalism, narco-terrorism, international terrorism and multiple threats from sinister non-state actors, we need to enter into global alliances. There is already a talk of 'Concert of Democracies', but we should also cooperate and collaborate with other countries (which do not carry the democratic labels) with a stake in international peace and security.

Problems of global nature require global cooperation to tackle them and here the high and mighty in the Comity of Nations should realize that they can not continue to be islands of prosperity amid all round deprivation and at a time, when a 'revolution of rising aspirations' is taking place all over the world. After all, instability and insecurity elsewhere does not stop at one's borders. In fact, such phenomena do not recognize borders at all and easily cross over into other's territory, jeopardizing latter's national interests and national security in the process. So, if the affluent countries want to secure their national interests effectively, they have to make compromises so that others, at least, can live a dignified life.
Only, through international cooperation, can a nation manage these aspects of threats to its security, and not by riding roughshod over such endeavours as the United States of America is trying to do by jettisoning the Kyoto Protocol and thereby inviting environmental insecurity for all. One can say that today security of one means security of all. In today's world, Alexander Dumas' famous motto (in his novel, The Three Musketeers), 'all for one and one for all' should be the motto of all the countries, if they are really serious about their national security management.

Even though there are always chances of one or the other country working against such principle of international cooperation, as far as possible, a nation should try to build defenses against war by investing more and more in peace. As the preamble to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization says, "It is in mind that war starts and it is there that the defenses of peace should be built". So, while a country needs to guard against the unwarranted invasion of its national culture, it should also see to it that an international culture of peace and prosperity develops through mutual cooperation and collaboration.

A country not only needs to manage her bilateral and multilateral relations well through effective confidence building measures, but should also try to promote international treaties in disarmament and arms regulation aiming at the larger goal of international peace and security. For this, we also need to have strong international organizations in place and need to provide more teeth to organizations like the United Nations. Besides, potential of such established forums as Non-aligned Movement, G-77, G-24, G-15, ASEAN, SAARC and APEC need to be properly harnessed towards national and international security management as both the issues are intertwined.

Also, as far as possible a nation should try to use its diplomatic resources to the best. It should not only try to presume and neutralize possible enemy moves and manouevrings through confidence building measures and through proper preparations, but should also try to expand her area of cooperation by either co-opting neutral and friendly countries to its side or by trying to get a toe-hold in their area of influence. As about India, one can say that India should strive to be a part of influential regional and international groupings like APEC, Asia-Europe Meeting and United Nations Security Council.

Diplomatic resources should be properly harnessed and deployed for wooing the powerful members of international community to a country's own point of view, for promoting its values, for cooperation is such fields as technological exchange and economic cooperation.

Also, India should utilize Indian diaspora and its resources abroad in such diplomatic exercises. India also has to realize that she cannot make much headway in national security management as long as South Asia remains hostage to the continuous confrontations between India and Pakistan. So, national security for any member country of South Asia should also mean rapprochement between India and Pakistan and only then can the vast resources of the region be properly channeled towards development. Hence, India, as the most powerful country in the region has to see to it that Cold War, which has ended elsewhere, ends in South Asia as well.
Apart from all the above, it is always advisable to have an inner circle of close allies and in India's case, such allies could be Russia, Israel, China and France and at the same time India can improve its strategic relationship with the USA. There is already a talk of a 'strategic triangle' among India, Russia and China. India should seriously explore the feasibility of such a concept.

To conclude, one can say that an effective national security management requires strong institutions, a responsible government, an effective national security policy, a participative and vibrant civil society, a just social structure, a well-oiled economic and political system with a sense of distributive justice, a healthy culture of peace, a better war-preparedness, a good diplomatic machinery and cascading international cooperation in different spheres through continuous confidence building measures.
 (2002)

Middle East Peace Process: An Overview
Saumitra Mohan

Since the conclusion of a peace accord between the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and the State of Israel, on September 13, 1993, the peace process in that conflict-ridden region has generated a lot of hopes for the elusive peace there, which finally seems to be within the reach. The peace accord on that fateful day marked the beginning of a credible settlement of the contentious Palestine question, which had cast its baneful shadow on almost all events and developments in the region for close to three quarters of a century. Though still not fully settled, the entire peace process shows as to what could be achieved if the requisite political will is there in abundance to take on a problem which for long evaded a solution acceptable to both the parties.

The conflicting claims of the Jewish and Palestinian people lay at the heart of the Palestine question. The Jews staked their claim on Palestine because it was the seat of the ancient Kingdom of Israel from which they had been expelled by the Babylonians, and later once again dispersed by the Romans, in the distant past. During their long diaspora in Europe, the Jews endured discrimination and injustice at the hands of the European Gentiles. Towards the end of messianic movement, called the World Zionist Organisation, which promised resurrection of a Jewish national state in Palestine, this object could be achieved only at the expense of the Palestinians, who had been living in that country since time immemorial.

When, soon after the First World War, Jews from Europe began to enter Palestine under the protection of British arms to set up a Jewish national home, the seeds of a Jewish-Palestinian conflict were sown. Subsequently, as more Jews fleeing Hitler's persecution in Germany began to enter Palestine, Jewish-Palestinian frictions assumed grave proportions. During its 30 years rule as a mandatory power, Britain made a terrible mess in Palestine and, at the end of the Second World War, decided to hand over responsibility to the United Nations. Whereupon, the United States of America, the home of the largest concentration of Jewish population in the world after the holocaust in Hitler's Germany affecting six million Jews, jumped into the fray to muster a two-thirds majority in the UN General Assembly for creating a Jewish state in a good part of Palestine, leaving the rest for the Palestinians.

There was, thus, an international entanglement in Palestine which assumed sharper dimensions when, in the years following creation of Israel, in May 1948, American patronage of Israel was matched by Soviet support for the Palestinians and the neighbouring Arab States, which vociferously opposed the rise of Israel. In so far as the Arab States surrounding Palestine viewed Israel as an imperialist transplant in their midst and resisted its emergence by means of arms, the Palestine question took on a Arab-Israel dimension as well.

The Palestine question, as it stood in the aftermath of partition, centred on two issues; land and people. Partition opened the way for the in-gathering of the Jewish diaspora in Israel and the simultaneous expulsion of some 800,000 Palestinians from their homes. Some more lost their homes as a consequence of the 1967 Arab-Israel War. Current estimates put the total number of Palestinians at over six million. Of this two million live in the occupied lands including East Jerusalem, one million in Jordan and another one million in Israel proper. The remaining two million are refugees scattered all over the world. Hence, with the exception of those who have become nationals of Israel or Jordan, the vast majority of the Palestinians live either under Israeli military occupation or as refugees.

As for the land, Israel took over in 1948 some 77 per cent of the Palestinian territory, even though the UN partition plan had assigned it only 55 per cent of the total. During the 1967 war, Israel seized the remaining 23 per cent as well. In addition, Israel took possession of the Golan Heights and the Sinai Peninsula, belonging respectively to Syria and Egypt. Soon after, Israel started setting up Jewish settlements in the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem. The Palestinians were thus deprived of a good chunk of their best agricultural and urban lands for the benefits of Jewish settlers.

It is important to note that, for nearly 20 years following the establishment of Israel, the Palestinians depended entirely on the frontline Arab States to fight for their rights. However, after the shattering defeat of Egypt, Syria and Jordan at the hands of Israel in the 1967 war, the Palestinians resolved to organise themselves to carry on their struggle for self-determination and for an independent Palestine State. Al Fatah, founded in 1965, joined the umbrella organization, called the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), in 1968. Other guerrilla formations followed Al Fatah in 1969. The PLO carried out hit-and-run battles against Israel from its Jordanian base until 1970, when it moved into Lebanon, following a bloody show-down with King Hussein’s army. In 1982, the Israelis invaded Lebanon to flush out the Palestinians from their bases in that country. The PLO then shifted to far away Tunis in North Africa. This marked the beginning of a lean phase in the fortunes of PLO, which, however, turned out to be the proverbial lull before the storm. December 1987 witnessed the outbreak of the intifada, or the Palestinian uprising, in the occupied West Bank and Gaza.

It is necessary also to mention some major international efforts towards unraveling the Palestine tangle. The Security Council resolution 242 of November 22, 1967, emphasizing inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by conquest, called for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from territories occupied in the June 1967 war and the termination of belligerency between the regional states (tacitly implying recognition of Israel by the frontline Arab States). With its overwhelming military superiority over the Arabs, the Israelis did not feel obliged to comply with the Security Council resolution until after the October 1973 war, which created the setting for American mediation. The Camp David Agreements of 1978 envisaged a comprehensive peace, including the creation of an autonomous Palestine in federal linkage with Jordan. But its immediate outcome was separate peace between Israel and Egypt. The core issue of Palestine was sidelined. The same held good for the Golan Heights. It, indeed, needed catalysts of the magnitude of the Gulf War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, which left America as the unchallenged power in the region, to break the impasse.

Over the years, the Palestinian cause gained strong international support, especially in the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) and at the United Nations. In November 1974, Yasser Arafat, Chairman of PLO, was invited by the UN General Assembly to address its special session which subsequently adopted a resolution reaffirming the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people in Palestine, including (a) the right to self-determination without external interference; and (b) and right to national independence and sovereignty. Mention must also be made of India's unwavering support to Palestinian rights, going back to the 1920's, when India itself was engaged in a titanic struggle for freedom from the British rule.

What gave a real big push forward to peace efforts more recently was the combined effect of Intifada, the outcome of the Gulf War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. It generated potent incentives for the three principal actors-the PLO, Israel and the United States-to start moving in the same direction with unprecedented resolve.

The United States achieved a decisive victory in the Gulf War, securing in the process, its own vital interest in the region's oil, as well as its market. The collapse and disintegration of the Soviet Union, which more or less coincided with the Gulf War, left America as an unchallenged power in the entire West Asian region. In the emergent situation, it was not in America's best interest to allow the chronic Arab-Israel problem to fester. Nor could the image of an America underwriting Israel's territorial expansions through military, economic and diplomatic support, be an asset to what followed on September 10, by exchange of mutual recognition by the PLO and Israel. On that day, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin signed a short letter recognizing the PLO as the "representative of the Palestinian People" and pledging to negotiate peace with that Organisation. PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat reciprocated by recognizing the "right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security" and committing the PLO to "a peaceful resolution of the conflict". He further affirmed that these articles of the Palestine Charter, adopted by the PLO in 1968, "which deny Israel's right to exist" and any other provisions that are "inconsistent with the commitments of this letter, are now inoperative and invalid".

Finally, at a historic ceremony at the White House in Washington, on September 13, 1993, Rabin and Arafat promised to end long years of enmity and mistrust between their peoples, as Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and PLO executive member Mahmood Abbas signed Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles (DOP), the epoch-making agreement heralding peace. The DOP, inter alia, called for concluding an agreement by December 13, 1993, on Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho and the structure of the withdrawal; compelling Israeli withdrawal and transferring authority in Gaza and Jericho to the Palestinians by April 13, 1994; elections for an interim self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza by July 13, 1994.

The Israeli-Palestinian negotiations on the implementation of the first stages of the DOP began in Cairo and the Red Sea resort of Taba on October 13, 1993. However, due to the serious differences, for example, different definitions on what constituted the geographical area of Jericho, release of Palestinian political prisoners in Israeli prisons, and violence in West Bank and Gaza, the agreement could not be implemented.

In January 1994, Yasser Arafat and Shimon Peres met in Switzerland to resolve the differences that were preventing the signing of an agreement on the implementation of the Gaza-Jericho component of the DOP. Sufficient progress was made and an agreement was reached on most of the issues. However, there was no resolution of the dispute over the size of Jericho enclave.
The peace process suffered a setback again in February 1994, When Baruch Goldstein, an American-born adherent of the extremist Kach movement carried out an armed attack on Palestinian worshippers in Hebron. In the beginning of April 1994, the PLO agreed to resume negotiations with Israel and amidst the unabated violence, the Israeli and the PLO officials signed the agreement on the implementation of the autonomy for Gaza Strip and Jericho on May 4, 1994 in Cairo. In the same month the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) evacuated the Gaza Strip and Jericho area and the Palestinian forces replaced them. For the first time, the PLO succeeded in establishing itself inside Palestine.

In the meantime, Israel signed a peace treaty with Jordan and it was feared that having achieved peace with Jordan, the Israeli government would not be pressed to pursue the negotiations on implementing the DOP. As feared, the negotiations were deadlocked by autumn of 1994. Though an ‘Early Empowerment Agreement’ was reached between them for the transfer of control in the fields of education, tourism, health and social welfare from the Israeli civil administration to the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), it did nothing to resolve the other serious differences.

On the other hand, the series of violent incidents intensified when Israel decided to expand its settlements. At the end of April 1995, Rabin supported the construction of 7,000 new homes in East Jerusalem and announced plans to confiscate 130 acres of Arab land to facilitate the project. The deadlock over the signing of the Israeli-Palestinian agreement on the interim stage of Oslo II was broken and the two sides signed the Taba Agreement on September 28, 1995, which set the terms for the second stage of the peace process. In accordance with the Taba Agreement, the IDF began its phased redeployment on the West Bank in mid-October 1995, which was completed by the end of 1995. It opened the way for elections to the Palestinian Legislative Council.

In Israel, the elections in May 1996 brought the right wing back to power. Benyamin Netanyahu, associated with the nationalist hardliners in the Likud Party became the Prime Minister. His pre-election pronouncements included total opposition to the Palestinian self-determination and no change in the status of Jerusalem. Though he pledged to continue the peace process, his policies ran counter to the Palestinian expectations. Netanyahu announced the establishment of eight new settlements in West Bank. The Israeli Defence Minister, Yitzhak Mordechai, decided to reintroduce IDF undercover units to the West Bank and to expand their operations to include areas of PNA- Palestine National Authority control. In the first official contact between the PNA and the Netanyahu government, the Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs, David Levy, informed the PLO leaders, that there would be no progress on resolving the outstanding issues of the interim phase period until certain conditions were fulfilled.

The implementation of the agreement of September 1995 on redeployment from Hebron had been postponed. During the electoral campaign, Netanyahu insisted on revising the terms of the agreement before committing himself to redeployment. Netanyahu and Arafat signed the Hebron agreement on the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Hebron on January 15, 1997, According to this, Israel accepted a proposal to complete its final West Bank redeployment by March 1998.

In addition, Israel agreed to begin immediate discussion on the outstanding interim issues of Oslo II, most notably the question of Palestinian detainees, Gaza airport and a West Bank-Gaza corridor. Also, in order to please the Israeli rightists Netanyahu decided to build 6500 new Jewish settlements at Har Homa (or Abu Ghneim), a hill-top between East Jerusalem and Bethlehem. As a result of these settlements, the negotiations were suspended by March 1997.

All this led to the renewed US efforts to save the Oslo process. The Clinton Administration pressed Israel for a pull back from at least an additional 10 per cent of the West Bank, which Israel did not accept. On the contrary, it offered a withdrawal from less than 10 per cent of the West Bank, in three phases over several months. In other words, it wanted to carry out only one withdrawal from the West bank matched by the reciprocal Palestinian actions against terrorism, before final status negotiations on a permanent settlement were held.

To achieve a breakthrough, the Clinton Administration called on Israel to withdraw from 13.1 per cent of the West Bank during second of the three slated interim stage pullbacks from the occupied Palestinian territory, over a period of three months, in exchange for specific Palestinian security measures. While Arafat agreed to the US plan, Netanyahu refused to accept it.

The US efforts led to the signing of the Wye River Accord between Israel and the Palestinians in October 1998. This agreement stipulated that the two sides will embark within a few days on direct negotiations on final status issues namely Jerusalem, the colonies (the settlements), refugees, border and water. The agreement also provided for an Israeli withdrawal from 13 per cent of the West Bank to be carried out in three stages. It also provided for the release of the 750 prisoners from occupation jails and the establishment of two safe passages between the West bank and Gaza. The agreement also called for starting work on the airport and forming a special committee to begin work on the Gaza sea port and forming a bilateral Palestinian-Israeli committee that will discuss over a period of four months the third Israeli redeployment in accordance with the letter of assurance of former US Secretary of State Warren Christopher. As far as the security was concerned, this agreement included an independent security document that outlined the measures that need to be taken by both sides regarding security. Regarding unilateral measures, it was agreed that the US President Bill Clinton will address separate letters to the Palestinian and the Israeli sides specifying each side’s commitment to refrain from taking unilateral measures that would affect the status quo of matters on the ground.

Regarding the clause forbidding the unilateral steps, Netanyahu held that it did not apply to building new settlements but to the Palestinians, who could not unilaterally declare a Palestinian State. Netanyahu by the present accord had delayed the third Israeli redeployment under the Oslo accords, while final status talks were to start ten days after the memorandum entered into force. Even after these agreements were signed, he continued to build new Jewish settlements and expand the existing ones.

In December 1998, Israel suspended the implementation of the accord, charging the Palestinians with failing to carry out their obligations. He listed five conditions, which he expected the Palestinians to fulfil. Those were: Palestinians must uphold their commitments, they must withdraw their intention to declare the establishment of a Palestinian State and their intention to declare Jerusalem as its capital, and that they must stop violence. Israel would not release prisoners with blood on their hands and that Palestinians must remove all illegal weapons.

Yasser Arafat embarked on a campaign in order to consult the Arabs and other countries regarding the controversial plan to declare the Palestinian Statehood by May 4, 1999, to persuade them to support the declaration and to urge Israel to implement the Wye Plantation Land-for-Security Accord. All the States whom he had consulted were in favour of postponing the declaration. The establishment of the Palestinian State was hence deferred as it required international support and recognition.

Moreover, Israeli election, which was on the cards, was also a factor in Arafat's decision of postponing the declaration of Palestinian State as Netanyahu was threatened from within his coalition especially by the National Religious Party, that the government would be brought down, if he handed over more territories to the Palestinians. The difficulties in his cabinet made the election inevitable. During the election, Ehud Barak, Netanyahu's main rival from the Labour Party registered a decisive victory over him. With the sidelining of the Netanyahu government, the prospects of peace in the Middle East became bright. Resolution of issues related to the Palestinians could now be hoped for.

Barak projected himself as being security-oriented, but willing to reactivate the peace process with the Palestinians. He promised a Palestinian State within four security red lines which were: a united Jerusalem under Israel's sovereignty as the capital of Israel, no return to 1967 borders, no foreign army west of Jordan River and most of the settlers in West Bank and Gaza will be in settlement blocs under Israeli sovereignty.

During his time, the differences between the Israelis and the Palestinians continued on setting the timetable for redeployment, safe passage, seaport and economic issues. There was also a wide disagreement on the release of Palestinian prisoners by Israel.

However, in order to implement the Wye River Accord, "Sharm El Sheikh Agreement" was signed between Israel and the Palestinians in the first week of September 1999. According to this agreement, talks on the permanent status between Israel and the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) have opened. A framework agreement outlining the permanent status principles would be reached by February 2000 and the permanent status agreement would be drafted within a year (by September 2000). With the completion of troop redeployments, as the agreement envisages, the PNA will exercise control over civil affairs in 40 per cent of the West Bank. It will also be in-charge of security affairs in a part of the 40 per cent of the West Bank, while Israel will retain an overall supervisory role in respect of security affairs in the remaining area. Sixty per cent of the West Bank will remain under full Israeli control in respect of civil and security matters.

Within the next few months the two sides are scheduled to firm up an agreement on the opening of a seaport in the Gaza Strip. If this deal does come through, then Palestinians, whether living in the Gaza Strip or the West Bank, will be able to ship their produce out without being dependent on the Israelis or the Jordanians. The seaport is likely to remain under some form of Israeli control like the airport that was opened earlier this year, but, at least, the delays and other forms of harassment will be reduced. With the signing of the Wye II agreement, Israel reconfirmed the plans to open a safe corridor between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.

As the Israelis and the Palestinians set out on the road to a final peace, both sides defiantly laid down their own terms. Israel is adamant that it would come to the permanent status discussions guided by four security red lines spelled by Barak. The Palestinian side too outlined a list of demands sharply at odds with the Israeli position. They aspired to live within the borders of an independent Palestinian State on June 4, 1967 boundaries, with holy Jerusalem as its capital. They also demanded full cessation of all Israeli settlement activities.

Today, PNA President Yasser Arafat is accorded the protocol due to a head of a sovereign state whenever he makes a diplomatic excursion and his officials are treated like representatives of a full-fledged government. It is also more than likely that most countries will extend recognition to the Palestinian State if Arafat declares statehood in a reasonable and responsible context and now in keeping with the spirit of the Wye II agreement whereby he is not supposed to act unilaterally, that is without taking Israel into confidence. Israel is keen to restrict the Palestinian's treaty-making powers so that they do not make alliances with countries hostile to Israel.

Arafat seems to have little hope of regaining those portions along the "Green Line" (the border between Israel and the West Bank after the 1948 armistice until the 1967 war), which Israel has built as if it was its own territory. About 90 per cent of the Israelis in the West bank live in this thickened "Green Line" and successive Israeli governments have indicated that they will not let go these areas of land. Both Arafat and Barak would have to find a suitable middle ground so as to come to an understanding in respect of these areas without compromising each other's vital interests.

Today, about five million Palestinians live in refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon and the Gaza Strip, not to count others scattered all over the world. Since they are classified as refugees, they are entitled to return to the lands from which they were ousted, which means to sites that are now part of Israel. But it is inconceivable that Israel can be persuaded to allow the Palestinian refugees to return to Israel proper. It has taken a tough position on allowing the refugees to return even to the territories that it will hand over to the Palestinian Authority. Besides, Israelis also nurture a fear that the Palestinians might block their access to holy sites in and around the Walled City, if East Jerusalem were to be handed over to them.

In fact, there are many scruples which keep haunting both the parties, and both harbour doubts about each other's real intentions but notwithstanding that, they would have to move along the extant path of peace if only to give peace and security in that hapless region a chance.

Given the sharply divided views, no immediate solution seems to be in sight. It requires a tremendous amount of hope to believe that the talks would be settled in favour of both the parties. Bark seems to be dodging already—"If the two sides do not agree to as outlined by February (2000), they might have to settle for mutually agreed long term interim agreements on most issues". This would mean that they would fail to get a genuine final peace accord. He has pledged to strengthen the largest Jewish settlement in the West Bank, Malleh Adumin and intends on cultivating the hard-liners even as he moves to revive the peace process. The talks on issues particularly "Jerusalem" and "settlements" might take months. One wonders if it would be settled on Israeli terms.

Barak is, as one observer says, 'fortunate to have the international community, including the United States, on his side'. With all hopes pinned on him, the day is not far when the peace that has eluded the region for years would prevail between the Israelis and the Palestinians.
(1999)

The Kosovo Problem: Implications for India
Saumitra Mohan

The tinder-box of the Balkans is again in flames and even threatens to spin out of control. The conflict over Kosovo has gone far beyond the "humanitarianism" that informed the collective intervention in Somalia about half a decade back. Even a greenhorn unschooled in international relations can sense the dangerous portents in Yugoslavia. The smoke wafting away from Kosovo may one day garrotte the world if it continues to be a mute spectator over a conflict which has serious implications for the concretizing post-Cold War world order.

Though India has lately undertaken a few proactive steps towards the resolution of the Kosovo tangle, Indian reactions so far have been quite restrained and stopped short of an outright condemnation of the US misadventure in Yugoslavia. The Indian response is informed more by her own substantial economic interests in trade with the US and Europe which together account for more than 40 per cent of the two-way trade with this country. In this context, it would definitely be worth its while to see as to what could be the ramifications and repercussions of the Kosovo crisis and its implications for India. But before that, a small backgrounder of the Kosovo crisis seems to be in order.

The seeds of conflict in Kosovo were sown simultaneously with the NAM (non-aligned movement) appeal to eschew designs for domination. In June 1989, just about two months before the NAM summit in Belgrade, Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic had celebrated in Pristina, the capital of Kosovo, the heroism shown by the Serbs in the war against Turks 600 years ago in 1389.[1] It was a demonstration of Serb chauvinism that had been rearing its head in the post-Tito Yugoslavia. The federalism on the basis of which Tito had evolved composite Yugoslav nationalism by equal treatment to diverse ethnic groups and regions began to be eroded. The result was in the first place, the breaking away of Slovenia and Croatia and subsequently unrest in Bosnia, Kosovo and other ethnic minority regions.

The growth of fissiparous tendencies was seen as an opportunity by the West European nations to expand their sphere of influence. Despite most of the federating units breaking away, Kosovo somehow survived the contagious urge for a separate nation-state. But the smouldering embers of nationalism got fanned by the collusion and connivance of the Western powers and the Dayton Accord in 1995, ironically, provided the last whiff of air needed to turn it into a conflagration. The non-violent resistance of the Kosovar Albanians turned violent and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) accelerated its activities with aid flowing in from the West.

The beginning of 1998 marked a turning-point upsetting the delicate balance that had existed for nearly eight years since the break-up of Yugoslavia. Crucial in this respect were the events unfolding in February 1998 when the Serbian authorities launched a full-scale offensive against the ethnic Albanian populations which by the end of March 1999 had left some four thousand dead and hundreds of thousands taking shelter in neighbouring countries. Attempts of the ‘contact group’ comprising the USA, Britain, Russia, Germany, France and Italy to strike a compromise came unstuck owing to intransigence of Serbia and the KLA. To the KLA, nothing short of independence was acceptable. The 17-days-long peace conference on Kosovo held in Rambouillet, France, in February 1999 failed to achieve any breakthrough. The threat of possible NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) strikes failed to deter Milosevic. Finally, NATO began its air strikes on March, 24, 1999.

The Kosovo crisis has raised sundry questions. The most pronounced one is regarding the legality of the NATO operations. The situation in Kosovo never reached a stage which could not have been managed through diplomacy and in no case was there any ground in international law for legitimating the NATO aggression to force a sovereign country to agree to its territorial disintegration. There is nothing in the UN Charter which would permit such interference in a sovereign country's internal affairs. Article 2, sub-clause 7 of the UN Charter explicitly bars the world body to "intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state".[2] But there could be situations where such interventions could be permitted under the Charter, but the US and her allies never expected to obtain a mandate for armed operations from the UN. Hence, the short shrift to the latter.

Yugoslavia has argued that the attack is unlawful since it had been initiated after bypassing the UN Security Council.[3] It insists that Yugoslav security operations in Kosovo have been those of a sovereign state protecting its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Its actions, Belgrade says, have been directed solely at the KLA, which has been working to detach Kosovo and create a greater Albania. Yugoslavia has told the International Court of Justice (ICJ) that the NATO aggression has claimed more than 1000 civilian lives so far and that 4500 others have been grievously wounded; in addition, there has been massive damage to bridges, factories, schools and hospitals.[4] According to Western media estimates, Yugoslavia may have suffered material loss exceeding 100 billion dollars. According to one analyst, the main US target now is to overthrow Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic who, like Saddam Hussain of Iraq, has dared to defy the sole super power.[5]

Even if the far-fetched allegations about genocide are true, the 1948 International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide does not allow states to use force arbitrarily and is in contravention of the UN Charter[6] in order to prevent genocide. In fact, Washington has set a dangerous precedent in Kosovo. With the UN being sidelined on important issues, the West could try to impose Kosovo like solutions on other countries as well. And after the recent Washing summit of NATO whereby NATO officially assumed the role of a global policeman bypassing the UN Security Council,[7] this is a strong possibility.

Meanwhile, many observers have begun to question the criteria being adopted vis-à-vis Kosovo. Why are the Kurds and Palestinians not being given the same treatment as the Kosovars?[8] Despite the fact that the Kurds demand only autonomy and not independence, the Turkish Army is allowed to go on the offensive against them. One can also ask: will NATO ever send in its planes to bomb Tel Aviv for Israel's non-implementation of the Oslo accords?

As far as India is concerned, some of the fears expressed above extend to India as well. Observers here have argued that, if uncriticised, the US may one day try to play the Daniel in Kashmir as well. Even though a desperate Pakistan has called Kashmir as their Kosovo, let's see how far the comparisons hold.

To begin with, there have not been any large-scale human rights violations in Kashmir to attract the wrath of the super cop and whatever stray incidents have taken place, they have largely taken place due to the exigencies of terrorism. Also, a large number of such human rights violations remain in the nature of allegations and are still unsubstantiated. Unlike Yugoslavia, India has allowed human rights bodies from abroad to check the truth for themselves by visiting Kashmir and there has not been any criticism of serious nature from them.

Then while Kosovo's problem has aggravated due to aiding and abetting from many neighbouring countries aimed at the former's independence, here the Kashmir problem is the handiwork of a single country with sinister designs over Kashmir. Pakistan's involvement in various terrorist activities in this country in general and in Kashmir in particular is well documented. The US State Department itself has from time to time brought out reports confirming active Pakistani involvement in terrorism in Kashmir.

Also, Kashmir is so divided between India and Pakistan that there is no possibility of an independent Kashmir. Pakistan, which has already lost a major part of her territory in 1971, is active in Kashmir only to grab more territory and not to allow an independent country acting as a buffer between India and herself. An independent Kashmir would redound to further Pakistani loss of territory as it would envisage Pakistan also foregoing her part of Kashmir to which it would never agree. To Pakistan, Kashmir's right to self-determination ends at its unification with the former. After the end of the Cold War, Pakistan does not have much geo-strategic significance left for the US. So, with almost no stakes in Kashmir, the US had better let the status quo continue if only to have both the South Asian giants over the barrel.

Again, the so-called independence movement is already petering out in Kashmir as in Punjab and after the installation of a popularly-elected government, the State is back into the electoral process. Fed up with Pak-sponsored terrorism, Kashmiris have come down heavily on Pakistan and have been helping Indian troops lately in fighting terrorism. It is notable that the tip-off on Kargil came from a Kashmiri shepherd.

With India being a vigorous democracy, a major economic partner and a prospective ally vis-à-vis China, the US is not going to alienate India. Not only this, the US is not going to get the same support from her allies in the assumed incursion overriding roughshod over the world public opinion very soon and becoming villain of the piece in the process. Also, if at all the US decides to go on her own in Kashmir, her operations in Kashmir is not going to be as easy as in Yugoslavia. Unlike Yugoslavia, India has a nuclear deterrent in her armoury now and is equipped with Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) and other state-of-the-art weaponry. So, a feeble Yugoslavia may not be able to respond, but the same is not going to be true of India. The US may end up in a situation worse than that of Vietnam and might even get a bloody nose in the exercise.

So, even though India is not Yugoslavia and is a rich multi-religious, multi-cultural, multi-linguistic, multi-national and multi-ethnic country with a good record in Kashmir with much of the stray human rights violations stemming from Pakistan-inspired terrorism, in all likelihood the US is not going to act soon (if at all it does) in Kashmir as the costs involved are substantial. The US quick intervention may also lead to the entire world speaking out against her much to her detriment. So, after the Yugoslav operations, the US would have a prolonged breathing space before setting off on another such venture.

At a time when the post-Cold War world order seems to be consolidating in favour of the sole superpower with a countervailing force yet to emerge, a country of India's size should not bank on anyone else for her security. While she should keep on exploring the possibility of a joint front with Russia and China to act as a counterforce to the US, she should simultaneously start working towards development of an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defence system and Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) with stronger AWACS (Air-borne Warning and Control System). Just because our record is good, the US has no stake in South Asia, India is a major economic partner or Kashmir's is a unique situation owing to Pakistan's disinclination to forego her part of Kashmir; India should not bank on the United State's good sense. She should keep on strengthening her security so as to make her impregnable to any such future aggression.

After the Chagai Nuclear tests, Pakistan has attained parity with India and should have no security threat (if at all one was assumed to be there) from India. So, now there can be no 'relative gains' problem (that India would benefit more from any bilateral cooperation) and it is possible to convert competitive security scenario into a positive-sum game (where both partners benefit) by indulging in functional cooperation in several areas of mutual interest. Nawaz Sharif has slowly been able to assert civilian supremacy in a Pakistan whose history has been marked with military interventions and dictatorships. But, Pakistan still has a long way to go as the military establishment there is still autonomous enough to set the agenda for the civilian authority when it comes to national security. It is hoped that Sharif would one day get out of the time-warp by further restraining the military-bureaucratic establishment without undermining their defence potential and lead his country to work with India in consonance with the Lahore spirit in the interests of both the country and South Asia as a whole.

If somehow it happens, Samuel Huntington's assumed "Clash of Civilisations" would not longer describe the situation in South Asia.
Reference
[1] D.R. Goyal, "US Challenges World Community", Politics India, May 1999, New Delhi, p. 3.

[2] Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice. United Nations Department of Public Information, New York, 1993, p. 5.

[3] D.R. Goyal, op, cit., p.3.

[4] John Cherian, "NATO : Geeting Out of Control", Frontline June 4, 1999, p. 59.
[5] Surendra Kumar "Kosova : Boiling Cauldron of Balkans" Politics India, May 1999, New Delhi, p. 34.
[6] The UN Charter itself vide Article 2, subclause 4 forbids members to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.
[7] Ramesh Chandran, "NATO widens scope for intervention", The Times of India, April 26, 1999, p.1.
[8] John Cherian, "Kasovo Stalemate", Frontline March 26, 1999, p. 51.
(1999)