Growing Naxal Threat in West Bengal
*Saumitra Mohan
If recent patterns of naxal violence and activism in West Bengal are any indication, the Maoists’ new strategy seem to be setting up bases in newer regions by means of taking up such emotive issues as forcible displacement caused by industrialization and infrastructure development projects. The reports of alleged involvement of the naxals in recent ‘ration riots’ across West Bengal also give a tell tale hints of their changing tactics.
With Singur and Nandigram coming into focus, naxalites seem to be placing more reliance on agrarian revolution and protracted people's war as the path for their so-called ‘new democratic revolution’, as seen during the heydays of the Naxalbari upsurge in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The motivation for reversion to the nearly four-decades-old agenda is the temptation to capitalize on the controversy revolving around the conversion of farmlands into industrial zones.
The naxalites have, indeed, successfully cashed in on the popular resistance to the proposed land acquisitions in Singur and Nandigram, if reports of their expanding mass base in such areas are to be believed. They further plan to use resistance to the SEZ phenomenon as a means to extend their presence to new areas.
The recent surge in naxal violence in West Bengal has established beyond doubt that naxalism is no longer a mere law and order problem here. Naxalites are learnt to have teamed up with Nepal’s Maoists to create disaffection among people of Nepalese origin, who have been living for generations in Darjeeling and Dooars regions of West Bengal. They intend to engineer a movement for ‘self determination’ which could unleash violence on a wide scale and much worse than that was witnessed during the hey days of ‘Gorkha Land’ agitation.

Not only this, they have also been linked up with the extremists of the Kamtapur Liberation Organization (KLO) whom the former have been allegedly providing moral and logistical support for carrying out agitation for the creation of a separate Kamtapur state to be carved out of the areas in North Bengal and Assam. Closure of many tea gardens and continuing industrial sickness in the tea gardens of North Bengal has provided them with a potent issue to expand their network and activities in the region.

The perceived administrative inefficiency and relative underdevelopment in the districts of West Medinipur, Purulia, Bankura and parts of East Medinipur and Burdwan have given them enough leeway to grow in size and they seem to be running parallel administration in the so-called ‘liberated zones’ of these districts. They have been striking at will as reflected in the frequent naxal attacks on some police posts and establishments of party offices in Belpahari, Bandowan and other such places resulting in the killing of some policemen and party cadres.
Naxalites are known to follow flexible tactics. If the situation warrants, they restrict the movement at the level of political mobilization, highlight local issues through front organisations and organize meetings in strongholds to garner popular sympathy. They are believed to be working at a counter strategy including exploring newer ways to intensify the people's war by increasing their mass base across the state and strengthening its armed cadres.
The Maoists do not abruptly launch into 'armed struggle' or violence, but are known to proceed very methodically including conducting a preliminary study of local social, economic and political milieu and the vulnerabilities of particular populations before coming out with customized action plans. They prefer to maintain a low profile in adverse conditions. They deliberately keep violence low in border regions so as to keep away police attention, thereby facilitating intra-state movement. The porous borders with Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan provide them easier getaway for safer hide-outs in those countries.
If we try to see through the pattern, breadth and precision of naxal violence in the country, then we would find that the naxalites have not only been successful in strengthening the People's Liberation Army (PLA), the military wing of the CPI-Maoist, but have also succeeded in recruiting more cadres through militant, but populist mass movements against the neo-liberal policies of globalization, liberalization, and privatization. Their strategies seem to expand the armed struggle from 'guerrilla war' to 'urban and mobile warfare', focusing on industrial areas.
Taking a cue from their Nepalese counterparts, the ‘desi’ naxalites are learnt to have got into collusion with the sundry revisionist and secessionist forces in a bid to expand their support base. Maoists in Nepal had declared their support to eight minority autonomous regions during their armed struggle phase and thereby got immense support, in turn, from these areas.

Naxalites, here, similarly have been supporting demands for a separate state of Kamtapur as part of their larger goal of eventual setting up of a communist state in this country. Not only this, they also support the secessionist movements in north-east and Kashmir and as such they pose bigger threats to national security than we have cared to believe so far.
Now that increasing evidence is being found of their extra-national linkages with the forces hostile to the interests of this country, there is definitely an urgent need for a national policy on naxalism to evolve a well-coordinated approach towards the resolution of this problem.
Not only this, there is also a need for a reinforced and better targeted developmental efforts in naxal-affected districts apart from sprucing up the extant police machinery. The police need to be better equipped to deal with the naxal threat and evolve area-specific counter revolutionary measures for the purpose. Moreover, better awareness among the people of the affected areas about the real naxal intent to deprive the people of the fruits of development in a bid to grind their own axe can also come handy in tackling the naxal threat.
In fine, better counter revolutionary measures coupled with effective development initiatives and positive awareness among the people hold the key to the naxal problem.