CTBT: A Nehruvian Perspective
Saumitra Mohan
Of late, a great debate seems to be raging as to whether India should give up the nuclear option by signing the CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) or not. There are people like Kanti Bajpai and Surjit Mansingh (Professor at the JNU), Praful Bidwai and Achin Vanaik (of the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library) who want India to give up the nuclear option as it would be more in her national interest to do so. Kanti Bajpai argues, “By forcing Pakistan in a situation to acquire nuclear weapons, we have allowed her to be our strategic equal which won't be the case if by signing the CTBT India forces her to renounce her nuclear option and then India would have an upper hand over Pakistan owing to her superiority in the conventional warfare.”[1] There are people like Raja Mohan (Strategic Editor, The Hindu), Satish Kumar (Professor at the JNU) and K. Subrahmanyam (Former Director, Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses) and others who plead to the contrary because of its discriminatory character and, the threat it poses for global peace and security.

Notwithstanding the fact that Nehru was a great votary of disarmament and was against nuclear weapons, it seems that Nehru would also have joined the latter group as his views show. Nehrusaid:
“Whatever policy you may lay down, the art of conducting foreign affairs of a country lies in finding what is most advantageous to the country... a government functions for the good of the country it governs and no government dare do anything which in the short or long run is manifestly to the disadvantage of that country.”[2]
And as it is, India is surrounded by countries like China and Pakistan who have nuclear bombs in their armoury plus the bombs and capability possessed by a number of other countries from whom there would be an incessant threat to India's security. Though the supposed aim of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is complete disarmament, they exclude the five major powers from this arrangement and allow them unconditionally and indefinitely to possess nuclear weapons; and therein lies a catch.

Today countries like Israel, Pakistan or say even India are having nuclear weapons or capability and they have definitely secured these after March 5, 1970 when the NPT came into force (though in the case of Israel it may have been even earlier) which means that they have received them from the nuclear powers which in turn means that the nuclear powers have not respected their obligation under Article 1 of the NPT of not transferring or supplying the nuclear technology meant for military purposes. If they have not respected the obligations under the NPT, what is the guarantee they would do so in the context of the CTBT?

The recent revelation regarding China's supply of 5000 ring magnets to Pakistan only reinforces this deduction. But the self-professed champion of the CTBT, the US, chose not to penalize China under its laws and went ahead with renewing the ‘Most Favoured Nation’ status for China. Also, it has been widely reported that China's readiness now to join the CTBT emanates from an agreement between Washington and Beijing for the transfer of certain computer simulation technologies for nuclear testing to the latter by the former.[3] So, it is very much likely that even though officially Pakistan's nuclear capability may be neutralized after her joining the CTBT, she may continue to be a nuclear threat to India's security with the connivance of China and one can never be sure of a wily China with whom we have friendly relations at the moment. But bonhomie was there even in the period preceding the 1962 war. So, national interest certainly demands that India retains her nuclear option irrespective of the reservations the major world powers have.
NEHRU averred:
“You can't expect me to give up our viewpoint or the results that we have arrived at, because some other nations think differently. I just would not do that. I am on my country's side and on nobody else's.”[4]

With vox populi overwhelmingly being against India's signing the CTBT, Nehru could not have willed otherwise. As for the cost of at least retaining the option, it is certainly going to be cheaper than a supposed defeat in a war. And nuclear deterrent may even reduce the need for the acquisition of additional armament which may even allow us to channelise the surplus resources for developmental purposes. Really very Illustrative here are the ideas of as great an admirer of Nehru as T.N. Kaul who, while supporting the nuclear option in the face of threat from China and Pakistan, argues:
“From the financial point of view, it would, in the long run, be cheaper to develop a nuclear deterrent rather than go on increasing our armed forces and conventional weapons. We can never match the Chinese in the numerical strength of our armed forces and national militia. It would, therefore, be necessary to have a nuclear deterrent capability.”[5]

Given the magnitude of threat to the national security and all these calculations, I am sure that Nehru would have never agreed to jettison the nuclear option and he would have resisted every attempt of being dragooned into signing a discriminatory treaty and he would have done so while simultaneously advocating a true and total disarmament.

Some people may disagree with this view and may argue that Nehru would have agreed to give up the nuclear option in the best national interest with their own arguments of cost efficiency and world peace. I would again disagree and say that Nehru could never visualize world peace coming through a treaty which leaves enough loopholes for the Big Five to circumvent their obligation under the treaty and go on testing through computer simulation and in a situation where through the NPT their nukes have already been legitimized and perpetuated.

The other day there was a news item in the newspapers that quoted a French official saying that the nuclear testing at Mururoa Atolls were done to perfect the techniques of laboratory testing.[6] History has been witness to the fact that the countries who have possessed weapons, have eventually ended up using them and a Nehru with profound historical savvy could clearly perceive this threat. So, a Nehru with such historical savvy, concern for world peace and a Nehru who was against any sort of inequality and discrimination with his feet also rooted in national interest would have loved to effect a harmony in national and international interests.

Nehru believed that there should be a harmony between the short-term interest and the long-term interest. While the short-term interest remains the protection of national interest, the long-term interest would have warranted a percipient Nehru to work for a total nuclear disarmament rather than a partial one. T.N. Kaul here says:
“It is necessary for us to work for disarmament in general and nuclear disarmament in particular. We must urge all the nuclear weapon states to sign a nuclear disarmament agreement banning nuclear tests (except under international safeguards) and the production and use of nuclear weapons, freeing the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and laying down a reasonable time limit within which they must be destroyed [Rajiv Gandhi came out with such a plan in 1988 to destroy all the nukes in a phased manner by 2010 AD] under international safeguards and controls. If they agree, well and good; if not, we must go ahead with our plans to develop nuclear technology.”[7]

In fine, Nehru would have preferred a balanced approach which would realistically take care of both national and international interests.[8] So it would be worthwhile for the Indian foreign policy-makers to toe this Nehruvian line, that is, not signing a discriminatory treaty and working vigorously and continuously towards total disarmament.

Obviously, Nehru believed in a foreign policy that was both idealistic as well as realistic. As he said, “A policy must be in keeping with the traditional background and temper of the country. It should be idealistic and realistic. If it is not idealistic, it becomes one of sheer opportunism; if it is not realistic, then it is likely to be adventurist and wholly ineffective.”[9]

So, Nehru pursued his idealism when he allowed Pakistan to hold on to the occupied territory in Kashmir in the vain hope of winning her friendship, when he agreed to renounce Indian claims over Tibet or when he sent peacekeeping missions outside; but Nehru was unflinching when it came to national interest as in the case of Goa's liberation, or when he agreed to large-scale import of armaments in the aftermath of the 1962 war notwithstanding his stand on disarmament. Not only this, Nehru, along with Sardar Patel and others, even insisted not to give to Pakistan her share of Rs. 55 crores that was due to her after partition.

Therefore, India should always pursue a balanced approach in foreign policy rather than adopting an extreme stand based on pure idealism or pure realism. But in a situation where world peace depends totally on India, there Nehru would have readily sacrificed national interest. As he said,
“The interest of peace is more important, because if war comes, every one suffers.”[10]

But world peace definitely does not depend solely on India in a world which perpetuates and legitimizes the nukes of few nations while disarming others; consequently making world peace hostage to the whims of the former. The draft treaty of the CTBT entitles a country to withdraw from it on the ground of its national interest being jeopardized, as revealed in the continued China-Pakistan nuclear hobnobbing and the reported Pakistani deployment of nuclear missiles on its borders targeted against India.[11] So it would be worthwhile for India to withdraw at this stage on the aforementioned ground which would also pre-empt any possibility of India being blamed for wrecking the treaty. If would be in keeping with the line we adopted in case of the NPT and would also enable us to join it at a later date when the situation becomes favourable to us. In sum, it would be in the best national interest not to sign the CTBT as a tribute to Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru.

References
1. Kanti Bajpai, "India and the Bomb", The Times of India, January, 24, 1996, p. 10.

[2] India's Emergence in World Affairs in Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches 1946-49, Publications Division, Volume One, 1967. p. 206.

[3]C. Uday Bhaskar, "Chinese N. Test, CTBT and India's Security Dilemma", The Times of India, June 13, 1996, p. 11

[4] A. Appadorai, National Interest and India's Foreign Policy, Kalinga Publications, New Delhi, 1992, p. 9.

[5] T.N. Kaul, Ambassadors Need Not Lie : Some Aspects of India's Foreign Policy. Lancer International, New Delhi-49, 1988, p. 160.

[6] K. Subrahamanyam, "The CTBT Issue—1", The Times of India, February 7, 1996, p. 10.

[7] T.N. Kaul, Ambassadors Need Not Lie : Some Aspects of India's Foreign Policy, Lancer International, New Delhi-49, 1988, p. 161.

[8] A Appadorai, Natinoal Interest and India's Foreign Policy, Kalinga Publications, New Delhi, 1992, p. 21.

[9] Michael Brecher, Nehru : A Political Biography, Beacon Press, Boston, p. 217.

[10] A. Appadorai, National Interest and India's Foreign Policy, Kalinga Publiations, New Delhi, 1992, p. 8

[11] As reported in The Indian Express, June 13, 1996, p. 1.
(1996)