National Rural Employment Guarantee Programme: How Effective?
Dr. Saumitra Mohan

A liberal welfare state tries to ensure equitable distribution of the development pie by resorting to myriad ways of redistributive allocation of values among its citizens. One of such measures include employment guarantee schemes for the toiling masses to ensure them work for minimum number of days on pre-decided subsistence wages. It is with this objective that the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) was launched in all the districts of this country. This follows on the back of various employment generation and food for work programmes including Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP), Community Development Programme (CDP) and Swarnajayanti  Jawahar Rojgar Yozna (SJRY). NREGS is actually predicated on the experiences and knowledge gained during implementation of all these previous schemes.

Since then, many observers have come up with suggestions and proposals for further fine-tuning of this flagship employment guarantee programme. This author read with interest an article recently which espoused the idea to provide employment subsidies to employers instead of providing guaranteed jobs through state-run employment generation programmes like the NREGS. The underlying assumption of the said proposition was the belief that such an approach would create jobs more efficiently and effectively than done by the present employment guarantee scheme.

Nobel Laureate Prof Edmund Phelps was quoted in the said write-up as saying, “Although such programmes have been substantial in Europe and the US, the working poor remain as marginalized as ever. Indeed, social spending has worsened the problem because it reduces work incentives and, thus, creates a culture of dependency and alienation from the commercial economy, undermining labour force participation, employability and employee loyalty.”

Proposing an alternative, Prof Phelps says, “The best remedy is a subsidy for low-wage employment, paid to employers for every full-time low wage worker they hire and calibrated to the employee’s wage cost to the firm. The higher the wage cost, the lower the subsidy, until it has tapered off to zero. With such wage subsidies, competitive forces would cause employers to hire more workers, and the resulting fall in unemployment would cause most of the subsidy to be paid out as direct or indirect labour compensation. People could benefit from the subsidy only by engaging in productive work.”

It is believed that the employment generated through this alternative scheme that Prof Phelps proposes, shall be an asset for the economy instead of a burden. Prof Bharat Jhunjhunwala of IIM, Bangalore believes that the present approach provides for taxes to be imposed mainly on urban business enterprises while money is spent in rural areas. The urban businesses have to bear the tax burden while the benefits are reaped by faraway villages. The business sector suffers on account of higher wage rates. The availability of some employment in the villages acts as a disincentive for workers to move from labour-surplus to labour-scarce areas because some employment is available locally under the Rojgar Guarantee Scheme. The author bemoans the fact that the business enterprises do not only have to pay higher taxes, but also have to pay higher wages. The author believes that if Prof Phelps’ suggestion is accepted then the taxes paid by businesses are recouped by receiving employment subsidies. The net outgo on wages shall be reduced due to subsidies thus received.

While the author’s suggestion for subsidy to labour-intensive industries does make some sense, but going whole hog for Prof Phelps’ proposed alternative definitely does not work, more so in the Indian context. To begin with the beginning, notwithstanding the supposed failure of the employment guarantee scheme in the developed countries, they still have not been able to replace the same with the ‘employment subsidy’ approach as advocated by many including Prof Phelps.

This is notwithstanding the fact that such employment guarantee schemes have been in force for over 50 years in most of these developed countries. Prof Phelps’ proposal is fraught with loopholes and complexities and prone to more corruption than one thinks. Moreover, it also does not promise to increase the job opportunities for the jobless as has been proved to be practicably possible by the present employment guarantee scheme, the many implementational hitches and glitches notwithstanding.

First and foremost problem with this approach is the moral hazard of passing off the extant employment in a firm to claim wage subsidies falsely and dishonestly. The employers led by petty and comprador bourgeoisie, instead of creating new employment, would try to ingenuously cheat the system for claiming the subsidies. After all, we don’t necessarily have a data-base of employed manpower of all such firms and industries. And such a data-base, even if created and maintained, may not be completely sacrosanct. Our experience tells us as to how such data-base is often tinkered and tampered with, often to the advantage of the high and mighty.

So, any system of working out compensatory subsidies for employers by establishing contrived linkages to employment generation is going to be very complex and is also likely to involve a lot of scope for discretion and subjectivity for the bureaucracy than the extant system. There is definitely no need to compensate big businesses for higher taxes levied on them as there are already multiple government schemes and incentives for performing enterprises and businesses. Moreover, even after paying those taxes, they are still left with decent profit margins to go shopping the world over for acquiring many of the renowned companies even in times of recession. Over the years, our tax and incentives structure have come to be comparable with the best in the world.

The assumed fear that such employment guarantee scheme actually encourages mediocrity and dependence on government is far from the truth. The present system is an incentive-based transparent system where a more productive worker can earn more if she/he gives more output and her/his wages shall correspondingly be higher compared to others whose output is less. The fear that villages unduly gain at the expense of towns is unwarranted, to say the least. The fact remains that towns are always better endowed in terms of basic services and facilities than those found in the villages. The employment guarantee scheme not only ensures assured employment for a household throughout the year (considering 100 days for each adult member of a family including the handicapped), it also envisages creation of basic infrastructures in the countryside.

It is believed that the progressive creation and availability of such infrastructures and employment opportunities in the countryside shall discourage people from migrating to the urban areas where basic infrastructures and services are already feeling pressure of increasing population. It shall also bridge the gap between rural and urban areas in terms of socio-economic indicators which are quite uneven at the moment. It is believed that wages in the urban areas shall go up consequent to reduced emigration and reduced availability of workers from the rural area. With less workers competing for more works, the real wages in urban areas shall go up which would continue to attract a minimal number of workers from the countryside as per changing demand and supply curve. The increased wages for urban workers shall be in keeping with the increased expenses required for urban living eventually enabling them to lead a better life than has been possible otherwise.

The apprehension that reduced availability of low wage workers shall either lead to shut-down of enterprises in the urban areas or relocation of many of them to the rural areas is also unfounded. At a time when we are talking of liberalization and globalization, we definitely should have no reason to think of the industries who shut down as a result of having to pay higher wages to the workers, more so when multiple government incentives are available. The enterprises need to learn to survive the cut-throat competition in a laissez faire market. They always have the option of shaping up or shipping out. Moreover, such an apprehension remains far-fetched as the pool of low wage workers shall still be larger in this unreasonably populous country despite local availability of guaranteed employment in the villages as there still are many push and pull factors which drive people to the urban areas. As such, there is no reason to panic.

Still, if some of them decide to move to low-wage areas which are likely to be under-developed, it is all the better as that would lead to infrastructural and capacity development of such areas and further improvement of quality of life there which eventually may see rise in labour costs in those areas as well. The cycle may go on till all parts of the country are more or less equitably developed. The government can actually think of giving incentives for relocation or establishment of new industries including labour-intensive ones in the backward and underdeveloped areas.

The belief that the current employment guarantee approach reduces labour force participation and employability of a worker is also not true. The experience from all over the country tells us that labour force participation in the economy has only increased as a result of operation of such a scheme and as a result, per capita income has also gone up. The multiplier effect of such a rise has been perceptible in the relatively high economic growth rates and other development indicators of our economy, recession notwithstanding. Besides, an employment guarantee scheme is also immune to the negative impacts of a recession. While the government shall have more reason to persist with such employment guarantee schemes in difficult times like recession, the employers, finding reduced demand and market for their products, would shut down overnight rendering all the workers under their dispensation jobless. It is again employment guarantee scheme which shall come to the rescue of such affected workers. Another advantage of such schemes is also the pump-priming of the local economy as the wages that workers earn as a consequence of operation of such a scheme on a huge scale shall keep the demands afloat to enable the local industries survive the aftermath of a debilitating recession.

Again, contrary to the belief, the employability of a worker is also not compromised because of in-built incentive structure in such employment guarantee schemes as the worker learns to be more hard working to earn higher wages by giving better output and by being more productive. The various training programmes given to people under the said scheme and under many other schemes do give the workers a choice to decide for themselves as to what do they intend to do. The dovetailing and convergence of many such cognate schemes and programmes further could yield better results with better value allocations among the hoi polloi. The cascading multiplier effects and resultant pay offs for the country as a whole is bound to be better and greater than commonly understood. The many success stories from the countryside regarding the positive effects of MGNREGA do bear out these beliefs.

The supposed acquisition of newer skills under the employment subsidy approach is quite problematic and is more at the level of assumption than a reality. The belief that the innocent, ignorant and gullible workers would get better jobs and acquire better skills as per their choice and aptitude moving from one industry to another for job-shopping is misplaced and fraught with danger. The danger emanates from the feared exploitation of workers by these enterprises who are likely to take advantage of their helplessness and non-possession of requisite skills by paying low wages and forcing them to work in unhygienic and undignified working conditions. The apprehension of fake claims for subsidies could also not be ruled out where industries and workers remain on paper just for siphoning the hard-earned public money.

Moreover, most of these enterprises are not likely to be enlightened enough to do a charity by employing an ignoramus and inexperienced worker to teach him/her newer skills to employ him/her later. However, the spirit of the proposal here is well taken and one does feel that the scope and ambit of such employment guarantee scheme needs to be further broadened and diversified. It could also be creatively fine-tuned to offer better wages and better opportunities to the people. But one has to give the scheme some time to evolve naturally and be more promising and better suited to the requirements of the employment-seeking workers.

After all, the Constitutional Right to Work, as envisaged in the fourth chapter of the Indian Constitution detailing directive principles of state policy, which took more than six decades to be translated into a reality, is likely to take some more time to be better customized to the requirements and needs of the target people. The very fact that NREGS, after being launched selectively in some districts of the country for guaranteed employment in the rural areas throughout the year, has now been extended to the entire country is itself a big achievement of sorts.

The belief that the alternative proposal is corruption-proof compared to the present one is also not true as already pointed out above because of the element of discretion and subjectivity inherent therein. The extant scheme because of the transparent system of job-card, fixed responsibility to provide jobs within fifteen days of receipt of an application demanding work or to pay unemployment allowance in case of failure of the same and the provision of social audit is much better placed to do the needful. The provision of job cards, public hanging of Muster Roll, public notice of details of an on-going works and Muster Rolls and a participatory social and financial audit of all the aspects of the schemes ensure better transparency and accountability than any other scheme. The Right to Information plugs the loopholes and fills the gaps, if any left anywhere.

Yes, one does feel that there is lot of scope for further improvement of the scheme. One is sure that as more feedback from the field is received and fed into the system to further fine-tune it, the extant scheme shall respond better to the tasks and objectives it is supposed to realize. To give some credit to Prof Phelps, his proposal can be tried on an experimental basis in selected areas as a pilot project rather than completely replacing the extant scheme. After all, it is too early to pronounce a judgement on the success and failure of the same. And in any case, an ingenuous and creative mix of the two conceptions rather than an exclusive reliance on any of the one can always be a better idea. One hopes that NREGS would evolve with time in keeping with the objective of realizing and ensuring growth with equity and justice.

Also, with the failure of the invincible capitalist system of economic development as represented by the Washington Consensus, it is all the more accepted and acknowledged that we can no longer depend on market forces for taking up social responsibilities. Rolling back the state completely is no longer an option. The state has to be there as a regulator and disciplining force with minimal responsibilities of maintaining law and order, dispensing justice and building an equitable society. So, the ‘employment subsidy’ approach, as dependent on private enterprises, is just not acceptable in preference to the employment guarantee approach as the same would only reinforce the Marxian apprehension about primitive accumulation of capital, thereby further pauperizing the proletariat. It shall only lead to the development of an underdevelopment if not checked and balanced through a judicious mix of well thought-out policies.

Now, the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) has been in operation for over eight years and is being implemented in all the districts of this country. NREGS has today turned out to be one of the most fascinating schemes launched by the State, generating lots of expectations because of the success story it has turned out to be.

Many executional problems and criticisms of certain aspects of the scheme notwithstanding, NREGS is the flagship scheme which has become the principal vehicle for extension of government benefits to the unemployed masses of this country. The changes in the quality of people’s life could be easily noticed in the countryside as also the massive infrastructures created under the scheme. The purchasing power generated has also created positive spin offs and multiplier effects for the economy as a whole.

However, the programme does require some structural and conceptual modifications to be better able to realize its objectives in the light of the experiences gained during its operation over the years. It is very well known that almost all the districts across the country have not been able to fully harness the scheme uniformally as the performance varies from state to state. Not only this, only a few of the districts have been able to realize the target of providing 100 days of employment to all the enlisted households even though financial allocations for the programme have seldom been a constraint.

It is argued that NREGS being a demand-driven scheme, the emphasis should be on provisioning of employment to those demanding work rather than on expenditure of fund allotted. But the fact remains that there are still hundreds of thousands of people in need of work in this country. It is felt that the implementing agencies i.e. district administration and various line departments could be and need to be more proactive in reaching out to the people needing work through better ‘information-education-awareness’ (IEC) programme. Many people still do not know that they can rightfully demand work under NREGA and shall be paid an ‘Unemployment Allowance’ in case of failure to provide the same within 15 days of demanding work, the latter mostly existing on paper.

A regional variation in terms of utilization of allotted amount has been observed as some states have availed of larger funds compared to many others. Many states including Rajasthan, Andhra Pradesh and Kerala have done exceedingly well in terms of fund utilization and a huge number of schemes have been executed in these states. The same has resulted in creation of massive purchasing power of the local people in those states, while many other states have also started catching up, West Bengal being one of them.

If still many people do not come forward to do work under NREGS, the reason for the same is said to be the availability of work at higher wages in the private sectors than the one provided under NREGS, resulting in less utilization of the allotted funds. This explanation may be tenable for the relatively developed states or for the urban areas even in the backward states, but definitely not for the rural and underdeveloped areas in states like Bihar, Jharkhand or Uttar Pradesh. These states definitely should have been able to utilize more money by providing more number of employment than they have been able to do so far.

One feels that as the Indian economy continues growing at a brisk pace, there shall be more people attracted to work at the more attractive market wage rates than the minimum wage ranging from 150 to 200 as provided under NREGS. Since no state has been able to provide hundred days of employment to all its citizens, there is definitely a need to take the required corrective measures to reach the said target.

In fact, at this stage of the scheme, it is advisable that we should get more daring and remove the ceiling of 100 days and make it a completely demand driven employment guarantee scheme to be available throughout the year for as many person-days as might be demanded. At least, the individual cap of 100 days per household should be removed. This would allow the individual district to go on providing work to individual household beyond 100 days’ ceiling. It would also enable them to utilize their own projected quota of man-days calculated against the number of existing household for that particular district.

With states unable to realize even 100 days of employment, the drain on government resources is not going to be something beyond its reach. This is more so when more work at higher wages are likely to be available in the private sector in times to come, given the way our economy seems to be performing. With India being one of the demographically young countries, more people are likely to be in the productive age groups meaning thereby they shall all be need to be provided with work. Hence, the need to modify the minimum number of mandays’ stipulations as envisaged in the Act at the moment. One hopes that the recent upward revision of this ceiling for the people belonging to SC/ST communities (150 days for them) shall help them improve the quality of their life by increasing their participation.

However, one also feels that this emphasis on 100 days per household should be qualified and modified with respect to the socio-economic conditions of the districts concerned. Often, it has been noticed that an overemphasis on completing 100 days per household often results in iniquitous and Pareto sub-optimal outcomes in terms of redistribution of limited economic resources and value allocations in a particular society. The overemphasis on high average persondays per household often leads to same families being given work again and again at the expense of other sections of the society. The district administration concerned is often encouraged to give more and more works to the same households to improve average employment (persondays) per household with other families being deprived. Hence, one feels that instead of high average persondays per household, the emphasis should be more on creation of more and more mandays in a district with more and more opportunities being given to more and more families. A district as huge as Burdwan in the eastern Indian state of West Bengal has as many as 10.5 lakh job card holders and as the district administration there has attempted giving works to almost every enlisted households, the average persondays per household has generally been quite low compared to many other smaller districts or other districts where relatively much lesser number of enlisted households have been engaged for work, thereby improving their average persondays per household. Here, the performance of Burdwan district would appear pathetic compared to any other district where the base itself is very small or where relatively much lesser number of households have been engaged for work. An emphasis on overall creation of persondays in the district shall not only be more equitable but shall also be a much better indicator of performance of works than the other way round.

Knowing that employment would be available for asking in the villages itself, the wage labourers will be less motivated to head towards the urban areas for seeking wage employment thereby reducing migration from village to cities. The same shall also reduce pressure on urban amenities and infrastructures. As a result, there is likely to be enough work left for the urban workers as also indicated in the discussion above. As there shall be less number of persons competing for work in the urban areas, it is likely that the urban wage labourers would get higher and more rewarding wages. It is also felt that the same reduces the need for the government to formulate any such wage employment guarantee programme for the urban workers even though the government is actually reportedly been contemplating introduction of an urban mutant of NREGS sooner than later.

The objective of the scheme includes not only provisioning of guaranteed employment in the rural areas to discourage rural-urban migration, but also to create gainful assets in the countryside. It is, therefore, advisable for the government to keep revising the minimum wages from time to time to reflect the market wages as also to diminish attraction of higher wage employment as might be available in the urban areas. If this does not happen, people would not feel encouraged to stay back in the villages to work for NREGA schemes thereby reducing the opportunities to create basic amenities and civic infrastructures in the rural areas.

It is felt by many that NREGS being a demand driven programme, people should be willing to do the work at the government approved rates, which is the minimum wage sufficient to sustain a household per day. If the people are getting work at higher wages elsewhere, they should go ahead and do it. This would result in saving of government money which can be better utilized for implementation of other ongoing welfare programmes run by the government including NREGS as well as for undertaking more material-intensive schemes. The unwholesome competition among states for higher NREGA fund utilization does not let this flagship employment guarantee programme remain a demand-driven one; in fact, it is run almost as a supply-driven programme. The cherry-picking of households and workers for providing NREGS works due to their proven or deemed proximity to the locally dominant political formation is also a major drawback of the scheme. There are many genuine job-seekers who don’t get NREGS works because they are not found to be politically suitable. Though they have the option of applying for the job and claiming unemployment allowance, the actual practice in the field is otherwise. The policymakers and implementers definitely need to think over this problem to fix the same.

During rainy season and other such busy seasons which may vary from state to state, people get higher wages in the rural areas itself thereby leaving very few volunteers for wage employment works in the countryside and the same results in less utilization of the NREGS money. But one would say that less or more utilization of NREGS allotment should not be a criterion to judge the success of the programme. Less utilization may also mean that there is less demand for such work in that particular area. This should actually be seen as a development indicator as that means people are getting work at higher wages elsewhere, thereby reducing dependence on government to provide such wage employment.

However, one does find it surprising when one sees that work demanded is significantly less even in those areas where people living below the poverty line are more than the usual and are still not demanding work under NREGA. It feels more surprising when such people keep sitting idle without doing any work, while plenty of opportunities could be created under NREGA for not only providing them with work, but also for creating permanent productive assets in the countryside resulting in enhancement of basic quality of life for the inhabitants.

So, it does feel that there has not been done enough ground work for creating awareness about the programme. It has been observed that people are still not aware of the fact that they can demand work under NREGA as a matter of their right. Most of them are still not aware of their right to demand unemployment allowance as a result of implementing agency’s failure to provide the work within the statutory fifteen days of the receipt of the petition demanding such a wage employment. The necessary allocations for such IEC exercises also remain unutilized in a good number of cases.

Surprisingly, unemployment allowance paid so far anywhere in the country is a very negligible amount of the total expenditure. The reason proffered for the same is provisioning of job within the statutory 15 days which is not the case. Actually, many implementing agencies have mastered the art of refusing unemployment allowance by not issuing the signed receipt for the applications demanding job. The payment of unemployment allowance is not only a charge on the local government, but also means the failure of the implementing agency to provide job within 15 days. In case of such a failure, the officers and staff members concerned are supposed to be penalized if responsibility could be fixed. Hence, the penchant for avoiding payment of unemployment allowances. There have reportedly been regular failures on the part of the many executing agencies to provide the demanded work within fifteen days, thereby defeating the very objective of NREGA. Not only this, no government official has yet been penalized for having failed to realize this programme objective notwithstanding there being the provision for the same.

Under NREGA, there is an in-built mechanism to check corruption and leakage of government money by means of better supervisory and monitoring arrangements. The same is supposed to be ensured by way of regular monitoring, field visits, muster roll checking by public, wide publicity of the details of the work being done or already done through an information board and other social auditing measures by the beneficiaries and other members of the society. The muster rolls are supposed to be publicly read to ward off corruption. The mechanism for a third party audit and Ombudsman also exist. However, the same is not being done regularly, thereby giving rise to suspicion of foul play. The provision of keeping an account of job demanded and provided through the specially designed individual job cards carrying photographs of the household members is also supposed to be a major anti-corruption tool. 

However, it was believed that these very arrangements were reasons for a general apathy initially among the programme implementing agencies to implement the scheme effectively as there was almost negligible scope for siphoning of government money as was available earlier during the previous wage employment schemes including Swarnjayanti Gram Rojgar Yojna (SGRY) days. 

But as they say, human ingenuity knows no bounds. The vested interests immediately discovered newer ways to sabotage the programme and got onto the gravy train. If some newspaper reports are to be believed, not only many fake job cards have come to notice of the monitors, but also there have been many reports where it has been found that implementing agencies or locally dominant factions have got a good number of job cards deposited in their custody and are using the same for nefarious purpose of minting money illegally. It has been reported that the vested interests pay the households a part of the wages for the work they never did and pocket the rest. The latter happily agree to the arrangement as the same helps them earn easy money without wiggling a finger. In many such cases, the work is reported to have been executed using heavy machines, something which is prohibited under the scheme.

Reports of preparation of cooked-up muster rolls without execution of any work have also come to notice, not to speak of many other known ways of making money. Here also, the wages are split between the households and vested interests. Sometimes, the entire wages are pocketed by the latter by way of an unholy alliance with the financial institutions like banks and post officers where the households’ accounts are maintained. Not only this, employment to job card holders is still being given more as an obligation than as a matter of right. It is complained that the site selection for the schemes is often politically motivated. Usually, those areas are alleged to be preferred for NREGA works which are under control of the locally dominant factions, and not those as are populated by the supporters other than the locally dominant factions. It has also been alleged that the locally dominant party often uses the scheme to oblige its supporters, thereby giving a miss to the workers who are opposition followers.

It has been alleged that by means of fake job-cards, the vested interests have ensured siphoning of government money by making false entries into the muster roll and the daily attendance sheet. It has also been complained that job cards have not been issued to all those who wanted it and applied for it, but only to those who are loyal to the locally dominant party/faction or could grease some palms. The practice of getting a cut out of the labour wages of workers has also come to the notice and has been reported in the press as also mentioned above. Hundreds of complaints/FIRs have also been lodged with the local police stations in all such known and established cases of fraud and chicanery. However, with regular monitoring, supervision and participatory social audit, the scope for such shenanigans have been reduced considerably.

Also, the wage is supposed to be paid as per the quantum of work done by the individual labourers. However, the same has been noticed to be paid at a flat rate irrespective of the efficiency or work quantum standards in some of the cases, thereby rewarding a hare and a tortoise equally, something which goes against the purported objective of the scheme. The initial idea was that those working harder with higher productivity should be able to earn higher wages under the scheme. The actual practice, however, is something different. At many of the places, officials have pointed to the practical constraint of continuing with the ‘flat rate wage payment’ as differentiated payment creates discontentment among the workers, often leading to law and order problems in the field. Besides, it is also felt that the work benchmarks should be relaxed for the more aged workers (read senior citizens) and for the women.

Again, the workers have often unfairly refused to work beyond a few hours or at the pre-determined wage on various pretexts. This is simply because NREGA being a government scheme, they would not like to work harder and would like to just have their wages without putting in the requisite labour for a requisite output. At least, that is what has come to be heard by the implementing agencies at some places. But thankfully such instances are only few and far between. Another problem noticed in the implementation of NREGA is the fund crunch often faced by the administration from time to time. Even though NREGA is supposed to be a demand driven scheme, it has invariably been noticed that the fund flow has not been smooth for various factors, thereby hampering the effective execution of this rights-based scheme. So, governments at all levels should ensure that the availability of funds does not become a constraint in the execution of the programme.

The stipulation for timely payment of wages (within 15 days) is, ergo, observed more in breach and the principal reason reported by the executing agencies is the erratic and irregular flow of funds from New Delhi, something which is not at all advisable. The already precarious economic condition of NREGA households and job-card holders becomes only worse as a result thereof. Hence, the need to ensure timely and regular flow of NREGA funds to the executing agencies through the state governments.

Also, the basic work site amenities as are supposed to be there as per the programme guideline are often not found to be available. The provisioning of a crèche for children of working women, provisioning of the first aid boxes or potable water at the work sites are still not seen at most of the places. If at all such amenities are provided, they are only to comply with the guideline rather than to fulfill the real spirit behind the provision. The stock argument proffered is that people feel that employment created through such works are less strenuous and villagers object to the fact that some people can earn their wages without putting in any hard labour. What they fail to realize is that such works can accommodate not only the physically handicapped people, but the same works can be rotated among the beneficiaries, if the handicapped or such other people are not readily available.

The signboard giving details of the ongoing or completed NREGA works is also found missing at many of the sites and is often put up without much details. However, the absence of the information board giving scheme details says something about the intentions of the implementing agencies, the motives being pre-empting people to question the quality and quantity of the works done. But such an argument does not stand in this age of Right to Information when any and every information can be accessed by way of the rights created under the said Act.

Several suggestions are being made to modify and improve NREGA further. It is felt by many that the material-wage ratio of 40-60 should be hiked to be 50-50 and this ceiling should be flexible enough to be applicable only at the state level so as to make allowance for taking up bigger and better schemes. The conditional use of machineries should be allowed and made more flexible than it is admissible now though the same should be explicitly linked to facilitating the works and without compromising the generation of more person-days under NREGA.

Again, individual benefit schemes (IBS) have been allowed for weaker sections/marginal/small farmers for the permissible schemes under NREGA. Such schemes include conversion of wasteland/uncultivable/undulating land into cultivable land, roof-top water harvesting structures, construction of dug-wells, soil conservation, excavation of pond/water harvesting structures, social forestry schemes, watershed development schemes, animal shed, sanitary toilets, grain-threshing concrete floors, construction of irrigation channels and some other schemes. 

Many states have done exceedingly well while many other states have a long way to go on this count. One feels that there is a need to move methodically with regards to the implementation of IBS under NREGA as the same shall not only result in creation of more person-days in the under/undeveloped areas, but shall also create productive assets in the countryside. The same is likely to have immense multiplier effects. Timely identification of beneficiaries and creation of model scheme banks shall go a long way.

Again, there is a lot of scope for convergence or dove-tailing of NREGS with other schemes/programmes implemented by the line departments. If converged with other cognate schemes, the same shall help not only in more employment generation but it shall also result in improvement in the quality of schemes executed as the pool of resources available shall increase manifold through such convergence.

Convergence with Total Sanitation Campaign (TSC), as allowed recently, shall be another area requiring attention of the implementing agencies. As is known, TSC is one of the flagship schemes of the Government. However, the same has not been in a very good shape in many parts of the country. Even at the places where sanitary toilets have been constructed, they are not being used by the beneficiaries for different reasons including the one relating to the quality of the toilet constructed if feedback from the beneficiaries are to be relied upon. The main problem against the extant model is need of lot of water for flushing the night-soil which becomes more acute in the water-deficient areas. As the new models envisage use of ceramic pan in stead of a concrete one, water requirement could be greatly reduced.

Now that we are undertaking several individual benefit schemes (IBS) under schemes like NREGA, one feels that the convergence between the two (i.e. NREGA and TSC) can do wonders for both the development programmes, particularly TSC. Under the proposed convergence programme, people could be encouraged to contribute their share (Rs. 900/BPL household and Rs. 9100 scheme subsidy under NREGA/TSC), thereby greatly encouraging people to opt for construction of sanitary toilets in their premises. Such models are not only more durable, they shall also need less water for flushing the night-soil. It is hoped that with proper IEC (Information, Education and Communication) campaign, the said convergence can do a world of good to our sanitation programme. 

We are hopeful that this model of sanitary toilets when integrated with the IBS under NREGA has the possibility of becoming quite popular and could realize the objectives of the total sanitation campaign. This small piece of change to be effected through NREGA funds could go a long way in ensuring better health and hygiene in our countryside, not to speak of the possibility of unleashing immense opportunities for employment generation. And as the IBS schemes are also available to the marginal and small farmers, almost anyone and everyone can avail the benefits of sanitary toilets being provided under NREGA, thereby revolutionizing health and hygiene in the countryside.

The administration of NREGA can improve further with a dedicated Programme Management Unit (envisaged, but still not done at many places) at all the levels including districts, blocks and Gram Panchayats. There is also a need for proper utilization of the six per cent contingency provided for provisioning of the requisite infrastructures and manpower required for better programme implementation. Fund flow to various programme implementing agencies (PIAs) has to improve with proper coordination among the District Programme Management Unit, banks, post offices and all other stake-holders concerned. 

Newer NREGA schemes should be taken up. Such schemes may include solid waste management, more individual benefit schemes, drainage system, construction of model houses (of specific value a la IAY), sanitary toilets, kitchen gardens, rural hats, repair and maintenance of government building including construction of boundary walls. Self help groups (SHGs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) need to be involved in a huge way in various ways in implementations of the schemes including monitoring, work measurement and social auditing of the scheme.

Approved and vetted shelf of schemes should be ready for better and faster implementation of the NREGA schemes. Also, there is a need for the proper planning for all the seasons of the year. Still, the focus seems to be on expenditure of maximum money under NREGA but as it is a demand-driven scheme, the focus should be to generate employment for the unemployed and under-employed to prevent them from emigrating to the urban areas while also creating valuable assets in the countryside.

If NREGA has to be successful in realizing its programme objectives, then these concerns and problems, as mentioned above, need to be addressed sooner rather than later. One just hopes that with regular monitoring, social auditing and proper accounting coupled with some positive changes required in the light of the experiences gained during its operation over the years, NREGA can really become an effective answer to many of the problems for India’s poor masses.